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Funciones Binarias 
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Resumen 
El problema del carnbio sobre cuerpos de informaci6n es realmente interesante. 
La legislaci6n se encuentra en constante modificacibn, nuevos descubrimientos 
modifican a las teorias cientificas y 10s robots deben actualiaar su representacibn 
del mundo cada vez que un sensor adquiere nuevos datos. La teorh del carnbio 
de teorias ofrece un modelo para estos procesos bajo ciertas idealizaciones. 
Se asume un lenguaje formal y una noci6n de consecuencia Mgica. La nueva 
informaci6n es expresada como enunciados en el lenguaje Mgico. Conjuntos 
de enunciados clausurados por la operaci6n de consecuencia 16gica, es decir, 
teorias, son modificadas por medio de funciones. Estas toman un conjunto 
y un enunciado y retornan el conjunto actualizado. Las funciones de carnbio 
responden a un principio fundamental: consistencia 16gica. El resultado de un 
carnbio debe ser siempre un conjunto de enunciados mutuamente consistentes. 
En 1985 Alchourr6n, Gardenfors y Makinson (en adelante AGM) fueron 
autores de lo que seria la referencia clbica sobre el tema [Alchourr6n et al., 
19851. Concibieron funciones que, bajo la rnAxima de consistencia, retornan 
teorias que preservan lo m b  posible de las teorias originales y contemplan la 
nueva informacibn. Las teorias no deben ser modificadas m b  all6 de lo necesario. 
La relaci6n de inclusi6n entre conjuntos no es suficiente como criterio de minima 
pkrdida inforrnacional porque, en general, hay inifinitas teorias mutuamente 
incornparables con respecto a la relaci6n de inclusi6n. Por lo tanto puede resultar 
imposible seleccionar una linica como la m b  preservativa. En consecuencia las 
funciones AGM deben realizar una selecci6n no determinktica o codificar al*n 
otro criterio de selecci6n. 
A1 menos en dos respectos la teoria AGM esti  indefinida. En primer lugar 
las teorias de carnbio de teorias deben enfrentarse con el prablerna de la iteracidn 
del cambio. Las funciones AGM modelan carnbios singulares, toman una teoria 
y retornan una teorh actualizada, realizan un solo paso. Pero tarde o temprano, 
habrb otro carnbio que inducirb una nueva teoda. Es decir, se deberi actualizar 
la teoria ya actualizada. Aunque el formalismo AGM no prohibe la iteraci6n de 
sus funciones omite toda especificaci6n de c6mo debe realizarse o cudes son las 
propiedades del cambio sucesivo. 
El otro frente indefinido en el formalismo AGM es el problema del cambio 
e n  mdltiples teodus. Si dos teorias no son independientes, es de esperar que 
las operaciones de carnbio respectivas tampoco lo sean. Por ejemplo, si un 
teoria estb incluida en la otra podria esperarse que el carnbio de la primera 
este incluho en el carnbio de la segunda. Algunas propiedades de coherencia 
deberian vincular la operaci6n de carnbio sobre distintas teorias. Este es el tema 
central de esta tesis. 
Aunque las funciones AGM proveen una nocidn coherente de cambio para 
teorias tomadas separadamente, estas funciones no necesariamente son conjun- 
tamente coherentes. Esta es una limitaci6n seria del formalismo AGM y el 
presente trabajo estb dedicado a superar esta limitaci6n. Este problema no ha 
sido considerado en la teo& AGM y tampoco ha sido objeto de investigacidn 
en el kea.  Tras argumentar que las funciones AGM son en realidad funciones 
unarias (de aridad uno) relativas a la teoria a ser modificada, en este trabajo 
se proponen autenticas funciones binarias para el carnbio de teorias. El tkrmino 
binario se refiere a funciones de dos argumentos, es decir de aridad dos. 
Las funciones binarias resuelven el problema del carnbio en mliltiples teorias, 
y siendo definicionalmente simples, tambien resuelven en cierta medida el prob- 
lema de la iteraci6n del cambio. Dado que las funciones binarias e s t h  definidas 
para toda teoria, el resultado de aplicar una funci6n es a su vez otra teoria que 
puede ser puesta como argument0 de la misma funci6n. En consecuencia, las 
funciones binarias inducen un esquema de carnbio iterado que es deterrninistico 
respecto de 10s argumentos de la funcibn. Este comportamiento, que ha sido 
interpretado como carente de memoria histbrica, no siempre resulta deseable. 
Es una preocupaci6n actual entre 10s investigadores del Area la blisqueda de 
un modelo general de iteracibn, un linico conjunto de postulados que gobiernen 
el carnbio reiterado, en el mismo espkitu que 10s de AGM gobiernan cambios 
singulares. Luego de catorce aiios de la formulaci6n de la teoria AGM se han 
planteado varias formalizaciones alternativas que difieren en sus virtudes y de- 
fectos, pero se desconoce si tales postulados dnicos han de existir; tal vez no 
haya una linica regularidad que deba ser expuesta. 
Dentro de la teoria AGM existen dos funciones binarias que gozan de mliltiples 
propiedades, pero se corresponden con casos limites de funciones de cambio 
aceptables; estas son la funci6n de expansi6n y las funciones AGM full meet 
[Alchourrbn and Makinson, 19821. Fuera de la tradici6n AGM, Katsuno y 
Mendelzon han formalizado su operaci6n de update [ ~ a t s u n o  and Mendelzon, 
19921 como una funci6n binaria para el cambio de teorias. Las operaciones de 
update y revisi6n AGM denotan dos tipos de cambio que han sido considerados 
fundamentalmente diferentes. La funci6n de revisibn se ha considerado propicia 
para modelizar el proceso de refinamiento o correcci6n de una representacibn 
de objetos que permanecen estAticos. En contraste, la operaci6n de update 
modeliza la noci6n de cambio sobre la representaci6n de objetos que e s t h  en 
evoluci6n. En esta tesis se estudian en detalle las vinculaciones formales de 
ambas operaciones. 
Apartfindose de la tradici6n AGM la operacibn de update estfi definida como 
un conectivo binario sobre un lenguaje basado en un conjunto finito de variables 
proposicionales. Se demuestra que nada crucial depende de &to, ya que es posi- 
ble reformular la operaci6n de update como una funcion binaria que toma una 
teork y un enunciado y retorna una teoria. Sin embargo se exhibe un resultado 
inesperado: 10s postulados de Katsuno y Mendezon son incompletos para carac- 
terizar la funci6n de update para lenguajes proposicionales infinitos. Se provee 
un conjunto apropiado de postulados, reforzando 10s originales, y se demuestra 
el correspondiente teorema de representaci6n para lenguajes posiblemente infini- 
tos. De esta manera se extiende el trabajo original de Katsuno y Mendelzon que 
estaba definido solo para el caso finito. Los resultados encontrados completan 
y clarifican 10s de [Peppas and Williams, 19951, quienes ya habian notado que 
10s postulados originales de update eran incompletos para lenguajes de primer 
orden. Adicionalmente se consigue que las operaciones de revisi6n AGM y la de 
update queden en una misma base definicional, permitiendo su comparaci6n y 
mejor comprensi6n, cuando la naturaleza de la diferencia es aiin una pregunta 
abierta en la literatura de 16gica filos6fica. 
En este trabajo se proponen dos familias de funciones binarias que extienden 
el formalismo AGM: las funciones AGM iterables y las AGM analkicas. Ambas 
se definen sobre lenguajes posiblemente infinitos, mediante postulados que ex- 
tienden a 10s de AGM y para ambas se demuestran teoremas de representacibn 
sobre distintas estructuras formales. 
Las funciones AGM iterables tienen la peculiaridad de ser funciones casi 
constantes sobre el primer argumento cuando el segundo estb fijo. A pesar de 
su simpleza proveen una fuerte noci6n de coherencia con respecto a1 carnbio 
en distintas teonas. De acuerdo con las funciones AGM iterables el carnbio 
en una teoria depende del carnbio de la teoda m h  grande de todas, que es el 
conjunto de todos 10s enunciados del lenguaje. Se demuestra que las funciones 
AGM iterables satisfacen muchas propiedades, tanto para el carnbio de mliltiples 
teorh como para el carnbio reiterado. 
Las funciones AGM analiticas son funciones binarias de mayor complejidad 
definicional que las iterables. Son casi mon6tonas sobre su primer argumento 
cuando el otro estb fijo, sin ser funciones constantes ni casi constantes. La 
operaci6n de cambio analitica puede calcularse por medio de un andisis por 
casos, con la propiedad de que si una teorh es extensi6n de otra, 10s casos 
considerados para la primera son tambiQn casos para la segunda. Una subclase 
de funciones analiticas es la de las maxi-analiticas, cuya caracterlstica es que 
mapean teorlas completas en teorias completas. Las funciones anallticas son 
candidatas interesantes para el carnbio en distintas teorias y tambiBn satisfacen 
relevantes propiedades del carnbio iterado. 
Pero las funciones anallticas poseen ademh otro inter6s. Proveen una conexidn 
formal entre la operaci6n de update de Katsuno y Mendelzon y la revis6n de 
AGM. La revisi6n AGM analitica se basa en el aparato semAntico de update, 
y de este mod0 establece un puente entre dos formalizaciones aparentemente 
incomparables. 
Por liltimo la tesis provee un resultado de unificaci6n de dos cAlculos Mgicos 
para la teoria AGM: las 16gicas CO [~outilier, 19921 y DFT [Alchourrbn, 19951. 
A partir de la noci6n de consecuencia ldgica ambas Mgicas pueden usarse para 
calcular cambios en diferentes teogas. Y aunque las dos son Mgicas condi- 
cionales, difieren. La sembntica de CO es relational mientras que la de DFT no 
lo es. TambiBn difieren en la definicibn del conectivo condicional. Se demuestra 
que, bajo condiciones restrictivas apropiadas, las dos Mgicas son equivalentes. 
En su rol de 16gicas para el carnbio de teorias, las ocurrencias anidadas del 
condicional sugieren una funci6n de carnbio que admite iteraci6n. Pero resulta 
claro rapidamente que dicha funci6n es trivial. 
La tesis plantea direcciones de trabajo futuro, principalmente sugiriendo la 
definici6n de nuevas funciones binarias para el carnbio de teorias y la posibilidad 
de proveer un calculo 16gico para las funciones AGM iterables y anallticas. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The problem of change in corpora of information is indeed interesting. Legisla- 
tion is under constant modification, new discoveries reshape scientific theories 
and robots have to update their representation of the world each time a sensor 
gains new data. The theory of theory change offers a model for these processes 
under certain idealizations. 
A formal language and a notion of logical consequence relation are assumed. 
New information is expressed as sentences in the logical language. Sets of sen- 
tences closed under logical consequence, i.e. theories, are changed by functions. 
These take a theory and a sentence and return an updated theory. There is a 
leading principle for change functions: consistency. The result of a change by a 
consistent sentence should always be a consistent theory. 
In 1985 Alchourr6n, Gardenfors and Makinson (henceforth "AGM") pub- 
lished the article that became the classical reference in the literature on theory 
change [Alchourr6n et al., 19851. They conceived change functions that, under 
the maxim of consistency, preserve as much as possible of the original the- 
ory while accounting for the new information; theories should not be changed 
beyond necessity. Subset inclusion among theories alone is not enough as a 
criterion of minimal information loss because, in general, infinitely many theo- 
ries are incomparable with each other with respect to set inclusion. Hence, it 
may be impossible to select a single one as the most preservative. As a result 
AGM functions must commit to a nondeterministic choice or else encode some 
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other criteria for selection. The work of Alchourr6n, Gkdenfors and Makinson 
created a whole new area of research, also referred to as belief revision (see for 
example, [Gardenfors, 19881, [Gkdenfors, 19921). 
At least in two respects the AGM theory is underdefined. One is the problem 
of iterated change. AGM functions model single changes, they take one given 
theory to an updated theory, they perform one single step. But there will be yet 
another change after the one just considered that will induce yet another theory. 
That is, we will have to update the already updated theory. Although the 
AGM formalism does not forbid the iteration of change functions, it omits any 
specification of how it should be performed or what the properties of successive 
change are. 
The other is the problem of change in multiple theories. If two theories are 
not independent of one another we may expect the respective change operations 
not to be independent either. For example, if one theory is included in another, 
we may expect that the change of the first be included in the change of the 
other. Some coherence properties should linking the change operation over 
different theories. This is the central topic of this thesis. This problem has 
hardly been addressed by the AGM theory and it has not been the object of 
much investigation in the theory change community either. 
In this thesis we will propose change functions that are defined for every 
theory and every formula. As we will stay within the AGM framework, we will 
refer to them as binary AGM functions. We use the term binary to mean that 
they are functions of arity two; they take a theory and a formula and return 
a theory. In particular we will provide two specific formulations, two signifi- 
cant subclasses of binary AGM functions. We will establish a relation between 
the problem of iterated change and the problem of change in multiple theories 
and we will propose binary AGM functions as a definitionally simple scheme 
of iterated change. Clearly, binary functions can account for successive change 
because a theory returned by one application of a binary function is yet a pos- 
sible argument of the same function. If our simple solution for iterated change 
possesses enough virtues (for a class of problems at hand) then the maxim of 
parsimony in science will have been achieved. Otherwise, if it oversimplifies the 
problem, it will be justified to commit to a more complex solution. 
1.1. THE THEORY OF THEORY CHANGE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 3 
1.1 The Theory of Theory Change in Computer 
Science 
Computer programs are finite sequences of symbols that are expected to perform 
some task. Thus, programs can be taken to be a symbolic representation of their 
output. We may face two different reasons for changing a program. One is when 
the program's output differs from what we expected it to do. We usually say that 
the program is incorrect with respect to its specifications, or that it "has bugs". 
Correcting the program, also referred as "debugging", leads to new versions 
of the program until one (hopefully) reaches a final version that performs the 
desired task. 
A different reason to modify a program is when we are given a new speci- 
fication of what our program should do. Even though our program was sound 
with respect to some original specification, it should now be changed to match 
an updated specification. It is not that our program was incorrect, but there is 
something different that should be accounted for. 
The two examples above illustrate two different forms of changing represen- 
tations. The theory of theory change offers a model of the dynamics of represen- 
tations. AGM change functions, specially AGM revisions, have been considered 
suitable for correcting representations, but not for modeling changes produced 
by evolving specifications. A suitable operation for these kinds of changes has 
been proposed by Katsuno and Mendelzon [1992], and the two operations have 
been taken as representative of fundamentally different forms of theory change. 
The theory of theory change was rapidly included in Artificial Intelligence 
(AI). According to the the declarative or logical school, as portrayed by [Hayes, 
19851 or [ ~ o o r e ,  19821, when solving problems in A1 we start from a represen- 
tation of a problem. But such a representation may only be applicable if we 
can understand and model how to update it in light of new information. The 
state of a program is expected to be in constant change, reflecting the diverse 
inputs from the world. Theories of theory change are relevant to A1 addressing 
this issue. 
But why a representation must be a set of sentences in some logic? As 
explained by Boutilier [1992a], of course any formal system will do when it 
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comes to characterizing in a principled manner the reasoning performed by a 
program, and logic should be accorded no special status in this regard. If a set 
of differential equations will accurately model the behaviour of a program, why 
bother with logical accounts? While prediction of behaviour might be accurate 
within any formal system, it is the model-theoretic semantics of logics that give 
logical representations their advantage in understanding behaviour. Clearly 
formal semantics provides no real meaning to sentences (see [ ~ u t n a m ,  1970]), it 
is merely the mapping of one mathematical structure (the logical language) into 
another (an interpretation of the language). These so-called models may be any 
structure whatsoever. What different but equivalent representations are useful 
for is to grasp a problem from different perspectives. Logics are equipped with 
formal semantics that justify the notion of consequence in the logic. However, 
we require no actual commitment by a system to give an explicit representation 
in terms of logical sentences and to reason with a general purpose theorem 
prover, only that such a system be able to be understood in such terms. 
1.2 Thesis Overview 
Throughout we will assume some familiarity with classical propositional logic 
and with the AGM theory. In Chapter 2 we will introduce notational conven- 
tions and review the background concepts that will be needed. We will briefly 
present the definitions and results of theory change that we will be concerned 
with. 
In Chapter 3 we will formally present the two main problems discussed in 
this thesis. On the one hand, the problem of change in multiple theories, which 
was originally considered by Alchourr6n and Makinson in their article on Safe 
Contractions [Alchourrbn and Makinson, 19851. Since then, this problem has 
not been the object of much attention in the literature and the existing exam- 
ples of functions that provide coherent change in multiple sets were motivated 
by unrelated concerns. The problem arises because AGM defined functions that 
are relative to a specific given theory and may be inapplicable to another. On 
the other hand, the problem of iterated change. Also in the same article on 
Safe Contractions appears the very first reference to successive application of 
1.2. THESIS OVERVIEW 
change operators. In contrast to the problem of change in multiple theories, this 
has become a very relevant theme and there is already an important amount 
of literature about it. Instead of surveying the different approaches to iterated 
change we will isolate a set of significant properties arising from different pro- 
posals. Our contribution in this chapter will be to show that although the AGM 
model has been criticized for not addressing the problem of iterated change, it 
is in fact compatible with iteration. In particular we will show how the subclass 
of AGM functions that solves the problem of change in multiple sets, provides a 
simple scheme of iterated change. We will dub the functions in this class binary 
AGM functions. 
A main concern among researchers studying iterated change is whether there 
is a unique general model, a single set of properties in the same spirit AGM 
postulated functions for single changes. Fourteen years after the inception of the 
AGM theory we find several alternative formalizations differing in their virtues 
and defects, but remains unknown whether there could exist such a uniform 
set of properties of iterated change; perhaps there is no unique regularity to be 
exposed. 
We will devote Chapter 5 to present a result about a distinctive binary 
function authored by Katsuno and Mendelzon [1992], the update operation. 
In contrast to the AGM tradition, Katsuno and Mendelzon have formalized 
their operation as a connective in a finite language - namely, a propositional 
language over a finite set of propositional variables-. In this chapter we will 
reformulate the update operation as a binary function, taking a theory and a for- 
mula to an updated theory. Then we will exhibit an unexpected result: Katsuno 
and Mendelzon's postulates are incomplete to characterize the update function 
for infinite propositional languages. We will then provide the appropriate set 
of postulates, strengthening the original ones, and prove the corresponding r e p  
resentation theorem for possibly infinite propositional languages. This result 
extends and clarifies previous results in the area. 
We will define two families of binary AGM functions. Chapter 4 considers 
AGM functions that are almost constant (on their first argument, the second 
argument held fixed); we will name them iterable AGM functions. We will show 
that despite their definitional simplicity they satisfy a number of significant 
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properties of iterated change. 
Then, in Chapter 6 we will present binary functions that are almost 
monotonous (on their first argument, the second argument held fixed); we will 
name them analyt ic AGM functions. They too satisfy many of properties of 
iterated change but they are definitionally more complex than iterable AGM 
functions. For both, iterable and analytic functions, we will give formulations 
for possibly infinite languages, provide alternative representations and prove 
representation theorems. 
Analytic AGM functions have two main interests. As AGM functions for 
changing multiple theories they possess a significant property. The analytic 
change operation is decomposable in the sense that it can can be calculated by 
means of simpler operations. The other main interest of analytic AGM functions 
is that they provide a formal link between the AGM revision operation and 
Katsuno and Mendelzon's update, when the two have been traditionally taken 
as incomparable frameworks. 
We will devote Chapter 7 to provide a unification result about two logi- 
cal calculus for the AGM theory: DFT [Alchourr6n, 19951 and CO [~outilier, 
1992al. By appealing to the notion of consequence they both allow to calculate 
changes in different theories. Although the two are modal conditional logics, 
they differ. Boutilier's semantics is relational while Alchourr6n's is not. They 
also differ in the definition of their conditional connective. We will prove that, 
under restricting conditions, the two logics are indeed equivalent. In both log- 
ics the nested occurrences of the conditional connective suggest a function of 
iterated change. Unfortunately, DFT and CO are of no help to the problem of 
iterated change since such a function is truly trivial. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 we will summarize the contributions of this thesis and 
examine avenues for further research. 
Chapter 2 
The AGM Theory of 
Theory Change 
Throughout this thesis we will assume knowledge of the AGM theory. In this 
chapter we will briefly present the definitions and results that will be needed 
in subsequent chapters, making emphasis on the alternative presentations of 
the AGM theory. We shall start introducing notational conventions and basic 
definitions. 
2.1 Preliminaries 
If X and Y are sets, a relation R between X and Y is a set of ordered pairs, 
R = {(x, y)lx E X and y E Y}, a subset of the Cartesian product of X x Y. If 
(x, y) E R we shall write xRy. 
A function from X to Y is a relation f such that the domain of f is X and 
for each x E X there is a unique element y in Y with (x, y) E f .  For each x E X 
the unique y E Y is denoted by f(x). From now on we shall write f (x) = y 
instead of (x, y) E f .  The element y is called the value that the function assumes 
at  the argument x. The words map or mapping and operator are sometimes 
used as synonymous for function. The range of f consists of those elements y 
of Y for which there exists an x in X such that f (x) = y. If the range of f 
is equal to Y, then f is surjective. If f maps different elements of the domain 
CHAPTER 2. THE AGM THEORY OF THEORY CHANGE 
to different elements in the range, then f is injective. If f is surjective and 
injective, then it is bijective, establishing a one to one correspondence between 
X and Y. The symbol f : X + Y is used as an abbreviation for " f is a function 
from X to Y." Given a function f : X x Y -+ 2, we will refer to the function 
fZO : Y -+ Z defined f,,(y) = f (xo, y) as the projection of f for a fixed value xo 
of the first argument. Similarly for the second argument, fyo : X -4 Z defined 
fyo(x) = f (x, yo), as the projection of f for a fixed yo E Y .  
A function is unary when it is a function on a single argument. A function is 
called b i n a y  (n-ary), or of two (n) arguments, if it is defined on a set of ordered 
pairs (n-tuples); for example, the sum on the natural numbers is binary. 
We will refer to the following properties of binary relations. Let X be a set, 
and R be a binary relation over elements of X .  
R is irreflexive in X if and only if for all x E X ,  not XRX. 
R is reflexive in X if and only if for all x E X, XRX. 
R is symmetric in X if and only if for all x, y E X if xRy, then yRx. 
R is antisymmetric in X if and only if for all x,y E X ,  xRy and yRx only if 
x = y. 
R is transitive in X if and only if for all x, y, z E X ,  if xRy and yRz then xRz. 
R is connected in X if and only if for all x, y E X if x # y, then xRy or yRx. 
R is totally connected in X if and only if for all x, y E X : xRy or yRx. 
Notice that total connectedness implies reflexivity. 
A relation R over X is virtually connected over Y C X if and only if for every 
x, y, z E Y if xRy then either xRz or zRy. Equivalently, R C X x X is virtually 
connected over Y C X iff its complement R = X x X - R is transitive over Y. 
R is a preorder on X if and only if R is reflexive and transitive. 
R is a partial order on X if and only if R is reflexive, transitive and antisym- 
metric. 
R is a total order on X if an only if R is antisymmetric, transitive and totally 
connected. 
2.1. PRELIMINARIES 
A relation R is well founded on X if every non empty subset of X has a non 
empty subset of R-minimal elements; equivalently, if R is free of infinite de- 
scending chains. 
A relation R on X is acyclic if for any set of elements XI,. . . , x, E X ,  it is not 
the case that x1&czR. . . x , ~ ~ .  Let's notice that for n = 1, acyclicity implies 
irreflexivity. For n = 2 acyclicity implies asymmetricity. 
To denote arbitrary relations that are orders we will use the symbols 4, 5, 
< and 5, sometimes with subscripts. We will write lN for the set of natural 
numbers, 0 for the set of ordinals and R for the reds. 
We assume familiarity with basic notions of propositional logic. We consider 
a classical propositional language L and denote with P the set of all its propo- 
sitional letters. If P is finite we will call L a finite propositional language. The 
symbols A, V, l,>, = will denote the usual truth functional connectives. Indis- 
tinguishably, we will use the terms formula and sentence to refer to an element 
of L. As we only deal with propositional languages the two terms are indeed 
equivalent. Capital letters A, B,  C will be used to denote arbitrary formulae 
of L. We consider Cn a Tarskian consequence operation, a function that takes 
each subset of L to another subset of L such that: 
(inclusion) X G Cn(X). 
(monotony) If X C Y then Cn(X) G Cn(Y). 
(idempotency) Cn(X) G Cn(Cn(X) ) . 
In addition, following [Alchourrbn et al., 19851 we assume Cn on L satisfies: 
(supra classicality) If A can be derived from X by classical truth functional 
logic, then A E Cn(X) . 
(compactness) If A E Cn(X), then A E Cn(Y) for some finite subset Y C X .  
(introduction) If C E Cn(X U {A)) and C E Cn(X U {B)) then C E Cn(X U 
{A V B)). (introduction of disjunction into the premisses). 
Under these assumptions the consequence operation Cn also satisfies the deduc- 
tion theorem, that B E Cn(X U {A)) if and only if (A > B) E Cn(X), 
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A theory is a subset of L closed under Cn. Capital letters K ,  K', H are used 
for theories of L, and we denote by K the set of all theories of L. While L is 
the largest theory, Cn(0) is the smallest. A subset X of L is consistent (modulo 
Cn) iff for no formula A do we have (A A 1A) E Cn(X). A theory is complete 
if it sanctions a truth value for each propositional letter. 
We take W as the set of all maximal consistent subsets of L, that is, the set of 
all complete consistent extensions of L. The valuation function [ ] : L + P(W) 
is defined as usual, for any propositional letter p, w E Ipj iff p E w. Given 
A E L we denote by [A] the proposition for A, or the set of A-worlds, the 
set of elements of W satisfying A. For the purposes of this work we consider 
the terms maximal consistent subset of L, valuation on L and possible world, 
interchangeable. This, of course, amounts to working with models that are 
injective with respect to the interpretation function (no two distinct worlds 
satisfy exactly the same formulae) and full (every consistent set of formulae is 
satisfied by some world). If K is a theory, [K] denotes the set of possible worlds 
including K.  Given U a set of possible worlds, Th(U) returns the associated 
theory. 
We will say that a subset X of W is Lnameable whenever there exists a 
formula A in L such that X = [A]. When working with relations on W, we 
will often refer to a property that Lewis [1973] called the limit assumption. 
A preorder relation R on W satisfies the limit assumption if and only if for 
any satisfiable formula A in L there exists a set of R-minimal A-words. This 
requirement is in general weaker than the well foundedness condition. The limit 
assumption just requires that L-nameable non empty subsets of W have set of 
minimal elements, as opposed to requiring so for every subset of W. 
2.2 AGM Functions 
A comprehensive introduction to the AGM theory can be obtained in 
[Gkdenfors, 1988; Gkdenfors, 1992; Hansson, 19981. 
Three are the operations advocated by the AGM model [Alchourr6n et al., 
19851: expansions, revisions and contractions. The first two deal with "accom- 
modating" a new formula into the current theory, while the third is a "removing" 
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operation. Expansion is the simplest form of theory change. It is a simple addi- 
tion function, where a new formula A, hopefully consistent with a given theory 
K ,  is set theoretically added to K and this expanded set is closed under logical 
consequence. The function + : K x L + K is defined as K + A = Cn(K U {A)). 
The expansion function can also be characterized by the following postulates 
[Gkdenfors, 19821. 
(K+l) K + A is a theory. (closure) 
(K+2) A E K + A. (success) 
(K+3) K E K + A. (inclusion) 
(K+4) If A E K then K + A = K.  (vacuity) 
(K+5) If K H, K + A H + A. (monotony) 
(K+6) K + A is the G-smallest theory that satisfies closure, success, and in- 
clusion. (minimality) 
The AGM contraction and revision operations have a more subtle definition. 
The contraction function - takes a theory K and a formula A and returns the 
contracted theory, notated as K - A. Contractions are changes in a theory 
that involve giving up some formulae without incorporating new ones. When 
retracting a formula A from K ,  there may be other formulae in K that entail 
A (or other formulae that jointly entail A without separately doing so). In 
order to keep K - A closed under logical consequence, it is necessary to give 
up A and other formulae as well. The problem is to determine which formulae 
should be given up and which should be retained. In contrast to expansion, 
the explicit construction of AGM contraction functions is not so direct. AGM 
developed postulates that fully characterize the contraction functions. The first 
six postulates, (K-1)-(K-6), are called the basic postulates for contraction and 
they characterize partial meet contraction functions. Postulates (K-7) and (K-8) 
are called supplementary, and they impose additional conditions, which give rise 
to transitively relational contraction functions. These functions will be our focus 
of attention. The names of partial meet functions originated in the method for 
constructing the functions, that we shall review in the next section. 
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(K-1) K - A is a theory. (closure) 
(K-2) K - A C K. (inclusion) 
(K-3) If A @ K ,  then K - A = K .  (vacuity) 
(K-4) If not Cn(A) = Cn(0) then A # K - A. (success) 
(K-5) If A E K ,  then K C ( K  - A) +A. (recovery) 
(K-6) If Cn(A) = Cn(B) then K - A = K - B. (preservation) 
(K-7) (K - A) n ( K  - B) c K - (A A B). (conjunctive overlap) 
(K-8) If A 6 K - (A A B), then K - (A A B)  G K - A. (conjunctive inclusion) 
The conjunction of postulates (K*7) and (K*8) is equivalent to the Ventilation 
property reported in [Alchourrbn et al., 19851, which provides a factoring on the 
contraction by a conjunction from a theory. 
(Ventilation) For all A and B ,  K-(AAB) = K-A, or K- (AA B) = K- B 
o r K - ( A A B ) = K - A n K - B .  
The AGM revision function * takes a theory K and a formula A to a revised 
theory K * A. The problem here is that the formula A should be added under 
the requirement that the resulting theory be consistent (whenever A is); hence, 
A can not just be set theoretically added to K. Revisions are constrained by 
the following eight postulates [Alchourrbn et al., 19851. 
(K*l) K * A is a theory. (closure) 
(K*2) A E K * A. (success) 
(K*3) K * A 2 K + A. (inclusion) 
(K*4) If -A 9 K then K + A K + A. (vacuity) 
(K*5) K * A = C n ( l )  only if Cn(7A) = Cn(0). (consistency) 
(K*6) If Cn(A) = Cn(B) then K * A = K * B. (preservation) 
(K*7) K * (A A B) C (K * A) + B. (superexpansion) 
(K*8) If TB 4 K * A then (K * A) + B C K * (A A B). (subexpansion) 
As for contractions, the first six are called the basic postulates for revision, 
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and they characterize partial meet revision functions. Postulates (K*7) and 
(K*8) are supplementary and they give rise to transitively relational partial 
meet revision functions. 
A nice feature about revisions and contractions is that they are inter defin- 
able. By the Levi identity revisions can be defined in terms of contractions and 
expansions. This identity defines revisions as first pruning away all potential 
inconsistencies, and then adding the new formula. 
The counterpart of the Levi identity is the Harper identity, which provides 
a definition of contractions in terms of revisions. The formulae in K - A is 
captured as what K and K * 7A have in common. 
It is not hard to verify that the two identities commute. Given the interde- 
finability of revisions and contractions throughout this thesis we will present 
change functions in either the contraction or revision version, indistinctly. 
A crucial remark about the AGM postulates for contraction and revision is 
that they indicate nothing about the behaviour of the functions when applied 
to different theories K E lK. Although change functions are supposedly defined 
as binary functions taking two arguments, a theory K and a formula A, they 
are in fact a family of independent unary functions: 
{*K : L + lK : K E K and *K satisfies K*1-K*8). 
The AGM postulates never refer to revision of different theories, hence the 
functions *K can be totally independent. There are no properties shaping the 
joint behaviour of the different unary functions. To discover what are these 
properties and how they interact is a fundamental issue, and we will return to 
it in subsequent chapters. For the moment it should be clear that postulates 
(K*l)-(K*8) d m  to characterize only the single unary functions *K at a time, 
or equivalently, consider * for a fixed, theory K (similarly so for contractions). 
That is, the postulates constrain the behaviour of the change function with 
respect to all kinds of propositional input but do not deal with varying theories 
(see [ ~ o t t ,  19991 and [Areces and Becher, 19991). 
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The situation is quite different for expansions. The function + is indeed a 
binary function + : IK x L -+ K,  which provides one and the same definition 
for every theory K E K. A strong coherence property links the expansion of 
different theories because set theoretical addition is monotone. 
However, in general * and - are not monotone. If one theory is included 
in another, the revision of the first is not necessarily included in the revision of 
the second: 
(Monotony *): I f H C  K then H * A c K * A .  
Observation 2.1 (follows from [Alchourr6n et al., 19851) If * is a revi- 
sion operation satisfying postulates (K*l), (K*4) and (K*5), in a language ad- 
mitting at least two mutually independent formulae A, B (neither A € Cn(B) 
nor B E Cn(A)) , then monotony fails for *. 
PROOF. Let K = Cn(A, B),  HI = Cn(A), Hz = Cn(B). Assume monotony. 
As Hi C K for i E {1,2), by monotony, HI * T(A A B) K * -(A A B) 
and Hz * l ( A  A B) C K * l ( A  A B). 
By independence, HI = Cn(A) is consistent with l ( A A  B), so HI * l ( A A  
B) = Cn(H1 U {l(A A B))) = Cn(A A TB). 
Likewise, H2 * l ( A  A B) = Cn(H2 U ( - ( A  A B))) = Cn(B A TA).  Hence, 
both (A A 7B)  and ( B  A 1A) are included in K * l ( A  A B). 
Therefore, K * l ( A  A B) is inconsistent. By postulate (K*5), l ( A A  B) is 
then inconsistent, contradicting the independence of A and B. QED 
2.3 Constructions of AGM functions 
In the words of Alchourr6n and Makinson [1982], the postulates characterize 
the change operations by formulating conditions of a more or less inclusional 
or equational nature. They allow for clear intuitions about the processes un- 
der study and the web of interrelations between them. But another approach 
to defining the functions is to seek for explicit constructions. These provide 
some kind of foundation for justifying the intuitions. Originally the work on 
contraction functions and their associated revision functions in terms of explicit 
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constructions was given by Alchourr6n and Makinson in [1982]. The represen- 
tation theorem linking the explicit functions with the postulates was given in 
the celebrated joint paper by the three authors, Alchourr6n, Gardenfors and 
Makinson [1985]. 
2.3.1 Partial Meet Functions 
Let K be a theory and A a language formula. The process of eliminating A from 
the theory is not uniquely defined unless additional specifications are given. In 
general there are many subsets of a set that do not imply a given formula, and 
indeed many maximal such subsets. 
Alchourr6n and Makinson 119821 base the construction of a contraction func- 
tion for theory K and sentence A on the set of maximal subsets of K that fail 
to imply A. They define K I A  as the set of all these maximal subsets. 
Definition 2.2 
K I A = {K' KIA $! Cn(K1) and K' is C_ -maximal with this property). 
By the compactness of Cn it follows that K I A is not empty unless Cn(A) = 
Cn(0); in addition, the elements of K I A are theories. 
Alchourr6n and Makinson give two natural ways to to define contraction 
functions : by intersection and by choice. The full meet contraction is defined 
by putting K - A = n ( K  I A), when K I A is non-empty, and to be K itself 
otherwise. 
Definition 2.3 (Full meet contraction) 
K - A =  
{ FK I A), if K I A # 0. 
otherwise . 
In contrast, they define mazichoice contraction function by putting K -A equal 
to a single element in K I A, whenever K I A is non empty, and K - A = K ,  
otherwise. To come up with the single element of K I A they require a choice 
function that makes the selection (actually, in [Alchourrbn and Makinson, 19821 
this function is referred as a choice contraction that they rename as maxichoice 
in the AGM joint paper [Alchourr6n et al., 19851). As they observed, maxi- 
choice functions have some rather disconcerting properties. In particular the 
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maxichoice revision has the property that for every theory K ,  whether com- 
plete or not, the maxichoice revision of K by A will be complete whenever A 
is a proposition inconsistent with K.  So in general the result of a maxichoice 
revision is a set that is too large. In contrast, the result of a full meet function 
is in general too small. In particular when K is a theory with 1 A  E K the full 
meet revision of K by A yields Cn(A), just the consequences of A. 
Observation 2.4 If * is a full meet revision then for every A E L, 
Cn(A), if 7A E K. K * A =  
Cn(K U {A)), otherwise. 
AGM explain that the full meet operation is very useful as a point of reference, 
as it serves as a natural lower bound of any reasonable change function. As 
a result in [Alchourr6n et al., 19851 they propose partial meet functions, which 
yield the intersection of some nonempty family of maximal subsets of the theory 
that fail to imply the formula being eliminated. 
A partial meet function is based on a selection function sK which returns a 
nonempty subset of a given nonempty set K I A. Let K be a theory, we note 
as sK : L -t P(P(K)) \ {0), a selection function for K I A, for A E L. We 
furthermore require that sK(A) = {K) whenever K I A = 0. The AGM partial 
meet contraction function - is then defined, for a theory K, as follows. 
Definition 2.5 (Partial meet  contraction) 
K - A = n sK(A), where sK is a selection function for K. 
Under this definition the contraction function - is formally characterized by 
the basic AGM postulates (K-1) to (K-6) ([Alchourr6n et al., 19851, Observa- 
tion 2.5.) For - to be characterized by the extended set of postulates, (K-1) 
to (K-8), it suffices that sK be transitively relational, i.e. for each A E L the 
selection function returns the smallest elements according to some transitive 
relation defined over K I A ([Alchourr6n et al., 19851, Corollary 4.5.) Explicit 
constructions of (transitively relational) partial meet revisions are definable via 
the Levi identity, so the representation results apply for revisions as well. 
The AGM theory enjoys three other presentations over quite different formal 
structures. w e  will briefly present them here to be revisited'in the chapters to 
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follow. We will first concentrate on Alchourr6n and Makinson's [1985] contrac- 
t ion function, where they start from a hierarchical ordering over the formulae in 
the theory under change. The connection between safe contractions and tran- 
sitively partial meet contractions was studied by [Alchourrbn and Makinson, 
19861 in the finite case, and extended by [ ~ o t t ,  1992al for the general case. In 
addition, safe contraction functions were later generalized by [~ansson,  19941 
under the name of incision functions. 
Then we will focus on epistemic entrenchment orderings, originally defined 
by Gardenfors [1984]. The representation theorem linking the change func- 
tions based on epistemic entrenchment relations and partial meet functions was 
proved in [~ak inson  and Gardenfors, 19881. 
Next we will concentrate on the systems of spheres proposed by [Grove, 
19881. They provide a kind of possible worlds semantics for AGM func- 
tions. This representation result allowed later for the connection established by 
[~outilier, 1992a] between AGM functions and modal conditional logics. Grove's 
formalization has been of great insight for us too, most of our definitions were 
firstly considered in systems of spheres. 
2.3.2 Safe Contraction Functions 
Alchourr6n and Makinson [1985] construct a contraction function based on a 
hierarchical ordering in the language. They based the idea on their previous 
work on hierarchies of regulations and their logic [Alchourrbn and Makinson, 
19811. 
Let K be a theory, <, a non-circular relation over K and A a formula in L 
we wish to eliminate from K. An element is safe with respect to A (modulo <,f 
and given some background Cn) iff it is not a minimal element under <, of any 
minimal subset (under set inclusion) H K such that A E Cn(H). They define 
the safe contraction of K by A as the set of safe elements of K with respect to 
A. Let's study some details. . 
A binary relation <,,over a set K is a hierarchy if it is acyclic: for any set of 
elements Al l . .  . ,A, E K, n > 1, it is not the case that Al <, Az <, . . .A,  <, 
Al. 
A relation over K continues up Cn if for every All A2, A3 E K, if Al <sf 
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A2 and A3 E Cn(A2) then A1 <, A3. 
A relation <, over K continues down Cn if for every Al,A2,A3 E K, if 
A2 E Cn(A1) and A2 <, A3 then A1 <,As. 
A relation <, over K is virtually connected if for every A1, Az, A3 E K if 
A1 <, A2 then either A1 <, A3 or Ag <, A2. 
Let <, be a virtually connected hierarchy over a theory K that continues 
up and down Cn, and let A be a sentence in L. The safe contraction function 
-, is defined as: 
Definition 2.6 (Safe contraction) 
K -,A = Cn({BI VK1 C K, s.t. A E Cn(K1) and K' is -minimal with 
this property, B $ K1 or there is C E K' s.t. C B)).  
The elements of K -,A are called the safe elements of K with respect to A 
since they can not be "blamed" for implying A. An element is safe for A if it 
does not belong to any of the C-minimal subsets of K that imply A, or else it 
is not <,,=minimal in the hierarchy in such subsets. 
Alchourr6n and Makinson [1985] show that every safe contraction over a 
theory K is a partial meet contraction function over K .  They also prove the 
converse result for finite theories (in the sense that the consequence operation 
Cn partitions the elements of K into a finite number of equivalence classes). 
The general case (finite and infinite theories) was proved by [Rott, 1992al. The 
following representation theorem links safe contractions contractions and partial 
meet functions. 
Observation 2.7 ([~lchourrbn and Makinson, 1986; Rott, 1992al) 
Every contraction function - over K satisfying the (K-1)-(K-8) can be 
represented as a safe contraction function -sf generated by a hierarchy <,f that 
is virtually connected and continues up and down Cn. 
2.3.3 Epistemic Entrenchments 
An epistemic entrenchment for a theory K is a total relation among the formulae 
in the language reflecting their degree of relevance in K and their usefulness 
when performing inference. The following five conditions are required for an 
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epistemic entrenchment relation 5, for a theory K [Gkdenfors, 1984; Makinson 
and Gardenfors, 19881: 
(EE1) If A I,, B and B I., D then A 5,  D. 
(EE2) If B E Cn(A) then A 5, B. 
(EE3) A See (AA B)  or B 5, (AA B). 
(EE4) If theory K is consistent then A 9 K iff A 5, B for every B. 
(EE5) If B 5, A for every B then A E Cn(0). 
The associated interpretation is that the epistemic entrenchment of a sentence 
is tied to its overall informational value within the theory. For example, lawlike 
sentences generally have greater epistemic entrenchment than accidental gener- 
alizations. When forming contractions, the formulae that are retracted are those 
with the lowest epistemic entrenchment. Tautologies are the most entrenched, 
hence they are never given up. 
For any given relation I,, for a consistent theory K ,  the formulae in K are 
ranked in I,, while all the formulas outside K have the <,,-minimal epistemic 
value. That is, by (EE4) for a consistent theory K ,  all the formulas outside 
K are zeroed in 5,. However, (EE4) is vacuous for the contradictory theory 
L. (EE1)-(EE3) imply connectivity, namely, either A I,, B or B 5, A (the 
epistemic entrenchment ordering will cover all the sentences). 
The AGM contraction function -,, based on an epistemic entrenchment 
relation <, for K ,  is defined as follows. 
Definition 2.8 (Epistemic entrenchment contraction) For every formula 
A in L, 
K - , A =  { B E  KIA€Cn((d) or A<,(AVB)),  
where <, is the strict relation obtained from I,,. 
The representation result shows that a revision function can be constructed by 
means of an epistemic entrenchment ordering on the language. 
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Observation 2.9 ([Makinson and Giirdenfors, 19881) A contraction 
function - for K satisfies (K-1)-(K-8) iff there exists an epistemic en- 
trenchment relation for K satisfying (EE1)-(EE5) such that for all A € L, 
K - A = K - , , A .  
2.3.4 Systems of Spheres 
Among the alternative presentations of the AGM theory, Grove's 119881 provides 
a possible worlds semantics systems of spheres. A system of spheres SK centered 
on a theory K is a subset of P (W)  containing W, totally ordered under set 
inclusion, such that [K] is the C-minimal element of SK. A system SK should 
validate the limit assumption, in the sense that for every satisfiable formula A 
in the language there exists a C-minimal sphere in sK (written as cK (A)) with 
non-empty intersection with [A].  
Definition 2.10 (System of spheres) A system of spheres SK centered on 
theory K is a set of sets of possible worlds that verifies the properties: 
(Sl)  If U, V E S then U C V or V U. (totally ordered.) 
(S2) For every U E S, [K] C U. (minimum.) 
(S3) W E S.  (maximum.) 
(S4) For every sentence A such that there is a sphere U in SK with [A] n U # 
0, there is a C_-minimal sphere V in S such that [A] n V # 0. (limit 
assumption.) 
For any sentence A, if [A] has a non-empty intersection with some sphere in SK 
then by (S4) there exists a minimal such sphere in SK, say cK(A). But, if [A] 
has an empty intersection with all spheres, then it must be the empty set (since 
(S3) assures W is in SK), in this case cK is put to be just W. Given a system 
of spheres SK and a formula A, cK is defined as: 
if [A] = 0 
cK (A) = 
the C -minimal sphere S' in SK s.t. Sf n [A] # 0 otherwise. i w  
A system SK determines a contraction function -,, for K in the sense that for 
every formula A E L and every w E W, w E [K -,, A] iff w E (cK (A) n [A]) U [K]. 
2.3. CONSTRUCTIONS OF AGM FUNCTIONS 
Definition 2.11 (Sphere contraction) Let SK be a system of spheres cen- 
tered on K .  For every formula A in L, 
K -,, A = ~ h ( ( c ~  (A) n [A]) U [K]). 
Grove proves the following representation result. 
Observation 2.12 ([Grove, 19881, Theorems 1,2) - is a revision function 
for K satisfying (K-1)-(K-8) iff there exists a system of spheres SK centered on 
K such that for all formulas A E L, K - A = K -, A. 
The same approach can be used to model revision functions. If we define K *A 
as the theory of (cK (A) n [A]), by means of the Levi identity we obtain the 
representation theorem for contraction. 
Let's turn now to a subclass of AGM functions, the subclass generated by 
well founded systems of spheres. A system of spheres SK is well founded if 
c is a well founded relation on SK, that is for every subset of X C W there 
exists C-minimal sphere in SK intersecting X. In contrast general systems of 
spheres establish the requirement only for nameable subsets of W - actually we 
require nameability by a single formula rather than a set of formulae -. Following 
[peppas, 19931 we refer to revision functions definable over a well founded system 
of spheres as well behaved revision functions. All revision functions for theories 
over a finite propositional language are well behaved. But it is well known that 
well founded systems of spheres do not capture all AGM revision functions. This 
is perspicuously proved by Peppas in [1993] who exhibits a first order theory 
K and a revision function * for K such that no well founded system of spheres 
represents *. Peppas characterizes well behaved revision functions the following 
postulate. 
(K*WB) For every nonempty set X of consistent formulae of L there exists a 
formula A E X such that 1 A  $L K * (A V B), for every B E X. 
Peppas proves the following. 
Observation 2.13 ([Peppas, 19931, Theorem 5.4.3) Let * be a revision 
function satisfying (K-1)-(K-8). Then * is well behaved iff it satisfies (K*WB) 
for every theory K of L. 
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It is up to now unclear how strong is the restriction to well behaved revision 
functions. 
It is possible to recast a system of spheres centered in [K] as a total preorder 
5 over W, having the elements of [K] as minimal elements, and satisfying the 
limit assumption (every Enameable subset of W must have some 5-minimal 
element). Without loss of generality then a system of spheres centered in [K] can 
be seen as a function from W to any totally ordered set with smallest element. 
This set can be taken to be El+, be the set of positive real numbers including 
0, but not necessarily so. We define d~ : W + R+ that decorates with real 
numbers the nested spheres of a Grove system. 
Observation 2.14 For every system of spheres SK there is a function d~ on 
El+ such that 
dK(v) < ~ K ( w )  iff ( 3 4 ,  S 2  E sK)(v E SI, w E Sz and SI C S2), and 
dK(v) = ~ K ( w )  iff (QSi E SK)(w E Si * v E Si). 
These functions provide a notion of distance from theories to worlds: If dK (w) < 
dK(v) then w is closer than v or "more consistent" with the current theory K. 
And this measure can be naturally extended to functions over sets of worlds 
(propositions), by requiring the value assigned to a set X to be the smallest value 
assigned to the worlds in X.  Special consideration is required if X is empty. 
Let now SK be any system of spheres and dK any real function corresponding 
to it as in Observation 2.14 above. We first extend dK to any subset of W as 
follows. Define dK : P(W) -t R+ as: 
In order to represent a system of spheres by a function dK we should impose the 
limit assumption on dK. For every nameable subset X , dK(X) must be defined. 
But if X is not nameable by a single formula then the set {dK(w) : w E X) can 
be infinite, with infinite descending values where the min may be undefined. 
The function dK induces a revision function * such that K * A is the theory 
entailed by the set of A-worlds that are closest to K according to the function 
dK. Then, if we take 
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K * A = Th({w E [A] : ~ K ( w )  = d~( [Al ) ) )  
the revision operation so obtained coincides with the original * operation whose 
semantic model was SK. 
Well founded systems of spheres are free of infinite descending chains of 
spheres. Consequently for these systems the function d~ can be defined over 
the ordinals as opposed to be defined over the reals. For instance Spohn's ordinal 
functions [Spohn, 19871 kK : W -+ 0 straightforwardly represent well founded 
systems of spheres that are centered on a consistent theory. 
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Chapter 3 
Binary Functions for 
Theory Change 
The AGM model has as points of departure a theory to be modified, a formula 
to be considered as new information, and change functions. The framework 
seems to be that of binary functions that when applied to a theory K and a 
formula A return a new theory K'. However, when we study the AGM model, 
we immediately realize that change functions are relative to some given theory. 
Then, a function is applicable to theory K ,  but in general, it is not applicable 
to another theory K'. The situation can be compared, for example, to the 
square root function on the set of Natural numbers. If we define f : PJ + .UV by 
f (n) = fi, the actual domain of f is just the set of perfect squares, because the 
value off  is only defined for natural numbers that are perfect squares, and it is 
undefined otherwise. So f is only partially defined over N. Hence, when AGM 
functions are regarded as binary functions they are just partially defined on the 
set K x L. Once the first argument has been fixed to be a given theory K, the 
function is well defined for every language formula. But it may be undefined 
when the first argument is any other theory. Henceforth the behaviour of AGM 
functions is asymmetrical with the two arguments. For this reason we argue 
that AGM functions are not truly binary and they should be taken to be unary 
functions -K : L + IK. It is possible to consider a binary - : lK x L + K as 
the family of independent unary functions -K, one per theory K, such that 
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- = {-" : L t lK : K E lK and -" satisfies ( K  - 1) - (K - 8)) 
But this family can be arbitrary. The AGM postulates only aim to  constrain the 
behaviour of the indexed unary functions separately without trying to correlate 
them with each other. 
3.1 Change in Multiple Theories 
The problem of change in multiple theories is simply the problem of an appro- 
priate definition of unary change functions that are jointly coherent. Suppose 
we possess some complete set of unary change functions, one for each possible 
theory K E K. Since the AGM postulates provide no correlation between the 
different unary functions we should not expect that the change of one theory be 
significantly related to the change of another. 
But not all AGM functions are alike in this respect. Expansions are sub- 
stantially different to general revisions and contractions. The definition of 
+ : lK x L t lK states that for every K E K and for every A E L, 
K + A = Cn(K U {A)). Expansion is really a function of two arguments, 
identically defined for every theory and every formula just in terms of the con- 
sequence relation. Being based on Cn, + inherits monotony, which definitely 
counts as a coherence property over the change in different theories. 
As it stands in the original partial meet construction presented in [Al- 
chourr6n et  al., 19851, AGM contraction is a unary function relative to a theory 
K ,  -K : L t lK based on a selection function sK depending on K .  
, 
Partial Meet: -K (A) = { ;I~(KIA) i f K I A # 0  
otherwise 
where the set K I A contains the maximal subsets of K that do not imply A 
and the function sK : L t P(P(K))  \ (0) selects a nonempty subset of K I A. 
The limiting case in which the function sK returns the whole set K I A gives 
rise to the full meet contraction function. The selection function sK relative to K 
disappears, yielding a contraction that depends solely on the explicit arguments 
K and A, i.e. if - is a full meet, again we have a binary function - : lK x L t K. 
3.2. ITERATED CHANGE 
Moreover, the representation result states that the full meet contraction function 
is defined as K - A = K n Cn(7A). Like expansions, they depend on no 
underlying structure, relative order or selection function, and are applicable to 
every theory. 
Alchourrdn, Gkdenfors and Makinson have argued that full meet functions 
suffer from too much loss of information and have taken them as a demarcation 
of the limiting case. The question now is whether it is possible to provide binary 
AGM functions which are more interesting than full meet functions. As we will 
remark in Chapter 5, outside the AGM framework there is a vivid example of 
a binary function with a strong coherence property, Katsuno and Mendelzon's 
update function. In Chapters 4 and 6 we will present two different formulations 
of binary AGM functions, one is based on Alchourrdn and Makinson's safe 
contraction [1985], the other inspired in the update function. 
3.2 Iterated Change 
The motivation to consider successive change is indisputable. A change op- 
eration takes a theory to a modified theory. But eventually there will be yet 
another change after the one just considered that will induce yet another theory. 
Hence we will have to update the already updated theory. This problem has 
been dubbed the problem of iterated theory change. 
A pertinent criticism of the AGM formalism is its lack of definition with 
respect to iterated change ( see [Halpern and F'riedman, 19961 and Rott [1999; 
19981). The iteration of revisions, contractions and expansions separately is 
significant, and even more so the consideration of sequences of different kinds of 
change. Although the AGM formalism does not forbid the iteration of change 
functions, it omits any specification of how it should be performed or what the 
properties of successive change are. 
Consider any two formulae A, B, a particular theory K and any AGM change 
function 01 for K (for example 01 may stand as a transitively relational partial 
meet revision for K). In order to calculate the successive changes of K ,  first 
by A and then by B,  we need 01 for K but also the change function 02 relative 
to (K 01 A). The result of the successive change is the theory (K 01 A) 02 B. 
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The application of a change function over a theory that is the result of another 
change operation is referred as an iterated change. 
Once we have understood that AGM change functions are really indexical 
(relative to the theory to be changed), an obvious first attempt to deal with 
iteration presents itself. If we possess beforehand the complete set of unary 
change functions, one for each possible theory, we can freely perform successive 
changes. But beware, if there are no coherence properties linking the different 
change functions the result obtained can be unexpected and the corresponding 
behavior erratic. The whole point is then to investigate ways to coordinate these 
different change functions. 
Clearly, binary AGM functions can be trivially iterated, that is, ( K  o A) o B 
is well defined. In particular AGM expansions inherit their capacity of iteration 
directly from the consequence operation. For instance, for any theory K and 
formulae A, B, we have ( K  + A) + B = Cn(Cn(K U {A)) U {B)) = Cn(K U 
{A) U {B))= K + ( A  A B). 
For similar reasons, full meet functions (revisions as well as contractions) also 
validate that (K o A) o B = K o (A A B). The fact that full meet functions can be 
iterated can be taken as an evidence for the compatibility of the AGM theory 
with iterated change. However, these are too specific binary AGM functions 
and the properties they satisfy we do not want them to hold as properties of 
binary AGM functions in general. 
3.2.1 The Property of Historic Memory 
Some advantages of binary functions as a scheme of iterated change are evident: 
they are mathematically elegant, definitionally simple and remain close to the 
AGM model (each time the theory argument is fixed a standard AGM indexical 
function is obtained). But, while formally attractive, binary functions make a 
strong simplifying assumption. Each theory is modified in a predetermined way 
independently of how we have obtained such a theory. A binary change function 
o : R x L -, K is deterministic with respect to the theory to be modified, i.e. 
it satisfies: 
(Functionality) If K = ((HoA1). . .oA,). then KoA = ((HoA1). . .oA,)oA, 
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But if K is really considered an argument of the function o, this is to be expected. 
If f is a function, it is required that f ( a )  = f (b) whenever a = b. This functional 
behavior has been interpreted as a lack of historic memory. Lehmann in [1995] 
refers to this property as a "Non Postulate'' for he considers that interesting 
systems should not make this simplifying assumption. 
In spite of the modesty of binary functions as operators for iterated change, 
they vary in the subtlety of their associated behavior. According to the represen- 
tation results, an AGM change function can be characterized by some ordered 
structure. It can be an ordering of formulae in the object language as in the 
epistemic entrenchment approach, an ordering of possible worlds as in systems 
of spheres or an ordering over maximal consistent sets for partial meet functions. 
From this representation perspective binary AGM functions vary according to 
the sophistication of their associated structure. 
In the simplest case we have binary functions that depend on no order at 
all, as expansion and the full meet functions [Alchourr6n and Makinson, 19821. 
A quite elaborate binary function, outside the AGM framework, is Katsuno and 
Mendelzon's update [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 19921. Based on a fixed set of 
orders of possible worlds (one order relative to each possible world), the update 
function is obtained as a fixed combination of such multiple orders. 
Proposals for iterated change that possess historic memory ought to expand 
the AGM model in such a way that change functions return not only the modified 
theory but also a modified version of the change function, or equivalently, return 
enough information to construct a new change function. Usually a method or 
algorithm to construct the new change function based on the original theory, 
the input formula and the previous change function is specified. 
This can be done in a qualitative way a s  in [~outilier, 1996; Nayak, 1994; 
Segerberg, 19971, or by enriching the model with numbers [Spohn, 1987; 
Williams, 1994; Darwiche and Pearl, 19971. Rott in [1998] englobes them un- 
der the name of iterative functions and gives a thorough comparison. These 
are not really going back to a binary function and returning the theory K to 
its original role of argument. The "construction" method is more flexible than 
considering a binary function. These approaches are very rich - they can avoid 
the functional behaviour of the change. But they are usually complex. In these 
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frameworks, given a theory K and a formula A, the change function associated 
with K o A is not uniquely determined and depends really on a third argument: 
the change function for K. But, as insightfully discussed by [ ~ o t t ,  19991, this 
is a circular description. 
There are two alternative formalizations of iterative functions that circum- 
vent the circularity. One is to consider iterative functions as 
that operate not just over a theory and a formula but on a more complex 
structure: a theory together with the AGM function relative to such theory. 
Depending on the chosen representation, each change function relative to a given 
theory boils down to some ordering relation, over subsets, over formulae, or over 
possible worlds. Let us observe that when working with theories these ordering 
are always infinite relations, which may or may not be finitely specified. The 
AGM idealization has been altered so that these iterative functions are binary 
functions whose first argument is quite complex. They return also a complex 
structure encoding the resulting theory and enough information as to define a 
standard AGM function for it. 
The other alternative formalization for iterative functions is presented by 
[Rott, 19991. He defines iterative functions as unary functions that take a 
sequence of logical formulae and return a plain theory. An iterative change 
function 
assigns for each sequence of input formulae the theory resulting after all the 
successive changes indicated in the sequence. Rott explains that these unary 
functions are relative to a state, a complex structure consisting of a theory 
together with its "changing criteria". Like in the previous formalization a state 
can be regarded as a theory of together with the standard AGM change function 
relative to such a theory. 
Although the signatures of the two formalizations are quite different it is 
possible to visualize any of the above mentioned methods in both of them. We 
regard Rott's formalization as more elegant and closer in spirit to  AGM's. 
3.3. SOME PROPERTIES 
3.3 Some Properties 
Clearly, we expect that not any binary function will qualify as coherent. Only 
those constrained in a certain way ought to be admissible theory change func- 
tions. In the words of [Rott, 19991, ". . . The most general idea to express con- 
ditions of coherence seems to be that the change function should be a structure 
preserving function, a morphism, in the sense that the values of the function 
stand in some special relation whenever the arguments of the function stand in 
a special relation." As we already argued, AGM postulates can be regarded as 
coherence constraints over the unary functions separately. In this section we 
will review many properties that have been presented in the literature, which 
will be of interest in the next chapters. 
Properties of Binary Functions 
We will first examine a property that was originally studied in [Alchourrbn and 
Makinson, 19821 as an intuitive property for change functions. By means of the 
Levi identity we know that AGM revisions can be defined from contractions. 
Levi. K * A =  ( K - 7 A ) + A .  
Alchourr6n and Makinson [1982] wondered under which conditions, an AGM 
revision function could validate the following intuitive condition. 
(Permutability) ( K  - 1A) + A = (K + A) - 7A. 
In particular, full meet revisions functions are permutable, but the question 
under which conditions an AGM function is permutable was left open in that 
paper. 
Hansson [1998] proposes reversing the Levi identity as an alternative and 
plausible way to define revision when change functions are applied to sets of 
formula that are not closed under logical consequence (bases). 
Thus, permutable revisions are equivalently defined by the Levi and the R-Levi 
identity. 
Consider now o to be a generic binary revision function o : lK x L + K. 
Let's first refer to the Monotony property, which is indeed a postulate of the 
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AGM expansion function. a postulate of the AGM expansion function. 
(Monotony) If K C H then K o A C H o A. 
For an arbitrary change function, it is strong coherence property that it may not 
always be desirable. For instance, as we have already shown in Observation 2.1 
general partial meet functions do not validate it, because monotony collapses 
with the preservation property. However, full meet revisions satisfy: 
(Weak Monotony) If 7 A  E K and K C H then K o A C H o A. 
In the context of their safe contraction functions [Alchourrbn and Makinson, 
19851 have considered properties of the intersection and union of theories. 
(Weak Intersection) If 1A E (Kl fl K2) then (Kl  fl K2) o A = (Kl  o A) n 
(K2 0 A). 
(Weak Union) If 1A E Kl n Kz, then (Kl  U K2)  0 A = (Kl o A) U (K2 o A). 
These properties truly relate the change of arbitrary theories. Quite trivially it 
can be proved that AGM expansions satisfy and full meet functions validate the 
two. In addition, they also validate the following D-Ventilation condition that 
is dual to the Ventilation condition of [Alchourrbn et al., 19851. AGM provided 
the Ventilation as a factoring condition on the contraction by a conjunction 
from a theory; they proved it to be equivalent to postulates (K"7) and (K*8). 
(D-Ventilation) (Kl  n K2)  o A E { (K l  o A) n (K2 o A), Kl o A, Kz o A). 
However, full meet functions do not in general validate the following two prop 
erties: 
(Intersection) (Kl n Kz) o A = (Kl o A) f l  (K2 o A). 
(Union) ( K I  U K2) 0 A = ( K I  0 A) U (K2 0 A). 
Full meet functions validate: 
(Commutativity) ( K  0 A) 0 B = ( K  0 B) 0 A. 
(Elimination) ( K  o A) o B = K o ( A  A B ) .  
The interest of the Elimination property is that it provides a way to reduce 
the iteration of functions to a plain single application of the change function. 
3.3. SOME PROPERTIES 
Areces and Rott [1999] have recently devised iterative functions based on the 
principle of Elimination, where the change of a theory by a sequence of formulae 
is recast to a standard AGM operation by a formula obtained from the sequence 
itself. In the case of expansions and full meet functions, Commutativity follows 
from Elimination. However, in Rott and Areces' framework this is not the case. 
Their novel function is a binary function o : LW --+ K, having as first argument 
the theory to be revised and the second argument is a sequence of formulae, 
the initial segment of the history so far. The revision of the original K by 
a sequence of formulae [Al,. . . ,An] yields a theory K o [A1,. . . ,An]. This is 
obtained by applying a standard AGM revision function to the theory K ,  but 
the formula to revise it by is obtained as a boolean combination of the formulae 
in the input sequence. Rott and Areces provide various algorithms to calculate 
such a formula. It is interesting that Rott and Areces' function may possess 
historic memory even though it is based on a standard AGM revision function 
relative to the original theory. 
Properties of Iterated Change 
We will now inspect some properties of iterated change arising from different 
proposals. Let's assume now that o is a generic iterative function. As we have 
argued above, trivially, binary functions over K x L give rise to iterative func- 
tions; henceforth, some of the properties we will discuss are candidate properties 
for binary functions. 
The following two conditions have been reported by Schlechta Lehmann and 
Magidor in [1996] as plausible properties for iterated change. For any pair of 
theories K1, Kz and sentences A, B,  C, D, 
(Or-Right) If D E (KoA)oC and D E (KoB)oC then D E (Ko(AvB))oC. 
(Or-Left) If D E (Ko(AvB))oC then D E (KoA)oC or D E (KoB)oC. 
For (Or-Right) suppose that after successive changes that differ only at step i 
(step i being A in one case and B in the other), one concludes that D holds. 
Then, one should also conclude D after identical successive changes when step 
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i is replaced by the disjunction A V B. We expect D to hold because knowing 
which of A or B is true at step i can not be crucial. 
The case for (Or-Left) is similar. If one concludes D from the change by a 
disjunction, one should conclude it from at least one of the disjuncts. 
Lehmann in [1995] argues that certain structures that he calls widening 
ranked orders are suitable for iterative change and proposes seven postulates 
that fully characterize revision functions based on these structures. In our 
notation they are: 
(11) K o A is a consistent theory. 
(12) A E K o A .  
(13) If B E K o A, then A > B E K. 
(14) If A E K then K o B1 o . . . o B, = K 0 A o B1 o . . . o B, for n > 1. 
(15) I fA€Cn(B) ,  then K o A o B o B 1 o  ... oB,= K o B o B 1 o  ... oB,. 
(16) If TB @ K o A  then KoAoBoB1o ... oB, = K O A O ( A A B ) O B ~ O  ... oB,. 
(17) K o - t B o  B g Cn(Ku B). 
Postulates (11-14) are a direct transcription of AGM's. (15) states that certain 
steps in a sequence of changes are negligible. The sequence containing a formula 
immediately followed by a logically stronger formula produces the same result 
as the counterpart sequence that lacks the logically weaker formula. Intuitively 
it says that if immediately after learning some information we obtain more 
specific information, the first learning is inconsequential. We consider that 
this condition is controversial, or without enough grounds to be a generally 
valid principle. Postulate (16) also asserts that under certain circumstances two 
sequences give the same result; in particular, when new information is consistent 
with the theory obtained so far. In this case the formulae at steps i and i - 1 
can be replaced by the the single formula that is conjunction of the two. (17) 
implies dependency between two revision steps and consequently enforces (at 
least to some extent) the property of historic memory, which in general binary 
functions lack. 
3.3. SOME PROPERTIES 
Darwiche and Pearl [1997] have proposed a number of properties for iterated 
change. In our notation: 
(Cl) If A E Cn(B) then (K o A) o B = K o B. 
(C2) If TA E Cn(B) then (K o A) o B = K o B 
While (C1)-(C4) have been proposed as desirable properties of iterated revisions, 
(C5) and (C6) have been considered too demanding. Condition (Cl) amounts 
to Lehmann's (15) and condition (C2) has been proved inconsistent with the 
AGM postulates (K*7) and (K*8) for binary change functions [Lehmann, 19951. 
We shall now consider four postulates for iterated change. We call the first 
one a trivial revision, and it will be studied in Chapter 7. It reduces the revision 
by a sequence just to the revision by the last sentence. 
(T) K o A o B = K o B .  
It is quite obvious that the scheme it induces not only lacks historic memory, 
but is actually a fake scheme of iterated change. In addition it conflicts with the 
AGM postulate (K*4), which requires that it TB $ K o A then (K o A) o B = 
( K  o A) + B. (T) and (K*4) would require that for all A, B E L such that 
1 B  $ K o A, (K o A) + B = K o B, which is not generally valid. 
For the next three postulates for iterated change we follow the presentation 
of [Rott, 19981. The first one is a conservative revision. It has been firstly 
proposed as a possible worlds construction by Boutilier [1996] that he called a 
natural revision. Darwiche and Pearl have supplied the missing completeness 
theorem for Boutilier's operation ([Darwiche and Pearl, 19971, Theorem l l ) ,  
providing the following postulate. 
(C) I f i B ~ K o A , t h e n K o A o B = K o B .  
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The conservative revision function validates all AGM postulates and (C), hence, 
when B is consistent with K o A, K o A o B =Cn((K o A) U {B) ) .  Rott has 
defined the same function as an epistemic entrenchment construction [1998], and 
proved the corresponding representation theorem. Boutilier in [1992c; 19931 has 
considered sequences of these revisions and has analyzed different reductions 
that can be involved in calculating the final result. 
The criticism to conservative functions is that they privilege new informa- 
tion at  the highest priority possible, but it is given up all to readily when more 
information comes in. In Rott's words [1998], " They provide no consistent at- 
titude toward novelty. The most recent information is always embraced without 
reservation, but the last but one piece of information, however, is treated with 
utter disrespect." 
The second iterative function is the irrevocable revision of [Segerberg, 19971. 
Its characteristic postulate is just the Elimination property of the previous sec- 
tion. 
( I )  K o A o B = K o ( A A B )  
Iterative functions are relative to  a single AGM function relative to the original 
theory K. The postulate induces an irrevocable scheme because the sequence 
of revisions by contradictory formulae results in the inconsistent theory, and it 
is impossible to overcome the inconsistency by applying further revisions. So, 
in order to avoid an inconsistent result the conjunction of the formulae to revise 
by in successive revisions has to be logically consistent. Ferm6 in [1999] has 
given the characterization result of irrevocable revisions in terms of epistemic 
entrenchment in a form that is close to the constructions reprted in [ ~ o t t ,  19911. 
Finally, there are moderate revisions, as a compromise between the conser- 
vative and the irrevocable. They were proposed by Nayak [1994] as an epistemic 
entrenchment construction. Its characteristic postulate is: 
(M) [ K o B  , if 1 B  E Cn(A) 
K o A o B =  ( K o (A A B) , otherwise. 
Moderate functions always give priority to the new incoming information and, 
unless the new formula is logically inconsistent with the previous, the resulting 
theory should accommodate all the formulae in the sequence of revisions. Among 
3.3. SOME PROPERTIES 
the models that account for historic memory Nayak's seems to be the best model 
one can get. 
Finally, the work of [Segerberg, 19951 and [Cantwell, 19971 on hypertheories 
promises a new perspective on iterative functions. 
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Chapter 4 
Iterable AGM Functions 
The aim of this chapter is to define iterable AGM functions, binary functions 
that satisfy all AGM postulates, but are close to being a constant function. We 
call them iterable because they provide a definitionally simple scheme for iter- 
ated change. We provide extended definitions for each of the five AGM presen- 
tations, meet functions, systems of spheres, postulates, epistemic entrenchments 
and safe hierarchies, and prove their equivalence. 
The basic idea dates back to Alchourrbn and Makinson's work on safe con- 
tractions [Alchourrbn and Makinson, 19851. Interestingly, in their paper they 
study some properties of the safe contraction function with respect to the in- 
tersection and union of theories, and also properties of "multiple contractions." 
They say [Alchourrbn and Makinson, 19851, p. 419: 
". . . we shall turn to questions that arise when K (the set of proposi- 
tions) is allowed to vary. [. . .]But in the case of safe contraction the 
way of dealing with variations of K is quite straightforward. As *e 
are working with a relation < over K the natural relation to consider 
over a subset K' of K is simply the restriction < n (A' x A') of < 
to A'." 
They obtain a general result relating K'-A to K-A, when K' G K.  As a special 
case they apply it to (K  - B) - C, since K - B C K always holds. Although not 
explicit in their article, a particular case of Alchourrbn and Makinson's proposal 
is to start with a hierarchical order over all the formulas of the language. The 
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simple restriction of the hierarchy over L to the elements of any theory K 
provides for a hierarchy over such a theory, hence, an appropriate relation for 
the definition of a safe contraction function for K. This setting yields a binary 
contraction function based on a unique fixed order of all the formulae, the safe 
hierarchy. 
Reusing the same fixed order makes sense, for example as pointed out by I. 
Levi (indirect personal communication), when involved in tentative reasoning: 
a fixed set of facts and laws which are known beforehand constitute the back- 
ground knowledge from which a sequence of consistent, but tentative, inference 
steps are performed to reach a conclusion. We will come back to this idea in 
Section 4.1.5. 
The following sections are devoted to the definition of iterable AGM func- 
tions in each of the classical presentations, following the ideas we just explained 
for safe contractions. Notice that since contraction and revision are inter- 
definable in the AGM framework via the Levi and Harper identities, the task of 
providing iterable change functions can be reduced to defining just one of them 
(see Section 4.3 for further details). 
4.1 The Five Presentations 
4.1.1 Extended Safe Contraction Functions 
Let's recall the definitions. A relation <, over a set K is a hierarchy if it is 
acyclic: for any set of elements A1, . . . , A, E K,  n 2 1, it is not the case that 
A1 <, A2 <sf . . . A, <, A1. A relation over K continues up Cn if for every 
A1,A2,A3 E K ,  if Al <sf A2 and A3 E Cn(A2) then A1 As. A relation 
<, over K is virtually connected if for every Al, A2, A3 E K if A1 <sf A2 then 
either A1 <, A3 or A3 <sf A2. Let <, be a virtually connected hierarchy over a 
theory K that continues up Cn, and let A be a sentence. The safe contraction 
function over K ,  - K  : L -t K,  is defined as: 
-K(A) = Cn({BI VK' C K,  s.t. A E Cn(K1) and K' is c-minimal with 
this property, B $! K1 or there is C E K' s.t. C <, B)). 
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The formulae B of -K(A) are called the safe elements of K with respect to A 
since they can not be "blamed" for implying A. An element is safe for A if it 
does not belong to any of the G-minimal subsets of K that imply A, or else it 
is not <,f-minimal in the hierarchy in such subsets. 
Following Alchourr6n and Makinson's idea of restricting the hierarchical 
order, we can define the iterable safe contraction function based on a hierarchy 
over all the sentences of L. 
Definition 4.1 (Derived Order) Let <9, be a hierarchy over the language 
L. Then for any theory K the derived hierarchy <$ is defined as <$ = lK 
(where RIX is the restriction of R to the elements in X). 
Observation 4.2 Let <, be a virtually connected hierarchy that continues up 
Cn in L, then for any theory K the relation <$ is a virtually connected hierarchy 
and continues up Cn in K. 
PROOF. Trivial. The properties of being acyclic, virtually connected and 
continuing up Cn are preserved under taking restrictions to theories. QED 
Once this result is obtained, to define an iterable safe contraction is straightfor- 
ward. We define the binary function -,f : lK x L + K. 
Definition 4.3 (Iterable Safe Contraction) Let <sf be a virtually connected 
hierarchy that continues up Cn in L. The iterable AGM contraction -sf : lK x 
L + lK is defined as 
K - ,A  = Cn({B I VK' C K, s.t. A E Cn(K1) and K' is G-minimal with 
this property, B $2 K' or there is C E K' s.t. C <$ B)) 
where <$ is the derived safe hierarchy for K.  
That -, satisfies the AGM postulates (K-1) to (K-8) follows from Alchourr6n 
and Makinson's original results stating that every safe contraction function gen- 
erated by a virtually connected hierarchy that continues up Cn over a theory K 
is a transitively relational partial meet contraction function. 
As a side remark, notice that definitions 4.1 and 4.3 can be merged in a 
unique definition and defined then directly over instead of over <a. This 
is just a matter of notation, as in both cases -sf is really a binary function as 
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required. This remark applies as well to the definitions of iterable functions in 
the remaining presentations. 
In the definitions above we started from a hierarchy for L and defined its 
restriction <:. A relevant question is whether the converse can also be achieved. 
Given a hierarchy for K can a hierarchy for L be defined such that the iterable 
function agrees with -K when applied to K ?  
Observation 4.4 Let -K be an AGM safe contraction function for a given 
theory K. Then -" can be extended to an iterable AGM safe contraction -,f, 
such that for every A, K -sf A = -"(A). 
PROOF. Given <: the order associated to -", define as follows: A <, B iff 
either (A @ K )  or (A, B E K and A <sf B). Intuitively, when extending 
the order to the whole language, elements in K are promoted in their 
safeness while elements outside K are minimally safe. From the definition 
<$ = <,IK, and it is not hard to check that <, is a virtually connected 
hierarchy that continues up Cn over L. QED 
In [~ansson,  19941 the safe contraction approach is generalized to a "kernel con- 
traction". Instead of implementing a relational way of defining "safe elements", 
selection functions (called incision functions) are introduced. Our results for 
safe contraction can easily be extended to kernel contraction. 
4.1.2 Extended Partial Meet Contraction Functions 
The principle of information economy requires that K - A contains as much as 
possible from K without entailing A. For every theory K and sentence A, the 
set K I A of maximal subsets of K that fail to imply A is the definitional basis 
for partial meet contraction functions. 
K L A  = {K1 C_ K ( A $2 Cn(K1) and K' is -maximal with this property). 
A selection function is a function which returns a nonempty subset of a given 
nonempty set. Let K be a theory, we note as sK : L -+ P(P(K))\{@), a selection 
function for K I A, for A E L. We furthermore require that sK(A) = {K) 
whenever K I A = 0. The original AGM partial meet contraction function -K 
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is then defined, for a theory K ,  as 
-K(A) = r) sK(A), where sK is a selection function for K. 
Under this definition the contraction function -K satisfies the basic AGM pos- 
tulates (K-1) to (K-6). To satisfy the extended set of postulates, (K-1) to (K-8), 
it suffices that sK be transitively relational, i.e. for each A E L the selection func- 
tion returns the smallest elements according to some transitive relation defined 
over K I A. 
In order to define an iterable version of -K richer than the full meet con- 
traction, we need to obtain somehow the selections functions sK, one for each 
eventual K .  Of course, we might assume to have all the selection functions be- 
forehand. But following the ideas presented in the extension of safe contraction 
functions, we would rather synthesize the different sK out of a unique structure. 
The largest possible theory is L, the whole language. Then sL provides for 
each formula A a selection function over all the maximal consistent sets of L 
that do not imply A. It is possible to extract from sL the corresponding sK for 
each theory K.  This is a consequence of the following two observations: (a) If 
A 6 K ,  then, trivially, the maximal consistent subset of K that fails to imply 
A is K itself. (b) If A E K, each maximal consistent subset of K that fails to 
imply A is included in a maximal consistent subset of L that fails to imply A 
(by a Lindenbaum-style argument, each element in K I A can be extended to 
an element of L I A). Therefore, we can derive a selection function sK(A) by 
just restricting the result of sL(A) to its common part with K.  
Definition 4.5 (Derived Selection Functions) Let sL be a selection func- 
tion for L. Then, for any theory K the selection function sK is 
sK(A) = i f A # K  
{Kt E K I A I K t  = K n Ht  with Ht E sL(A)) otherwise. 
It is immediate that each derived sK is indeed a selection function. What is 
more interesting is that each sK is transitively relational whenever sL is. 
Observation 4.6 If sL is a transitively relational selection function, then for 
any theory K ,  sK is a transitively relational selection function. 
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PROOF. The intuition is as follows, as sL is transitively relational there is 
a transitive relation R defined over L I A whose smallest elements are 
selected by s L ( ~ ) .  This relation R can be projected over each K I A to 
show that sK(A)  selects the smallest elements of a transitive relation. QED 
Given that sL is a transitively relational selection function we are able to define 
an iterable AGM contraction function -,, based on the partial meet construc- 
tion. 
Definition 4.7 (Iterable Partial Meet Contraction) Let sL be a tran- 
sitively relational selection function over L. The iterable AGM contraction 
-,, : K x L + K is defined as K -,, A = r) sK(A) ,  where sK is the derived 
selection function for K. 
By construction -,, is an AGM transitively relational partial meet contraction. 
It is iterable as it is applicable to any theory K .  We now prove that every AGM 
partial meet contraction function can be extended to an iterable partial meet. 
Observation 4.8 Let -K be an AGM transitively relational partial meet con- 
traction function for a given theory K. Then -K can be extended to an iterable 
AGM partial meet contraction -,, such that for every A, K -,,A = -K(A) .  
PROOF. Given a selection function sK we have to come up with a selection 
function sL. As we previously said, for each H E K I A there is H' E 
L I A such that H c H'. Hence, we can define sL(A)  = {HI E L I 
A I 3H E s K ( K  I A)  and H C H'). Notice that there can be some 
H' E L I A such that there exists no subset H of K and H 5 H', so that 
H' is not selected. 
Since sK is transitively relational there is a relation R over K I A which 
can be lifted to L I A. If R ( H l ,  H z )  then R'(Hi,  H i )  for H i ,  H i  E L I A 
such that Hi Hl. For every H' E L I A such that there exists no subset 
H of K and H c H', we define R'(H1', H') for every H" E L I A. Now 
sL(A)  selects the smallest elements of R'. It follows from the definition 
that R' is transitive, hence sL is transitively relational. QED 
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4.1.3 Extended Systems of Spheres 
In this section we develop a definition of an iterable contraction function based 
on Systems of Spheres, which turns out to be equivalent to an early unpublished 
result of Makinson (personal communication). We first turn to Grove's original 
framework [Grove, 19881 for AGM functions. 
A system of spheres S centered on a theory K is a set of sets of possible 
worlds that verifies the properties: 
(Sl) If U,V E S then U C_ V or V C_ U .  (Totally Ordered.) 
(S2) For every U E S, [K] G U. (Minimum.) 
(S3) W E S. (Maximum.) 
(S4) For every sentence A such that there is a sphere U in S with [A]nU # 0, 
there is a C-minimal sphere V in S such that [A] n V # 0. (Limit Assumption.) 
For any sentence A, if [A] has a non-empty intersection with some sphere in S 
then by (S4) there exists a minimal such sphere in S, say cS(A). But, if [A] 
has an empty intersection with all spheres, then it must be the empty set (since 
(S3) assures W is in S), in this case cS(A) is put to be just W. Given a system 
of spheres S and a formula A, cS(A) is defined as: 
if [A] = 0 
cs(A) = 
the -minimal sphere S' in S s.t. Sf n [A] # 0 otherwise. 
Using the function c,, the function f, : L -t P(W) is defined as fs(A) = 
[A]nc,(A). Given a sentence A, fs(A) returns the closest elements (with respect 
to theory K )  where A holds. Grove shows that the function defined as -K(A) = 
Th([K] U fs(lA)) is an AGM contraction function. And conversely, for any 
AGM contraction function relative to a theory K there is a system of spheres 
S centered on K that gives rise to the same function. 
We shall now extend Grove's construction to obtain an iterable function 
using the same strategy we used for partial meet. Again, the central idea is to 
consider the inconsistent theory. A system of spheres for L has the particular 
property that its innermost sphere is the empty set, since [L] = 0. G' wen a 
system of spheres S centered in 0 we define for any theory K a derived system 
SK centered on K simply by "filling in" the innermost sphere of S with [K]. 
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Definition 4.9 (Derived System of Spheres) Let S be a system of spheres 
for L. Then for any theory K the derived system of spheres SK is defined as 
SK = {[K] U Si 1 Si E S). 
Observation 4.10 Let S be a system of spheres for L. Then for any theory 
K, SK is a system of spheres centered on K. 
Having defined the method to derive a system of spheres SK, the functions 
c,K and f,K are as above. We can now define the iterable contraction function 
-., : K x L + lK, applicable to every theory K and every formula A. 
Definition 4.11 (Iterable Sphere Contraction) Let S be a system of 
spheres for L. The iterable AGM contraction -,, : K x L + K is defined 
as K -,, A = Th([K] U f,K(7A)), where f,K is the derived function for K. 
It is clear that -,, is iterable. By Grove's characterization result it follows that 
-,, is an AGM contraction function. We prove that every AGM contraction 
function can be extended to an iterable sphere contraction function. 
Observation 4.12 Let -K be an AGM contraction functions based on systems 
of spheres. Then -K can be extended to an iterable AGM contraction -, based 
on systems of spheres, such that for every A, K -,, A = -K(A). 
PROOF. It is enough to prove that if SK is a system of spheres for K, then it 
can be extended to a system of spheres for L. Define S centered in 0 as 
S = SK U (0). Clearly, S validates (Sl) to (S4) for L. QED 
4.1.4 Extended Epistemic Entrenchments 
An epistemic entrenchment for a theory K is a total relation among the formulae 
in the language reflecting their degree of relevance in K and their usefulness 
when performing inference. The following five conditions must hold for an 
epistemic entrenchment relation I,, for a theory K [Makinson and Gkdenfors, 
19881: 
(EE1) If A 5, B and B i,, D then A 5, D. 
(EE2) If B E Cn(A) then A I,, B. 
(EE3) A I,, (A A B) or B 5, (A A B). 
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(EE4) If theory K is consistent then A 6 K iff A 5, B for every B. 
(EE5) If B 5, A for every B then A E Cn(0). 
The AGM contraction function -K based on an epistemic entrenchment relation 
5, for K ,  is defined as follows. For every formula A in L, 
-K(A) = {B E K I A E Cn(0) or A <, (AV B)), 
where <, is the strict relation obtained from <,. 
For any given relation <,, for a consistent theory K ,  the formulas in K are 
ranked in I,, while all the formulas outside K have the I,,-minimal epistemic 
value. That is, by (EE4) for a consistent theory K ,  all the formulas outside 
K are zeroed in I,. However, (EE4) is vacuous for the contradictory theory 
L. If we consider as a point of departure an epistemic entrenchment over the 
contradictory theory L, there is an obvious way to derive an entrenchment order 
for any theory K: just depose the formulas not in K to a minimal rank. 
Definition 4.13 (Derived Epistemic Entrenchment) Let 5, be an epis- 
temic entrenchment relation for L. Then for any theory K the derived epistemic 
entrenchment relation 5: is defined as: 
A I: B iff either (A @ K )  or (A, B E K and A I,, B). 
Again the first step is to establish that our definition is sound. 
Observation 4.14 Let I,, be an epistemic entrenchment relation for L, then 
for any theory K ,  I: is an epistemic entrenchment relation for K.  
Definition 4.15 (Iterable Epistemic Entrenchment Contraction) Let 
I, be an epistemic entrenchment relation for L. The iterable AGM contraction 
-, : K x  L + K is defined as K-,A = {B E K ( A E Cn(0) or A <: (AVB)), 
where <: is the asymmetric part of 22, for I: the derived epistemic entrench- 
ment relation for K .  
It remains to show that every contraction function based on epistemic entrench- 
ments can be extended to an iterable contraction function. 
Observation 4.16 Let -K be an AGM contraction function based on epistemic 
entrenchments for a given theory K .  Then -K can be extended to an iterable 
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AGM contraction -, based on epistemic entrenchments such that for every A, 
K -., A = AK(A). 
PROOF. The key point is to prove that an epistemic entrenchment relation for 
K 52 can be extended to a relation for L. 
If K = L then we are done. Suppose K # L. We claim that 5: is also an 
epistemic entrenchment relation for L. Conditions (EEl), (EE2), (EE3) 
and (EE5) do not refer to the specific theory so they hold also trivially for 
L, while condition (EE4) does not apply as L is inconsistent. QED 
4.1.5 Extended Postulates 
One of the hallmarks of the AGM formalism is that a contraction operation al- 
ways returns a consistent theory. The largest possible theory is the inconsistent 
theory L, the whole language. The contraction function over the inconsistent 
theory can be regarded as a generic removal procedure leading to consistency. 
As every theory is a subset of the inconsistent theory this generic removal pro- 
cedure can be applied to any theory. We propose the following postulate: 
Postulate K-9 is extremely simple and reveals the unsophisticated beh&ior of 
our iterable contraction function. Its dual iterable revision postulate is defined 
as: 
( K * g ) I f - A € K ,  then K * A = ( L * A )  
In Section 4.3 we elaborate on the inter-definability of (K*9) and (K-9) via 
the Levi and Harper identities. It becomes obvious that a revision function * 
satisfying (K*l)- (K*9) is in fact iterable: for any A, B E L, K * A * B is well 
defined: If 7 B  E K*A then K*A*B = (L*B); else K*A*B = (K*A)+B. An 
immediate observation is that (K*9) forces independence between two arbitrary 
revision steps. Namely, the result of revising a theory is independent of the 
preceding steps that lead to it, only the actual theory being revised matters. 
This is what we have described as lack of historic memory in Chapter 3, or 
as reported in [Friedman and Halpern, 19961, the qualitative analogue of the 
Markov Assumption. 
4.1. THE FIVE PRESENTATIONS 
The revision postulate (K*9) is sound with respect to the interpretation 
of revision as a k i d  of tentative reasoning. The revision function for L en- 
codes a fixed and preestablished criteria, "the way things are" (facts) and "the 
way things work" (laws) in the actual world. A sequence of revisions is then 
performed in search of tentative explanations (of the facts) and conclusions (de- 
rived from them). When we detect an inconsistency between the hypothesis 
elaborated up to now and a new supposition we are trying to adjust to the rea- 
soning, we lose confidence in the chain of hypothesis. We should then start it 
all over, and accommodate the latest piece of our tentative chain in accordance 
with our (fixed and pre-established) criteria, leaving behind our previous wrong 
conjectures. 
We take (K-1) to (K-9) as defining iterable AGM contraction functions via 
postulates. We show in the next section that these functions coincide with the 
iterable AGM contraction functions defined above. 
Lemma 7.4 in [Alchourr6n and Makinson, 19851 can be considered as the 
first reference to the ideas put forward in postulate (K-9). But the connec- 
tion with iteration is first elucidated by [Rott, 1992bl. He mentions explicitly 
(K-9) in connection with generalized entrenchment relations and considers it 
as a policy of iteration. He also proves that iterated theory change accord- 
ing to this method reduces to change of the inconsistent theory. Remarkably, 
[Reund and Lehmann, 19941 proposes precisely the same postulate (K*9) and 
shows the correspondence between an AGM revision operation satisfying it and 
a rational consistency-preserving consequence relation. Freund and Lehmann 
also show that such a revision function admits iteration. Although their pos- 
tulate and ours turned out to be identical, the two works are indeed comple- 
mentary. In the attempt to elucidate the meaning and effect of (K-9) we were 
driven to recast it in the four other standard presentations of AGM (safe hierar- 
chies, partial meet functions, systems of spheres and epistemic entrenchments) 
and in the next section we will prove that they are indeed equivalent. Re- 
und and Lehmann chose instead to consider the connection existing between 
theory change and non-monotonic reasoning [Makinson and Gardenfors, 1991; 
Gkdenfors and Makinson, 19901 and study the effect of the new postulate on 
the (non-monotonic) inference relation. The main result in their paper is the 
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proof that revisions satisfying (K*l) to (K*9) stand in one-to-one correspon- 
dence with rational, consistency-preserving non-monotonic inference relations. 
4.2 Equivalences 
In this section we will prove the equivalence of the five systems presented. We 
first prove that postulates (K-1) to (K-9) characterize the iterable AGM con- 
tractions based on systems of spheres. 
Theorem 4.17 (Postulates/Systems of Spheres) Given an iterable AGM 
contraction - satisfying (K-1) to (K-9), there exists a system of spheres S for 
L such that for every K and every A, K - A = Th([K] U f,K(iA)). Conversely, 
every -,, based on a system of spheres S for L satisfies postulates (K-1) to 
(K-9). 
PROOF. As -, is a contraction based on systems of spheres it satisfies (K-1) 
to (K-8). It is trivial to check that it also satisfies (K-9). 
By Grove's original result, for any AGM function for L that satisfies (K-1) 
to (K-8) there is a system of spheres S for L such that L-A = Th(f,(-A)). 
By definition SK = ([K] U Si 1 Si E S). There are two cases. For any 
A $4 K ,  clearly f,K(iA) = [K] n [iA], then Th([K] U f,K(iA)) = K and 
by postulate (K-3), K = K - A, so we are done. For A E K ,  f,K(iA) = 
ff(-A), then Th([K] U f,K(lA)) = Th([K] U f f ( 1 ~ ) )  = KnTh(f,K(iA)) 
= K n (L - A), and we are done. QED 
We shall prove that -,, and the extended postulates are equivalent. 
Theorem 4.18 (Postulates/Epistemic Entrenchments) Given an iterable 
AGM contraction - that satisfies (K-1) to (K-9), there exists an epistemic 
entrenchment relation <, for L such that for every K and every A, K - A = 
{B E K [ A E Cn(0) or A <L (A V B)). Conversely, every -, satisfies (K-1) to 
(K-9). 
PROOF. Again, by previous results, -, satisfies (K-1) to (K-8) and it is easy 
to verify that it also satisfies (K-9). 
Let 5, be the epistemic entrenchment guaranteed to exist for any con- 
traction function satisfying (K-1) to (K-8). We already proved that it is 
an epistemic entrenchment for L. 
If A $Z K then by (K-3), K - A = K. As 5, satisfies (EE1) and (EE4), 
A <K, (A V B) for all B E K. Hence K - A = {B E K I A E Cn(8) or 
A <K, (A v B)). 
Suppose A E K. As IK, is the restriction of I,, K -.,A = {B E K I A E 
C ~ ( ~ ) O ~ A < ~ ( A V B ) } = K ~ { B E L I A E C ~ ( ~ ) O ~ A < , ( A V B ) ) =  
(L - A) n K = K - A, if - satisfies (K-9). QED 
We have presented -,, and -,,, and showed that they are both iterable 
AGM functions relative to some fixed order for the inconsistent theory L. We 
now prove that -, and -,, are in fact equivalent. 
Theorem 4.19 (Meet Functions/Systems of Spheres) For each iterable 
partial meet contraction -,, there exists a system of spheres S for L such that for 
every theory K and every A, K -,,A = Th([K] U cC(1A)). Conversely, for each 
iterable contraction -, defined by a system of spheres there exists a selection 
functions sL such that for every theory K and every A, K -,, A = n sK(A). 
PROOF. The theorem is a direct consequence of the "Grove connection" 
[~akinson, 19931 relating consistent complete theories in the language 
of K including A and the elements in {K U Cn(A)IK E K I 1A) by a 
total injective mapping. In the particular case when we consider the in- 
consistent theory L, this mapping can be recast as a bijection between the 
set of all consistent complete theories (worlds) and UA U(L I A). Once 
this connection has been established, the order provided by a system of 
spheres centered in 0 defines a transitively relational selection function sL 
and vice versa. QED 
Finally, by using results in [ ~ o t t ,  1992al we can establish the equivalence be- 
tween iterated epistemic entrenchment contractions and iterated safe contrac- 
tions functions, proving that the five approaches presented are indeed five faces 
of the same phenomenon. 
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Theorem 4.20 (Epistemic Entrenchments/Safe Hierarchies) For 
each iterable epistemic entrenchment contraction -,, there exists a virtually con- 
nected hierarchy <, that continues up Cn in L, such that for every theory K 
and every A, K -,A = K n  Cn({B ( VK' G K, s.t. A E Cn(K1) and K' is a G 
-minimal with this property, B @ K' or there is C E K' s.t. C <a B)). Con- 
versely, for each safe iterable contraction -d there exists an epistemic relation 
<, for L, such that for every theory K and every A K -sf A = {B E K ( A E 
-
Cn(0) or A <: (A V B)). 
PROOF. The first part is immediate. As it is proved in [Rott, 1992a], an epis 
temic entrenchment is also a safe hierarchy. Furthermore the relativization 
to K used during iteration is preserved. For the second part, let <, be 
the hierarchy for L associated to -,. Now using the main result in [ ~ o t t ,  
1992al we can obtain an epistemic entrenchment relation 5, such that 
the associated contraction function behaves as for L. Take I,, as the 
basis for our epistemic entrenchment iterable contraction function -,. If 
A E Cn(0) or A @ K ,  then as both -,and -, are AGM functions, K-,fA 
= K = { B E K I A E C ~ ( @ ) O ~ A < ~ ( A V B ) ) .  I f A @ C n ( g ) a n d A ~ K ,  
as the functions satisfy (K-9), K -,A = (L -,A) n K = (L -,, A) n K 
= { B E K I A E C ~ ( ~ ) ~ ~ A < ~ ( A V B ) ) .  QED 
4.3 Properties 
Postulate (K-9) immediately implies a weak form of monotony of the iterable 
function. This has been noticed by Makinson (personal communication). 
(Weak Monotony) If A E K and K K' then K - A C K' - A. 
This is a nice coherence property linking the contractions of different theories 
by the same formula. Also the iterable revision satisfies that, 
(Almost Constant) If -A E K, K' then K * A = K' * A. 
Namely, when the second argument is held fixed, the iterable revision be- 
haves almost as a constant function on its first argument. By (K*9), if 7A is 
in K then K * A is constant. But as iterable revisions satisfy AGM postulates 
(K*3) and (K*4), if TA # K ,  then K * A = Cn(K U {A)). 
4.3. PROPERTIES 
A key observation about iterable contractions is that they ought to be rel- 
ative to the largest theory, L, because attempting to make them relative to a 
smaller theory collapses with the AGM recovery postulate. 
Observation 4.21 (Makinson, personal communication) Let - be an it- 
erable AGM function. There is no value of theory H distinct from L for which 
(K-9(H)): If A E K then K - A =  ( H - A ) n K .  
is consistent with (K-5) (the postulate of recovery). 
PROOF. Suppose H # L. Choose any A in H (even T will do). 
L =, by (K-5), Cn(L - A) U {A)) =, 
by condition (K-9(H)) substituting L for K ,  = Cn(((H - A) n L) U {A)) = 
,by monotony of Cn and de Morgan laws, C Cn(((H - A)) U {A)) = 
,by (K-5), = H, giving us a contradiction. QED 
Although iterable AGM functions are binary and almost constant, they do not 
validate commutativity. In general ( K  - A) - B is different from (K - B) - A. 
Just as AGM contraction and revision are inter-definable via the Levi and 
Harper identities, so are iterable AGM contractions and revisions. Specifically, 
the Levi identity lets us define iterable revision functions: 
Levi. K * A = ( K  - TA) + A. 
This is important since it allows for sequences of different kinds of changes, like 
for example (. . . ((K + A) - B) * D . . . * C). 
In [Alchourr6n and Makinson, 19851 it is shown that under appropriate con- 
ditions safe contractions are permutable ([Alchourr6n and Makinson, 19851, 
Lemma 7.1). Given (K-9), an iterable revision function * can be defined in 
terms of an iterable contraction function equivalently via Levi or R-Levi. 
Observation 4.22 Iterable AGM contraction functions are permutable. 
A direct proof of the above is immediate but the result also derives from Lemma 
7.1 in [Alchourr6n and Makinson, 19851. 
As iterable AGM contractions induce safe contractions functions for each 
theory K, the results proved in [Alchourrbn and Makinson, 19851 carry over: 
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Observation 4.23 Iterable AGM contractions validate: 
And similarly for iterable revisions: 
(Weak Intersection) If 1 A  E Kl n K2 then (K1 f l  K2) * A  = (Kl * A )  n (K2 * A) 
(Weak Union) If 1 A  E Kl  n K2 then (Kl U K2) * A = (K1 * A) U (K2 * A). 
(Weak Commutativity) If 1 A  E K * B and 1 B  E K * A then 
( K * A ) * B = ( K * A ) n ( K * B ) = ( K * B ) * A .  
In fact, these properties hold not just for two theories but also for indefinitely 
many. We shall now show that the D-Ventilation property, which is a strength- 
ening of the property Weak Interscetion, is not generally valid for iterable AGM 
functions. 
(D-Ventilation) (Kl n K2) * A E {(Kl * A) n (K2 * A), Kl * A, K2 * A). 
Observation 4.24 There exist iterable AGM revisions that violate D- 
Ventilation. 
PROOF. Let L * A = Cn(A A 1 B  A 4'). Assume K1 = Cn({B, A - 1C))  and 
K2 = Cn({C, A =- 1B)).  Then (Kl n K2) * A = Cn(7A A B A C) while 
K1 = Cn(A A B A 4 )  and Kz = Cn(A A T B  A C). QED 
Iterable AGM revisions satisfy just three of the six properties of Darwiche and 
Pearl [1997]. 
C1. I f A E C n ( B )  t h e n ( K * A ) * B = K * B .  
C2. If 1 A  E Cn(B) then ( K  * A) * B = K * B. 
C3. I f A € K * B t h e n A € ( K * A ) * B .  
C4. I f l A $ K * B t h e n i A $ ( K * A ) * B .  
C5. I ~ ~ B E K * A ~ ~ ~ A $ ! K * B ~ ~ ~ ~ A $ ! ( K * A ) * B .  
C6. I ~ ~ B E K * A ~ ~ ~ - A E K * B ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A E ( K * A ) * B .  
4.3. PROPERTIES 
Observation 4.25 
i) All iterable AGM functions, satisfy C1, C3 and C4. 
ii) There exist iterable AGM functions violating C2, C5 and C6. 
Most noticeably, our iterable AGM functions validate the first six of the seven 
postulates of [~ehmann, 19951, the seventh requires the property of historic 
memory that iterable functions obviously lack. 
11. K * A is a consistent theory. 
12. A E K * A .  
13. I f B € K * A , t h e n A > B € K .  
14. I f A € K t h e n K * B 1 *  ...* B n = K * A * B 1 *  . . . *  B , f o r n > l .  
15. If A E Cn(B), then K * A * B * B1 * . . . * B, - K * B * B1 * . . . * B,. 
16. If - t B  61 K * A  then K*A*B*B1*. . .*B, = K*A*(AAB)*B1*. . .*B,. 
17. K * 1 B  * B G Cn(K U {B)). 
Observation 4.26 
i) All iterable AGM functions, satisfy 11-16. 
ii) There exist iterable AGM functions violating 17. 
Finally, let's consider the properties in [Schlechta et al., 19961. 
(Or-Right) If D E (K*A)*C and D E (K*B)*C then D E (K*(AVB))*C. 
(Or-Left) I ~ D E ( K * ( A v B ) ) * C ~ ~ ~ ~ D E ( K * A ) * C ~ ~ D E ( K * B ) * C .  
Observation 4.27 Iterable AGM functions satisfy Or-Right and Or-Left. 
We observe that iterable functions do not comply with the properties asso- 
ciated to iterative schemes. 
(T) K o A o B = K o B .  
(C) I f l B ~ K o A , t h e n K o A o B = K o B .  
(I) K o A o B =  K o ( A h B )  
[ K o B  , if 1 B  E Cn(A) 
K o A o B =  ( K O  ( A h  B) , otherwise. 
Observation 4.28 There exist iterable functions violating (T) ,(M) ,(I) and (C) . 
Modest as they are, it is surprising that iterable AGM functions satisfy a good 
number of the standard properties put forward as relevant for iterated change. 
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Chapter 5 
Update Functions 
In this chapter we will concentrate on a distinctive binary function outside the 
AGM framework, Katsuno and Mendebon's update [ ~ a t s u n o  and Mendelzon, 
19921. We will study various of its formal properties and we will complete and 
clarify previous results that extended the function for infinite languages. 
Some years after the seminal paper of Alchourrcjn, Gkdenfors and Makin- 
son, Katsuno and Mendelzon presented a new theory change operation which 
they called an update. In their paper, Katsuno and Mendelzon compared the 
update operation with the previous revision operation and following the work 
of [Keller and Wislet t ,  19851 provided some interesting remarks on the differ- 
ences between the two approaches: while revision functions seemed well suited 
for modeling the change provoked by evolving knowledge about a static sit- 
uation, update operations captured the change in knowledge provoked by an 
evolving situation. We quote [ ~ a t s u n o  and Mendelzon, 19921, page 387: 
"We make a fundamental distinction between two kinds of mod- 
ifications to a knowledge base. The first one, update consists to 
bringing the knowledge base up to date, when the world described 
by it changes. . . .The second kind of modification, revision is used 
when we are obtaining new information about a static world. . . .We 
claim the AGM postulates describe only revisions." 
The two forms of change can be illustrated with the following example, which 
is an adaptation of Katsuno and Mendelzon's original one. 
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Suppose that each day I either have no breakfast at  all or I have coffee and 
toast. Suppose you are now informed that I had coffee at breakfast. How should 
you incorporate this information into your knowledge? You could take it as an 
indication that I had coffee and toast, with which moreover it is consistent, 
so you expand your knowledge. This is what AGM revision sanctions for the 
example. Another way to look at  it, is to perform a case analysis over what you 
know. There are just two possibilities that are consistent with your knowledge: 
either (1) I have coffee and toast, or (2) I have neither coffee nor toast. Suppose 
(1). Finding that I had a coffee is perfectly reasonable with this case. Let us 
say that the outcome of case (1) is the scenario described by case (1) itself. Now 
suppose (2). Finding that I actually had a coffee conflicts with the case. You 
are obliged to jump to the "closest" scenario to case (2) that accommodates the 
information. For instance, it could be that I woke up late and left having no 
breakfast; but at  the bus stop I bought just a coffee from a vendor. From this 
case analysis you conclude that definitely I had a coffee but that nothing can 
be said about me having toast. This is the type of change dictated by update. 
They showed that the two operations have indeed different properties and, 
since then, AGM revision and update have been considered essentially different 
forms of theory change. The nature of their difference, though, is still an open 
question in the philosophical logic literature concerning theory change. For 
instance, are there other fundamentally different operations besides revision and 
update? A first formal difference between the two operations is that they do not 
stand on the same definitional ground. Katsuno and Mendelzon formalized their 
update operation as a binary connective between formulae in a logically finite 
language -specifically, a propositional language over a finite set of propositional 
variables-, Alchourr6n, Gardenfors and Makinson considered the general case 
of a possible infinite language and their revision operator takes a theory and a 
formula to the corresponding revised theory. 
A number of formal comparisons between the two approaches have been al- 
ready investigated. In particular Peppas and Williams [1995] have reformulated 
the update operation as a function over theories and extended Katsuno and 
Mendelzon's set of postulats so that an update operator may be used on first 
order languages. Implicitly, their article claims that Katsuno and Mendelzon's 
original postulates would be complete for general propositional languages, but 
not for first order. [peppas and Williams, 19951, page 120: 
"Grove [5] used a syntactic representation based on maximal consis 
tent extensions, or equivalently consistent complete theories, without 
the restriction of [6]. Katsuno and Mendelzon note in [6] that due to 
the one-to-one correspondence between consistent complete theories 
and interpretations in the finitary propositional case, their represen- 
tation result is derivable from the work of Grove [5]. Furthermore, 
the one-to-one correspondence between consistent complete theo- 
ries and interpretations does not require the finiteness property, and 
therefore, in the propositional case Grove's results have a semantic 
counterpart. However, this one-to-one correspondence does not hold 
for the more general first order case, and a model-theoretic charac- 
terization for this case has not hitherto been established. . . . Katsuno 
and Mendelzon [7] introduced a set of postulates for an update oper- 
ator on finitary propositional theories We extend their set of postu- 
lats so that an update operator may be used on arbitrary first order 
theories." 
Their reference [5] stands [Grove, 19881, [6] for [ ~ a t s u n o  and Mendelzon, 19911 
and [7] for [ ~ a t s u n o  and Mendelzon, 19921. 
In this chapter we will give a clarification of Peppas and Williams' result. 
After presenting briefly the standard update operation in Section 5.1, we will 
define updates for infinite languages. Then we will prove an unexpected result: 
Katsuno and Mendelzon's original postulates characterizing finite updates are 
not sufficient for the infinite propositional case. In Section 5.4 we propose a 
strengthening of postulate (US) which enables a representation theorem to be 
proved, obtaining the same postulate proposed in [Peppas and Williams, 19951. 
Finally we will evaluate the update function against the general properties we 
studied in Chapter 3. 
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5.1 The Update Operation 
Katsuno and Mendelzon define updates only for a classical propositional lan- 
guage based on a finite set of propositional variables P. This simplifying assump 
tion has strong consequences as the set W of all possible valuations becomes 
finite. Two main properties result: every theory can be finitely axiomatized by 
a propositional formula; and every total order 4 on W is free of infinite descend- 
ing chains. These two properties let Katsuno and Mendelzon provide a simple 
definition of the update operator as a binary connective in the propositional 
language: AOB is a well formed formula denoting the result of updating the 
theory Cn(A) with the formula B. The operator is characterized through the 
following postulates: 
(ul) AOB implies B. 
(u2) If A implies B then AOB is equivalent to A. 
(u3) If both A and B are satisfiable then AOB is also satisfiable. 
(u4) If A1 is equivalent to A2 and B1 is equivalent to B2 then AIOBl is equiv- 
alent to A20Bz. 
(u5) (AOB) A C implies AO(B A C). 
(u6) If AOBl implies B2 and AOB2 implies B1 then AOBl is equivalent to  
AOB2. 
(u7) If Cn(A) is complete then (AOB1) A (AOB2) implies AO(B1 V B2). 
(u8) (A1 V A2) 0 B is equivalent to (AIO B) V (A20B). 
They furthermore consider an additional postulate: 
(u9) If Cn(A) is complete and (AOB) A C is satisfiable then AO(B A C)  implies 
(AOB) A C. 
Katsuno and Mendelzon provide also a semantic characterization of the update 
operation through a notion of closeness between possible worlds. They consider 
a set of partial preorders on W, (5,: w E W). The intuitive meaning is 
that v 5, u if and only if v is at least as close to w as u is. The indexical 
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preorders 5, are then used in the definition of the update operation: given 
that any theory K can be semantically represented as a set of possible worlds 
[K] = {wi E W : K g wi), we can update K by considering the most plausible 
changes (according to dWz) to each wi to accommodate the new information. 
The only requirement on 5, is a centering condition, establishing that for every 
w, no world is as close to w as w itself: if v 5, w then v = w. 
The following characterization results hold for the update operation, see 
[ ~ a t s u n o  and Mendelzon, 19921 for the details. 
Theorem 5.1 Let L be a finite propositional language. The update operator 
0 satisfies (u1)-(u8) iff there exists a model (W, (5,: w E W)) where each 5, 
is a partial preorder over W that satisfies the centering condition, such that 
[AOB] = UwEIAl{~ E [B] : v is 5,-minimal in [B]). 
Theorem 5.2 Let L be a finite propositional language. The update operator 
0 satisfies (ul) - (u5),(u8) and (u9) iff there exists a model (W, (5,: w E W)) 
where each 5, is a total preorder that satisfies the centering condition, such 
that [AOB] = U,EIAl {v E [B] : v is 5,-minimal in [B]). (Postulates (u6) and 
(u7) are superfluous in presence of the rest.) 
5.2 Update for infinite languages 
Following the notion of change advocated by Alchourr6n, Garden-fors and 
Makinson [Alchourr6n et al., 19851, we generalize the update operation to the- 
ories. We redefine the update operator 0 as a function that takes a theory and 
a formula and returns a theory, 0 : IK x L -+ IK. Notice that in a finite propo- 
sitional language this is just a notational variant of Katsuno and Mendelzon's 
original setting. We can straightforwardly recast the postulates governing the 
update function for possibly infinite languages as follows: 
(UO) KOA is a theory. 
(U2) If A E K then KOA = h 
(U3) If K # L and A is satisfiable then KOA # L. 
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(U4) If Cn(A) = Cn(B) then KOA = KOB. 
(U5) KO(A A B) c Cn(K0A U {B)). 
(U6) If B E KOA and A E KOB then KOA = KOB. 
(U7) If K is a complete theory then KO(A V B) G Cn(K0A U KOB). 
(U8) (KI n K ~ ) O A  = (Kl OA) n (K20A). 
The additional postulate becomes: 
(U9) If K is complete and Cn((KOA) U {B)) # L then Cn((KOA) U (B)) G 
KO(A A B). 
It is quite straightforward to extend the characteristic pointwise semantics of the 
standard update function to infinite languages. The notion of closeness between 
worlds requires some adjustment. In addition to the centering condition, each 
5, should satisfy the limit assumption: let A be any formula in L, then there 
exists some non-empty set Y, Y G [A] such that each element in Y is a 5,- 
minimal element of [A]. Formally, 
Notice that the limit assumption is trivially satisfied in finite propositional lan- 
guages. 
Definition 5.3 (Update function) Let L be a possibly infinite propositional 
language. Let (W, (5,: w E W)) be such that each 5, is a total preorder 
over W satisfying the centering condition and the limit assumption. We define 
+ : K x L + l K a s  
K+A = Th( U {v E [A] : v is 5, -minimal in [A])). 
w W 1  
5.3 A Non-Representation Theorem 
The generalized version of the update postulates (U0)-(U9) does not characterize 
the update operation in a language with an infinite number of propositional 
letters. 
5.3. A NON-REPRESENTATION THEOREM 
Theorem 5.4 If L is an infinite propositional language, postulates (U0)-(U9) 
do not fully characterize the + operation. 
PROOF. Given a propositional language L with an infinite but countable num- 
ber of propositional letters we will exhibit a function o : K x L + K 
satisfying (U0)-(U9) for which there is no model (W, (5,: w E W)), sat- 
isfying that VK E K, VA E L, K o A = K+A. 
We semantically define o as follows. Let us single out an (arbitrary) point 
v in W. For every K E K and for every A E L define 
if [A] = 0. 
if [K] [A]. [K o A] = 
([K] n [A]) U {v) if A E v and [K] n [-A] # 0 is finite. 
1 [A] if A $?' v or [K] n [TA] is an infinite set. 
We first check that o satisfies postulates (U0)-(U9). By definition o triv- 
ially satisfies postulates (UO), (Ul), (U2), (U3) and (U4). 
(U5). We have to show that K o (A A B)  C Cn(K o A U {B)) holds. There 
are three cases. 
(a) If [K] [A] then K o A = K. If 1 B  E K ,  then Cn(K o A U {B)) = L 
and (U5) is verified. If 1 B  $?' K ,  then Cn(K o A U {B)) = Cn(K U {B)). 
Since A E K ,  Cn(K U {B)) = Cn(K U {A) U {B)) = Cn(K U {A A B)) = 
K o (A A B). Thus, (U5) holds. 
(b) Assume [K] n [-A] # 8 is a finite set. If [K] n [ l A  V l B ]  is an 
infinite set or A A B $?' v then K o (A A B) = Cn(A A B)  and (U5) holds. 
Suppose [K] n [TA V -B] is finite and A A B E v. So [K o (A A B)] = 
([K] n [A A B]) U {v), while [K o A] = ([K] n [A]) U {v). Since B E v, 
[KO A1 n [Bl = ((([Kl n [All u {v)) n P I )  = ([Kl n [A1 n [BI) U ({v) n PI) 
= ([K] n [A] n [B]) u {v)= [K o (A A B)], thus (U5) is verified. 
(c) If [K] n [lA] is an infinite set then [K] n [ l A  V TB] is also infinite. By 
definition [K o (A A B)] = [A A B] = Cn([A] U [B]) = Cn(K o A U {B)). 
(U6). Suppose B E K o A a n d  A €  K o B .  
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(a) If [K] G [A] then K o A = K .  Since B E K o A, then B E K ,  so 
K o B = K = K o A .  
(b) Assume [K] n [lA] # 0 is a finite set. If A E v then [K o A] = 
([K] n [A]) U {v). Since B E K o A, then ([K] n [A]) U {v) G [B], and 
in particular, B E v. Furthermore [K] n [ l B ]  # 0 is finite. Then, by 
definition, [K o B] = ([K] n [B]) U {v). Since, in addition, A E K o B,  
we obtain that ([K] n [B]) U {v) G (A]. Therefore, (K] n [A] = [K] n [B] 
and hence under the conditions in (b), K o A = K o B. Now suppose 
A g v .  Then [KoA] = [A]. Since B E K o A ,  [A] 2 [B]. As A E K o B ,  
[K o B] [A]. Hence [K o B] # ([K] n [B]) U {v), because we assumed 
A $ v. Hence, it must be that [K o B] = [B], so [B] G [A]. Therefore, [A] 
= [B] and K o A =  K o B .  
(c) Assume [K] n [ lA] is an infinite set. Then, [K o A] = [A]. Since 
B E K o A, then [A] 2 [B]. There are two possibilities for K o B. If 
[K o B] = [B] then, using that A E K 0 B, we obtain [B] [A] and 
[K o A] = [K o B]. If [K o B] = ([K] n [B]) U {v) then B E v and 
[K] n [ lB]  is a finite set. Because A E K o B ,  ([K] n [B]) U {v) G [A], and 
[K] n [B] G [K] n [A]. Then, [K] n [TA] 2 [K] n [+I; but this is impossible 
because we assumed [K] n [ lA] to be an infinite set and [K] n [ l B ]  to be 
finite. 
(U7). We want to prove that if K is a complete theory then K o (AV B) C 
Cn(K o A U K  o B). Assume K is complete. 
If A E K ,  K o A = K and K o (AV B) = K .  Thus, (U7) holds. If -A E K, 
and B E K, then Ko(AvB)  = K o B  = K ,  so (U7) holds. If 1 A  E K ,  and 
l B ~ K , i f A ~ ~ o r B ~ ~ , t h e n K ~ ( A ~ B ) = ~ , a n d e i t h e r K ~ B = ~  
or K o A = v, so (U7) holds. If 1 A  E v and 1 B  E v, then we obtain that 
K o (A V B)  = Cn(A V B), K o B = Cn(B) and K o A = Cn(A). Hence. 
(U7) is verified. 
(U8). Weshow that (KlnKz)0A= (KloA)n(K20A). Let K = KlnK2.  
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(a) Assume A E  K. Then K l o A =  Kl, K 2 0 A =  K2 and K o A = K .  
Therefore (U8) is validated. 
(b) Assume [K] n [ lA]  is a finite non-empty set and A E v. Then, [ K O  A] = 
([K] n [A]) U {v). If each [Ki] n [ lA] ,  for i = 1,2, is a finite set then [Ki o A] 
= ([Ki] n [A]) u {v), i = l ,2.  So [ K O  A] = ([Kl] n [A]) u ([K2] n [A]) u {v) = 
[Kl o A] U [K20A]. Otherwise, suppose [Kl] n [-A] is an infinite set, and say 
A E K2. Then it also holds that [KloA]U[K20A] = (([K1]n[A])u{~))u[K2] 
= (([Kll n [All u{v)) u (W21 n [All = ([Kll n [Al) u{v) u ([Kzl n [Al) = 
(([Kll U [K21) n [All U {v) = ([Kl n [All u{v) = [ K O A l .  
(c )  Assume [K] n [ lA]  is an infinite set or 7 A  E v. If 1 A  E v then 
K o A  = Kl oA = K2 o A = Cn(A), therefore, (U8) holds. Otherwise, either 
[Kl] n [YA] or [K2] n [-A] or both are infinite sets. Clearly [ K  o A] = [A] 
and, say, [Kl] = [A]. So [K o A] = [Kl o A], therefore, independently of 
the value of [K2 o A], we obtain that [ K  o A] = [Kl o A] U [K2 o A]. 
(U9). Assume that K is complete and [ K  o A] n [B] # 0. We prove that 
[ K  o (A A B)] G [ K  o A] n [B]. 
(a) If A E K ,  K o A  = K, by the hypotheses, B E K. So K o ( A A B )  = K .  
Thus, (U9) is verified. 
(b) If A $ K, then since K is complete 1 A  E K. If A E v, K 0 A = v. 
By the hypothesis that [K o A] n [B] # 0 we conclude B E v. Thus, 
[ K o ( A A B ) ]  G [ K o A ] n [ B ] .  Infact, [ K o ( A A B ) ]  = [ K o A ] n [ B ]  = {v). 
I f A $ v ,  [ K o A ]  = [A] and [ K o ( A A B ) ] =  [AAB]. Thus, [ K o A ] n [ B ] =  
[ K  o (A A B)], hence (U9) is verified. 
Now suppose for contradiction that there is a model M = (W, (3,: w E 
W)), where each 5, is a total preorder on W satisfying the limit assump- 
tion and the centering condition, such that VK E K ,  VA E L, K o A = 
K 4 A .  Thus, for every theory K such that [K] is a finite set, and for 
every formula A, if 1 A  E K and A E v, where v is the distinguished point 
appearing in the definition of o above, K o A = K 4 A  = v must hold. This 
translates into the following condition on the model M. 
CHAPTER 5. UPDATE FUNCTIONS 
Now let K be a theory such that [K] is an infinite set and let A E L 
be such that A E v and T A  E K .  Then by  definition of o, [K o A] = 
[A]. However, [K+A] = UxEIKl {y E [A] : y is 5,-minimal in [ A ] )  = {v). 
Because the language is infinite { v )  # [A]. QED 
5.4 A Representation Theorem 
In the previous section we proved that postulates (U0)-(U9) are insufficient 
to characterize the update operation in an infinite language. We propose the 
following postulate as a strengthening of Katsuno and Mendelzon's postulate 
(U8) to achieve the representation result. 
(IU8) If K = n Hi then K O A  = n(HiOA).  
(IU8) states that the update of an intersection is the intersection of the updates. 
Obviously (IU8) implies (U8). We now prove that postulates (U0)-(U9) plus 
(IU8) completely characterize the update operation when infinite languages are 
allowed. We will make use of the following lemma. 
Lemma 5.5 Let 5, a preorder satisfying the limit assumption, an let X ,  Y be 
L-nameable subsets of W. If min5, (X) C Y then min5, (X  n Y) = mind, (X). 
PROOF. Assume min5, (X) G Y. 
(G). Suppose v E mind,,, (X  n Y) but v $Z mind, (X). Then for every 
u E X n Y, v 5, u, but there is some z E X such that z 4, v.  By the 
assumption that mind, (X) 2 Y, z E Y, so z E X n Y. By transitivity of 
+, z +, v ,  contradicting the minimality of v in X n Y. 
(2). Suppose v E mind, (X) but v $2 mind, ( X  n Y). 
Then there is some z E X n Y such that for all u E X n Y, z 4, u. 
By the assumption that min5, (X) C Y, v E Y, moreover v E X n Y. So 
z 4, v ,  contradicting the minimality of v in X .  QED 
5.4. A REPRESENTATION THEOREM 
Theorem 5.6 Let L be a possibly infinite propositional language, and let Cn be 
a classical consequence relation that is compact and satisfies the rule of introduc- 
tion of disjunctions into the premisses. An operator 0 satisfies postulates (U0)- 
(U7), (IU8), (U9) if and only if there exists a model M = (W, (5,: w E W)), 
where each 5, is a total preorder over W centered in w that satisfies the limit 
assumption and for any K E lK, A E L, KOA = K+A. 
[ e l .  We have to  show that the operator 4 satisfies postulates (U0)-(U7), 
(IU8) and (U9). 
(UO) and (Ul). Granted since, by Definition 5.3, [K+A] C [A]. 
(U2). Follows as a consequence of the centering condition. 
(U3). Follows by the definition of min on nonempty sets. 
(U4). Obvious from the semantic definition of the update operation. 
(U5). We have to show that [K4A] n [B] G [K+(AA B)]. If [K+A] f l  [B] = 
0, the inclusion trivially holds. Assume [K+A] n [B] # 0. Let u be any 
in [K+A] n [B]. Then u E U,EIKl{v E [A] : v is 3,-minimal in [A]} n [B] 
= UwEIKl{v E [A] n [B] : v is 5,-minimal in [A]). Let wo E [K] be such 
that u is 5,,-minimal in [A]. That is Vv E [A], u d,, v. A fortiori, 
u E [A] r l  [B]. Thus, there is no v E [A] n [B] such that v 4,, u, SO u is 
indeed 5,-minimal in [A] n [B]. 
(U6). Assume B E K+A and A E K+B. We want to show [K+A] = 
[K+B]. [K+A] = U,,[,] {v E [A] : v is 5,-minimal in [A]}. By the 
hypothesis that B E K+A, [K+A] G [B]. So, [K4A] = Uwt [K] {v E [A] fl 
[B] : v is 5, -minimal in [A]n[B]). Similarly, [K+B] = UWElKl{v E [B] : 
v is 5,-minimal in [B]), and by the hypothesis that A E K+B,  [K+B] C 
[A]. Hence, [K4B] = UwEIKl {v E [A]n[B] : v is 5,-minimal in [A]n[B]). 
Therefore, [K+A] = [K+B], as required. 
(U7). We have to prove that when [K] is a singleton [K+A] n [K+B] C 
[K+(A V B)]. Assume [K] = {u}. Then, [K+A] = {v E [A] : v is 3,- 
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minimal in [A]), while [K+B] = {v E [B] : v is 5,-minimal in [B]). Fur- 
thermore [K+(A V B)] = {v E [A V B] : v is 5,-minimal in [A V B]) = 
{V E [A] U [B] : v is &minimal in [A] U [B]) = {v E [A] U [B] : v is 5,- 
minimal in [A] or v is 5,-minimal in [B]). And finally, [K+A] n [K+B] 
= {v E [A] n [B] : v is 5, -minimal in [A] and v is 5, -minimal in [B]). 
Thus, [K+A] n [K+B] C [K+(A V B)]. 
(IU8). Assume [K] = IJiEIIKi] to show [K+A] = UiE,[Ki+A]. By 
definition, [K+A] = UwEU,,r[K.I{v E [A] : v is 5,-minimal in [A]) = 
UiEl(UwEIK,l {v E [A] : v is 5, -minimal in [A])) = UiEIIKi+A]. 
(U9). Assume [K] = {u)  and ([K+A]) n [B] # 0. We have to show 
[K+(A A B)] G [K+A] n [B]. Suppose there is some y E [K+A A B] but 
y 6 [K+A] n [B]. Then [K+A] C [TB], contradicting [K+A] n [B] # 0. 
[+I. Let 0 be a change function satisfying (U0)-(U7), (IU8) and (U9). 
We will construct a model M = (W, (5,: w E W)) such that for every 
theory K E IK and formula A E L, KOA = K+A. 
We start by defining the model M. The domain W will be the set of all 
complete consistent theories in the language L. Assume (5,: w E W) 
is any set of total preorders satisfying the centering condition, the limit 
assumption and the following condition: 
(i.) v 5, u iff there exists A E v n u  such that v E [wOA] or there exists 
no satisfiable A such that u E [wOA]. 
In the limiting case when K is the inconsistent theory or A is unsatisfiable, 
KQA and K+A agree. We will now prove, for K and A satisfiable, that 
u E [KOA] iff u E [K+A] by analyzing the different cases. 
Suppose [K] = {w). 
[KOA] G [K+A]. Let v E [KOA]. By postulate (Ul), [KOA] C [A], 
so v E [A]. By (i.), for every u E [A], v 5, u. Hence, v E {y E [A] : 
y is 5,-minimal in [A])= [K+A]. 
5.5. PROPERTIES 
[K+A] 5 [KOA]. Let v E [K+A]. By definition of +, v f {y E [A] : 
y is 5,-minimal in [A]). So for all u E [A], v 5, u; thus, by (i.), v E 
[w 04. 
The general case, [K] > 1. 
[KVA] c [K+A]. Let v E [KOA]. By postulate (IU8), if [K] = UiEIIKi] 
then [KOA] = U,,,[KiVA]. 
In particular, [K] = UiEIITi] for complete theories Ti. Thus, v E 
UiEIITiVA]. Hence, v must be in, say, some [T,OA], j E I. Then, by 
the previous case, v E [Tj+A]. Therefore, v E UwEIKl{y E [A] : y is 5, 
-minimal in [A])= [K+A]. 
[K+Al C_ [KOAJ. Let v E [K+A]. Then, v E UwEIKl{y E [A] : 
y is 5,-minimal in [A]). In particular, there exists some w E [K] such 
that v E {y E [A] : y is 5, -minimal in [A]). By the previous case, 
v E [wVA]. But [K] = UiEI [TJ for complete theories T,, such that w = Tj ,  
for some j E I. By postulate (IU8) we obtain that when [K] = Ui,,[Ki], 
[KOA] = [TjVA] U (UiEI,i+j[TiOA]). Hence v E [KVAI. QED 
Katsuno and Mendelzon's characterization results based on partial orders as 
opposed to partial pre-orders also lift to the infinite case, replacing postulate 
(U8) with postulate (IU8). 
5.5 Properties 
Keller and Winslett's [1985] first insightful distinction about two fundamentally 
different operations has been taken as a fundamental one in theory change. 
In what sense are revision and update so fundamentally different operations? 
AGM expansions, revisions and contractions are also different operations from 
one another, but not fundamentally so. Revisions and contractions are interde- 
finable, and that expansions are a limiting case of revisions. Most importantly, 
all AGM functions can be understood in the same semantic framework. 
However, revision and update have been given different types of semantics. 
Update has a characteristic pointwise semantics that appears in no represen- 
tation of the AGM functions. Namely, AGM revision has been recast as some 
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ordering over maximal non-implying sets, entrenchment orderings, plain s y s  
tems of spheres and safe hierarchies; all single global orderings. In Chapter 6 
we will show that it is possible to define an AGM operation based on the update 
semantic apparatus, our analytic revision function. 
Among the formal distinctions between revision and update, we have ob- 
served that updates have been defined over propositional languages while revi- 
sions are for general languages. But, as we have seen, nothing crucial relies on 
this difference being possible to characterize the update operation for infinite 
languages. Another difference is that update is truly a binary function, while, 
as we already remarked, general AGM functions are unary. Moreover, there 
is a fundamental property that relates the update of two theories: the update 
function is monotone with respect to its first argument, the second held fixed. 
Monotony is a direct consequence of postulate (IU8) and the fact that 0 always 
returns a theory, i.e., KOA = Cn(K0A). 
Observation 5.7 0 satisfies Monotony. 
PROOF. Assume K G H. Then K = KnH. By (IU8) KOA= KOAnHOA C 
HOA. QED 
Let's concentrate now on the properties we presented in section 3.3. Since 0 
validates (U8) it also validates Weak Intersection and D-ventilation. Katsuno 
and Mendelzon have defined a notion of erasure associated to that of update, 
which is defined via the Harper identity. Namely, K - A = K n KOA. Using the 
Levi identity erasure and update are interdefinable; hence, KOA = ( K  - -A) + 
A, where + as the standard expansion function. Our first observation indicates 
that the update operator is not permutable, since the update operation does 
not overcome the inconsistent theory. 
Observation 5.8 0 is not not permutable. 
PROOF. For K a consistent theory such that T A  in K ,  K - 1 A  = K n KOA 
is a consistent theory, such that -A $! K - TA. 
However, ( K  + A) equals L, the inconsistent theory, and applying the 
Harper identity, L - -A = L n LO-A= L. 
Therefore, ( K  - -A) + A # ( K  + A) - -A. 
5.5. PROPERTIES 
t . 
8 i.. 
8 r 
The update function does not validate Union, Weak Union, Elimination, nor 
Commutativity. For ease of presentation we will write again the the different 
properties, putting a generic function o : lK x L + lK. 
(Union) Cn(Kl U K2) o A = Cn((Kl o A) U (K2 o A)). 
(Weak Union) If TA E K1 n K2, then Cn(Kl U K2) o A = Cn((K1o A) U 
(K2 0 A)). 
(Elimination) ( K  o A) o B = K o (A A B). 
(Commutativity) (K o A) o B = (K o B) o A. 
Observation 5.9 There exist update functions violating each of Union, Weak 
Union, Commutativity and Elimination. 
PROOF. Let L be a propositional language based on just two propositional 
letters A and B. Let K = Cn(1A A TB). Suppose [A] = {wl, wz) and 
[Bl = (201, w3) 
Let's first prove that the update function fails Union. Let O be any one 
satisfying the following pairs of the respective centered preorder relations; 
let wl +,, w2, w2 WI and wz +,, WI. 
Therefore, [K] = {w4) and [KOA] = [K] = {wl). But [Cn(-A)OA] = 
{wl, w2) and [Cn(43)OA] = {w2). Thus, 0 does not satisfy Union since, 
Cn(K1 U K2)OA # Cn((K1OA) U (K2OA)). 
The same example shows that 0 does not satisfy Weak Union. To see 
that the function does not validate Commutativity, let 0 be an update 
function such that w3 +w, w4, w1 +w3 wg and let [K] = {w2). 
Then [KOA] = {wz), [KOAOB] = (~31, [KOB] = {w3) and 
[KOBOA] = {wl). Thus, KOAOB # KOBOA. This example also 
shows that KOAOB # KO(A A B), since [KO(A A B)] = {wl) and 
[KOAOBI = ( ~ 3 ) .  QED 
Interestingly 0 fails (Or-Left) but satisfies (Or-Right). 
(Or-Right) If D E (KoA)oC and D E (KoB)oC then D E (Ko(AVB))oC. 
(Or-Left) I ~ D E ( K ~ ( A V B ) ) O C ~ ~ ~ ~ D E ( K ~ A ) O C ~ ~ D E ( K O B ) O C .  
Observation 5.10 O validates Or-Right but fails Or-Left. 
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PROOF. (Or-Right). Assume (1) D E (KOA)OC and (2) D E (K0B)OC. 
[KOA V B] = UwEIKl{v E [A v B] : v E mindw ([A V B])) = 
UWE[K]{~  IA1 IB1 : mindw (LA] [BI)} = 
UWE[K]{~  : [BI))U UWE[K]{~  6 [B] : E 
mindw ([A1 U [BI)). 
since UwEIK1{v E [A] : 21 E min5,([A] U [B])) C [KOA], and UwEIKl{v E 
[B] : v E mindw ([A] U [B])) C [KOB], we obtain that [KOA V B] 5 
[KOAI lJ [KOBI. 
[(KOA V B)OCl = Uw,[K0A,B1{v E [Cl : 'U E mindw([cl)} C 
U W E [ K ~ A ] { ~  [Cl : mindw([CI))U U W ~ [ K ~ B ] { ~  E [C] : 21 E 
([CI)}. 
BY (1) U w , [ ~ O ~ I  {v E [CI : v E mindw ([CI)) [Dl, 
and b ~ ( 2 )  UwElKoB1 {V E [c] : v E mindw([C])) G [D]. 
Therefore, [(KOA V B) OC] C [Dl. 
(Or-Left). Let L be a propositional language based on four propositional 
letters A, B ,  C and D.  Let K = Cn(7A A TB A 7C)  = w5 n w6. w2 = 
~ ~ ( A A ~ B A C A D ) ,  wg = ~ ~ ( T A A B A C A D ) ,  and w3 = Cn(AABACA7D), 
Let's prove that the update function fails Or-Left. Let 0 be any one 
satisfying the following pairs of the respective centered preorder relations; 
let wz +,, wi for all i # 5,6, wg +,, wi for all i < 6, and wg +w5 wi for 
all i # 2,5, w3 +,, wi for all i # 9,6. 
Therefore, [K] = {w5, w6} and [KO(A V B)] = {wa, wg). Since w2, wg E 
[C] and w2, wg E [Dl then [KO(A V B)OC] = {w2, wg} and D E KO(A V 
B)OC. 
On the one hand [KOA] = {w2, w3}. Since w2, w3 E [C], [KOBOC] = 
{wa, WQ). Since ws # [Dl, D # KOAOC. 
On the other hand [KOB] = {w3,wg}. Since w3,wg E [C], [KOBOC] = 
{w3, wg}. Since ws # [Dl, D $! KOBOC. QED 
Let's turn our attention to Lehmann's postulates for iterated change. The 
postulates that deal with iteration are not validated by the update operation. 
5.5. PROPERTLES 
(11) K o A is a consistent theory. 
(12) A E KO A. 
(13) If B E K o A ,  t h e n A >  B E K. 
( 1 4 ) I f A ~ K t h e n K o B ~ o  ... o B , = K o A o B 1 o  ... o B n f o r n L 1 .  
(15) If A E Cn(B), then K o A o B o B1o . . . 0 Bn = K 0 B 0 B1o . . . 0 B,. 
(16) If T B  # K o A  then KoAoBoB1o.. .oBn = KoAo(AAB)oBlo. ..oB,. 
(17) K o 7 B  o B C Cn(K U {B)). 
Observation 5.11 
i) All update functions satisfy (Il), (I2), (I3), (14). 
ii) There exist update functions violating (I5), (16) and (17). 
PROOF. The violation of (I5), (16) and (17) can be proved by constructing a 
counterexample. 
(11) , (I2), (I3), (14) follow from postulates (U0)-(U5). 
Updates do not validate any of Darwiche and Pearl's postulates [1997]. 
(Cl) If A E Cn(B) then ( K  o A) o B = K o B. 
(C2) If 7A E Cn(B) then ( K  o A) o B = K o B. 
((23) 1 f A ~ K o B t h e n A E ( K o A ) o B .  
( C 4 ) I f 7 A # K o B t h e n 7 A $ ? ( K o A ) o B .  
(C5) I f 7 B ~ K o A a n d A $ K o B t h e n A # ( K o A ) o B .  
( C ~ ) I ~ ~ B E K ~ A ~ ~ ~ ~ A E K O B ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A E ( K O A ) O B .  
Observation 5.12 There exist update functions violating (C1)-(C6). 
Finally, we observe that the update function validates none of the postulates 
for iterated change associated to iterative schemes. 
(T) K o A o B = K o B .  
(C) I f - B E K o A , ~ ~ ~ ~ K o A o B = K o B .  
(I) K o A o B = K o ( A A B )  
(MI 
, if l B € C n ( A )  
K o A o B =  
K o (A A B) , otherwise. 
Observation 5.13 There exist update functions violating (T) ,(M),(I) and (C). 
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Chapter 6 
Analytic AGM Functions 
In this chapter we will resume the discussion we initiated in Chapter 5 about the 
difference between AGM revision and update and we will end up establishing a 
bridge between the two kinds of change. We will provide a new presentation of 
AGM revision based on the update semantic apparatus, a pointwise semantics 
for revision. Our strategy will be to define a new semantic operation as a variant 
of the update operation that we will dub analytic revision. The key idea is that 
for each theory K we will define a preorder relation obtained from the indexed 
relations of an update model. We will show that our analytic revision is indeed 
a binary AGM function, that is defined for every theory and every formula. 
Theorem 6.15 is the main theorem of this chapter, and provides a charac- 
terization of analytic functions as those AGM functions satisfying (K*l)-(K*8) 
plus two new postulates, (K*3) and (K*V), governing the revision of different 
theories. 
This study builds on our initial work in [~echer,  1995bl. In that paper 
our current analytic function was called a "lazy update" reflecting that it was 
semantically defined as a variant of the standard update operation. Lazy update 
were just defined for finite languages and we proved they satisfy all AGM revision 
postulates. 
The independent work of Schlechta, Lehmann and Magidor's "Distance Se- 
mantics for Belief Revision" [Schlechta et al., 19961 turned out to be related 
to ours. Notably, their revision function based on distances and our analytic 
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revision function are definitionally equivalent, modulo some considerations over 
the formal structures they are based on. Our work extends and continues theirs 
in several respects. We consider an infinite language and we obtain characteri- 
zation results for functions built over non symmetric distances -a question left 
open in [Schlechta et al., 19961. Also novel in our work is the definition of AGM 
revision in the update semantic structure, which allows us to connect these two 
seemingly incomparable forms of theory change. 
6.1 Analytic revision functions 
Our aim is to define the AGM revision function in the semantic framework 
of update. We start by noticing some important particularities of the update 
function which are not shared with revision. As we already remarked in Chap- 
ter 5 update is an "authentic" binary function, but general AGM revisions are 
not. Another difference is how they deal with the inconsistent theory. In the 
update setup the inconsistent theory is a sink from which the change function 
cannot escape. In contrast, the revision of even the inconsistent theory should 
be consistent as far as the new information is (by postulate (K*5)); i.e. revision 
can recover from inconsistency, update cannot overcome it. Finally, following 
the ideal of minimal change, a consistent revision always coincides with an ex- 
pansion (by (K*3) and (K*4)), which does not hold for update. And a crucial 
consideration is that update possesses a pointwise semantics, that appears in 
no presentation of the AGM theory. 
Consider a theory as a set of possible scenarios. Katsuno and Mendelzon's 
operation can be calculated by means of a case analysis over the set of complete 
scenarios compatible with the original theory. First, for each case find out 
its closest outcome that accommodates the new information; then take as the 
overall result what is common to all outcomes. Even though for each case the 
closest outcome entailing the new information is selected, some outcomes could 
be relatively implausible. Could we have a measure to determine when one 
outcome is more plausible than another? What is a sensible notion to compare 
outcomes? We suggest that one outcome is more plausible than another when 
it is at  a closer distance from the theory under change. We will first formalize a 
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notion of distance we will be concerned with, and then define a new operation 
that picks as a result of the change just the outcomes that are minimally distant. 
We will call this operation an analytic revision. 
A distance is a binary function f : X x X -+ Y, such that X is a set and Y 
is a totally ordered set with minimal element, satisfying that f (x, y) = min(Y) 
iff x = y (centering) and f (x, y) = f (y , x) (symmetry). But there are weaker 
notions. Ultrametric distances satisfy the centering and the triangular inequality 
and pseudo distances just satisfy the centering condition. Since we seek the 
connection between revision and update, we are interested in a notion of distance 
that corresponds to the proerders of update models. Thus, we shall be concerned 
with pseudo distances only, and making some language abuse we will refer to 
them just as distances. 
Assume L is a possibly infinite propositional language, and W is the set of 
all it maximal consistent sets. Let's recall Definition 5.3. An update model is a 
structure M = (W, {A,: w E W)), such that each 5, is a total preorder over 
W satisfying the centering condition and the limit assumption. 
It is possible to recast an update model into a model based on functions 
having as range any totally ordered set with smallest element. We will consider 
the set RS of real numbers greater or equal to 0, but any other (not well 
founded) totally ordered set with smallest element would do. It is clear how 
each total preorder in the update model induces a function d, such that all the 
information encoded in 5, is placed in d, : W + R. 
v A, u iff d,(v) I d,(u). 
The centering condition establishes a restriction on the possible values of the 
functions. 
(centering) d,(w) = 0 and for every v E W such that v # w, &(v) > 0. 
For each indexical total preorder 5, the limit assumption requires that for each 
L-nameable set (by a single formula) [A] there exists some 5,-minimal elements 
of [A]. 
(limit assumption) For each x E W, for each [A] W, there are y E [A] such 
that VY' E [A], d, (Y) I dZ(yf). 
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The update of K by A is defined as: 
KOA = Th( U {v E [A] : dw(v) = d,([A]))). 
w d K 1  
Just for convenience we give the following 
Definition 6.1 (Distance between two points) Let an update model M = 
(W, {d, : w E W)) be given. We define the distance function d : W x W -+ R 
between pairs of worlds v, w as the value of w in d,: d(v, w) = d,(w). 
Since functions d, obey the centering condition, the distance from a point 
to itself is 0 and the distance from a point to every other point is greater than 0. 
We will require no further properties on d for the moment. Notice in particular 
that this conception of distance is not symmetric since d(w, v) may differ from 
d(v, w). Boutilier (personal communication) has provided a good rational for it: 
"The lack of symmetry seems certainly appropriate when the ordering mirrors 
exogenous change; for instance, it is quite easy to break an egg while it is 
hopeless to put it back together." 
We shall extend the above definition to distance between sets, as the result 
of a double minimization. The definition of d : P(W) x P(W) -t .R covers the 
limiting case of the empty proposition in a way that will be convenient. 
Definition 6.2 (Distance from a set to a set) Let d be a distance function 
obtained from an update model (W, {d, : w E W)). Let X ,  Y be subsets of W. 
Let f : W -+ IR be any positive (greater that 0) function. We define. 
minZEx minVEy{d(x, y)) , if X,  Y # 0. 
, i f X = 0 , Y # 0 .  
, if Y = 0. 
From now on we assume the extended distance function and, abusing nota- 
tion, we will write singleton sets without braces, i.e. we will write d(u, v) instead 
of d({u}, {v)). As before, notice the lack of symmetry: in general d(X, Y) is dif- 
ferent from d(Y, X). Furthermore we will directly consider models M = (W, d) 
instead of the indexical models as we can straightforwardly move from one to 
the other. We are ready now to give the formal semantic definition of analytic 
revision. 
6.2. CONNECTIONS 
Definition 6.3 (Analytic revision) Let M = (W, d) be a model and X, Y 
W, then the analytic revision : P(W) x P(W)  -t P(W) is defined as 
The syntactic counterpart taking as arguments a theory and a formula, 6 : 
lK x L -t lK is simply 
K i A  = Th([K] [A]). 
6.2 Connect ions 
6.2.1 Analytic revision and update 
The crucial semantic difference between analytic revision and update is that 
analytic operation relies on two minimizations while the update just one. As a 
direct consequence an analytic revision ignores some of the possible outcomes 
that an update would consider. Then the theory resulting from an analytic 
revision is at  least as informed as that of an update. 
Observation 6.4 If K is consistent, KVA KiA. 
PROOF. We want to show that X Y is included in XVY. Suppose y E 
X Y. Then min,,x{d(x, y)) = min,Ex,y~Ey{d(x, y')). Fix a value 
xo of x E X such that d(xo, y) = minZEx{d(x, y)). Then d(xo, y) = 
min,Ex,y~Ey{d(x,y'). Hence d(xo,y) = min,,Ey{d(xo,y'). Hence y E 
XOY. QED 
The reason for this observation being relative to the consistency of K is that the 
update function of the inconsistent theory results in the inconsistent theory. In 
contrast, analytic revision overcomes inconsistency. The following result asserts 
that when the theory is also complete the two operations coincide. 
Observation 6.5 If K is consistent and complete then K i A  = KVA. 
PROOF. The proof is quite trivial. Let K be consistent and complete, so its 
proposition is a singleton [K] = {u). 
Then, [KVA] = IJiErKl{w E [A] : di(w) = di([A])) = {w E [A] : &(w) = 
du([A])) = {w E [A] : d([Kl,w) = d([Kl, [A])) = [Kl [A]. QED 
CHAPTER 6. ANALYTIC AGM FUNCTIONS 
We establish precisely the connection between analytic revision and update, 
generalizing the two results above. 
Observation 6.6 Let K be a consistent theory and (W, d) a structure for the 
update operation 0. Then for every formula A there exists a consistent theory 
K' > K such that KsA = K'OA. In particular, K' may be chosen as Th({w E 
[K] : d(w, [A]) = d([K], [A]))). (Notice that Kt depends on A.) 
PROOF. By Observation 6.4 we know that taking K' = K provides us with 
a theory that is too weak to  satisfy the observation. Let's study this in 
detail. 
If A is a satisfiable formula, [A] # 0, so [KOA] is not empty. 
By definition [KOA] = UwEIKl{~ E [A] : dW(v) = dw([A])) = UwEIK1{v E 
[A] : d(w, v) = d(w, [A])) = 
U{{v E [A] : d(w,v) = d(w, [A])) : w E [Kl and d(w, [A]) = d([K], [A])) 
U 
U{{v E [A] : d(w,v) = d(w, [All) : w E [KI and d(w, [All > d([KI, [A])). 
Thus, [K'] should be chosen as [K'] = {w E [K] : d(w, [A]) = d([K], [A])) 
in which case K'OA = KiA.  QED 
The next lemma states that when a formula is consistent with the theory, the 
analytic revision operation is just the addition of the formula to the theory. 
Lemma 6.7 If A is consistent with K ,  then KsA = Cn(K U { A ) ) .  
PROOF. Assume A is consistent with K .  Then [K] n [A] # 0. By the centering 
condition d([K], [A]) = 0 and for any v # [K],d([K],v) > 0. Then by 
Definition 6.3, [K] [A] = {w E [A] : d([K], w) = 0). Thus, [K] [A] = 
[Kl n [A]. QED 
In spite of the technical connection it is not surprising to find that the analytic 
revision is not an update operator. 
Observation 6.8 G satisfies (U0)-(U7) and (U9), fails (IU8) and fails 
monotony. 
6.2. CONNECTIONS 
PROOF. Let's see first that 6 satisfies (U1)-(U7) and (U9). 
(UO) and (Ul) are granted since by Definition 6.3, [K] [A] C_ [A]. 
(U2) follows as a direct consequence of Lemma 6.7. 
(U3) is a consequence of the limit assumption of d. 
(U4) is obvious from the semantic definition of analytic revision. 
( U S )  ' We have to show that ( [K] [A]) n [B] g [K] [A A B] . If ( [K] 
[A]) f l  [B] = 0, the inclusion trivially holds. 
Assume ([K]. [A]) n[B] # 0. By Definition 6.3, ( [K]  [A]) n[B] = {w € [A] : 
d([Kl, w) = d([Kl, [A])}  n [Bl = {w E [A1 n [Bl : d([Kl,w) = d([Kl, [A])) .  
Also, [K] [ (A  A B)] = {W E [A] n [B] : d([K], W )  = d([K],  [A] n [B])}. 
Suppose for contradiction that (1) u E ( [ K ]  [A]) n [B], and ( 2 )  u $2 
[K] [ (A  A B)]. From (1) we obtain (3) u E [A] n [B], while ( 2 )  can be 
rewritten as (2') u $2 (w E [A] n [B] : d([K], w) = d([K], [A] f l  [B])}. 
Then by (2') and (3) we obtain (4) d([K],u) > d([K], [A] n [B]). By (1) 
we have that d([K],u)  = d([K], [A]), and (3) assures that u E [A] f l  [B]. 
Hence we obtain d([K],  u )  = d([K],  [A] n [B]),  contradicting (4). 
(U6) Assume B E K6A and A E KGB. Since d([K],[A]) =
min,EIKl min,EIAl{d(x, y)}, there exists v E [K] [A] such that d([K],  v) = 
d([K],  [A]). Similarly, there exists w E [K] [B] such that d( [K],  w) = 
d( [Kl, PI 1. 
Since [K] [A] C [B], then d([K], [A]) = d([K], v) 2 d([K],  [B]). Also 
since [K] [B] G [A] d([K], [B]) = d([K],  w) 2 d([K],  [A]). We obtain 
d([Kl, [Al) 2 d([Kl, PI) 2 d([Kl, [Al) , thus, d([Kl, [All = d([Kl, [BI). We 
conclude, [K] [A] = [K] [B], as required. 
(U7) Assume [K] = {u}, then distance from [K] is exactly distance from u 
and d(u, [AvB]) = d(u, [A]u[B]) = min{d(u, [A]),  d(u, [B])) .  Without loss 
of generality assume d(u, [A]) 5 d(u, [B]). Then [K] [A V B] = [K] [A]; 
hence, ( [K]  [A]) n ( [K]  [BI) C [K] . [A V B]. 
(U9)' We have to show that if [K] is a singleton and ( [K]  [A]) n [B] is not 
empty then ( [K]  [AA B])  C ([K]  [A]) n[B]. Assume (1)  ( [K]  [A]) n[B] # 
l ~ o t i c e  that this postulate corresponds to the AGM revision postulate (K*7). 
2 ~ o t i c e  that this ~ostulate is a particular case of the AGM revision postulate (K*8). 
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0. Then there is some x E [A] n [B] such that d([K], [A]) = d([K], x). 
Suppose (2) [K] [A A B] ([K] [A]) n [B]. Then there is some u E 
[K] [A A B)]) but u @ ([K] [A]) n [B]. By (1) and (2) we obtain (3) 
d([K], [A A B]) = d([K], u) > d([K], [A]). By Definition 6.3 and (3), for 
every w E [A], if d( [K] , w) = ( [K] , [A]) then w E [A] U [TB], contradicting 
(1). Notice for later use that for this proof we have not made use of the 
hypothesis that [K] is a singleton. 
To prove that s fails postulate (IU8) suffices to to provide witnesses to 
(X U Y) Z # (X Z) U (Y 2) .  Let X, Y, Z C_ W non-empty, such that 
X n Z = 0 a n d Y n Z # 0 .  Hence ( X u Y ) n Z = Y n Z # 0 .  
ByLemma6.7,Y.Z=YflZand ( X U Y ) . Z =  ( X U Y ) n Z = Y n Z .  
Therefore, (X U Y) Z = Y Z. From postulate (U3) proved above, 
X . Z # 0 .  
Since X Z may not be included in Y Z, (U8) may not be satisfied. 
For instance let X = {x) C_ [A A lB], Y = {y) G [A A B A C], Z = [B], 
and let v E [B A l C ] .  Let d,, d, satisfy the centering condition such that, 
d,(v) = 1. Then, v E X Z and Y Z = {y}. Thus, (X U Y) Z is 
different from ( X  Z) U (Y 2) .  
That s fails monotony can be proved using the same strategy of Observa- 
tion 2.1. QED 
The analytic revision operation relies only on those possible worlds that regard 
the change as minimally distant from the theory under change. Then, if possi- 
ble, the analytic revision will understand new information as having caused no 
change at all, a mere confirmation of what already was a possibility in our pic- 
ture of the world. This behaviour has been stated as Lemma 6.7 and is shared 
with AGM revision. In the next section we will show that AGM revisions and 
analytic revisions are indeed connected. 
6.2.2 Analytic revision and AGM revision 
First we will note that the analytic revision function 6 satisfies the AGM p o s  
tulates (K*l)-(K*8). 
6.2. CONNECTIONS 
Theorem 6.9 6 is a revision operator satisfying (K*l)-(K*8). 
PROOF. Most postulates follow directly from Definition 6.3 or from Lemma 6.7. 
(K*7) and (K*8) have been proved as postulates (U5) and (U9) respec- 
tively, in Observation 6.8. QED 
It is important to remark that the key idea behind an analytic revision is to 
define a meaningful distance relation between sets in terms of the functions dw 
(which in turn were obtained from the ternary relations 5,). For example, a 
candidate distance from a theory K could have been any arbitrary dv. But it is 
evident that the change operation this approach would induce does not satisfy 
the complete set of AGM revision postulates. 
Observation 6.10 Assume L a language with at least two propositional letters, 
K an incomplete theory of L, v E [K] a single element of W and dv an real 
function for v satisfying the centering condition. Let o be a change operation 
for K defined as K o A = Th({y E A : dv(y) = dv([A]))). Then o satisfies 
(K*l) ,(K*2),(K*5)-(K*8) but in general fails (K*3) (K*4). 
PROOF. (K*l),(K*2),(K*5)-(K*8) have identical proofs as those in Theo- 
rem 6.9. 
(K*3). Since we assume K is not complete then there is a formula A 
such that A,TA 9 K. Then, either v E [A] or v E [-A]. Without loss of 
generality, suppose v E [-A]. Then, there is some x E [K] n [A]. We show 
a counterexample to (K*3) such that x # [K o A]. Since L has at least 
two propositional letters, there is some u E [A], u # x. Let dv(u) < dv (5). 
Then, x # [K o A] = {y E [A] : dv(y) = dv([A])), as x is not a minimal 
element in dv satisfying A. 
If we add to the the previous counterexample that u $! [K] and dv(u) = 
d, ([A]), then postulate (K*4) also fails as u E [K o A] but u 9 [K] n [A]. 
QED 
Distance from theory K becomes the standard ordering used in the semantic 
presentations of AGM revision (a world w is as close as v from theory K if and 
only if the distance from [K] to w is not greater than the distance from [K] to 
v). 
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Theorem 6.9 shows that every analytic revision function is an AGM revision 
function. However, what is most interesting about analytic revision is that a 
transitively relational AGM revision function is an analytic revision. Only after 
this result we can speak of a true connection between AGM revision and the 
semantic structure of update. 
Theorem 6.11 (Makinson, personal communication) Every revision 
function * for K satisfying the extended set of AGM postulates (K*l)-(K*8) is 
an analytic revision function for K. 
PROOF. Let * be an AGM revision function for K satisfying (K*l)-(K*8). By 
Grove's result, there is a system of spheres SK for K that represents *. 
By Observation 2.14 SK induces an real function dK on W into the reals 
greater or equal 0, satisfying (centering) and (Limit Assumption). 
The proof of the theorem just consists in showing that any real function 
d : W + R+ satisfying (centering) and (Limit Assumption) can be ex- 
tended to a distance function, obtaining the semantic structure of analytic 
revision. We define d : W x W + Rf as follows. 
i. Vw,v E [K], w # v, d(w,v) = 1, 
ii. Vw E W, d(w, w) = 0, 
iii. Vw E [K], Vv E W \ [K] , d(w, v) = dK (v), 
iv. Vw E W \ [K],Vv E W,d(w,v) = g,(v), 
where gw : W + Rf is any function at  all assigning values greater than 
0. We extend d as a function on sets as usual, taking d(O, v) = dK (v), for 
the empty set. We have to check that the function d is of the kind needed 
to generate a analytic revision operation. We just check that the induced 
relations 5, over W defined by setting 
u 5, v iff d(w,u) I d(w,v), for all u,v, E W 
satisfy (1) 3, is a a total preorder on W, and (2) 3, is centered at w; 
i.e. if v 5, w then v = w. 
6.2. CONNECTIONS 
Now (1) is immediate. To prove ( 2 ) ,  let u E W with u # W .  We want 
to show that w 4, u; i.e. that if u # w then d(w,w) < d(w,u). By the 
second case of our definition of d, d(w, w) = 0 for all w E W ,  hence we 
have to show that for w # u, d(w, u) > 0. If u, w are both in [K] ,  then by 
the first case d(w,u) = 1 > 0. If w is not in [K],  it follows from the fourth 
case that d(w, u) > 0. If w in [K] and u is not, then d(w, u)  = r(u) > 0 
since r is itself centered in [K]. Thus in all cases d(w, u)  > 0 and we are 
done. 
It is immediate from the definition of d that (3) for all u, v E W \ [K] ,  
for any w E [K],  d(w,v) 5 d(w,u) iff d ~ ( v )  I d ~ ( u )  iff cK(v) C cK(u), 
and (4) for any u, w E [K] and for all v E W \ [K] , d(w,v) = d(u, V )  = 
d([Kl, v )  = ~ K ( ' u ) .  
Now let be the analytic revision function determined by the struc- 
ture (W, d ) .  We have to show that for all A, [K * A] = [K] [A]. 
If [K] n [A] # 0,  by (K*4) in Lemma 6.7 we have [K * A] = [K] fl 
[A] = [K] [A]. Suppose [K] n [A] = 0. By definition of analytic 
revision and (4) [K] [A] = {v E [A] : d([K],v)  = d([K], [A]))  = 
{v E [A] : d ~ ( v )  is <-minimal in {dK(w) : w E [A]))= {v E [A] : 
v is in the c-minimal sphere in S that intersects [A]) = (by (3) above) 
[K * A]. QED 
We observe in the proof above and also in Definition 6.2 that we have consid- 
erable freedom when defining the behaviour for the revision of the inconsistent 
theory. For example we could require what Makinson called the Overkilling 
property (0). It  says that the analytic revision of an inconsistent theory should 
result in plain acceptance of the new information. Coincidentally, this property 
defines the revision of the inconsistent theory in [Schlechta et al., 19961. 
(0)  If K is inconsistent then K A = Cn(A). 
The analytic revision function that comply with (0) can be characterized by 
the function f : W -+ R+ involved in the definition of d (see Definition 6.2). 
Observation 6.12 (Makinson, personal communication) 
(K*l)-(K*8) and ( 0 )  if and only if f is a constant function. 
satisfies 
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PROOF. i satisfies (K*l)-(K*8) and (0) iff, by Theorem 6.9 and 6.11, i is 
a analytic revision in (W,d) s.t. if K is inconsistent then KSA = Cn(A) 
iff * is a analytic revision in (W, d) and for any A, {w E [A] : d(0, w) = 
d(O, [A])) = [A]. Now, {w E [A] : d(0,w) = d(O, [A])) = [A] iff for any v, 
w in [A], f (w)= f (v) iff f is a constant function. QED 
6.3 Representation Theorems 
Theorem 6.11 proved the correspondence between analytic revision and AGM 
transitively relational partial meet revisions of a given theory. However, analytic 
revisions are defined for every theory, not just for a given theory, and the analytic 
revisions of different theories are not independent. Thus the question whether we 
can characterize the family of AGM unary functions corresponding to a given 
analytic operation remains. We are looking for the postulates that link the 
behaviour of revision of different theories. In the case of a finite propositional 
language the needed postulate the D-Ventilation condition that we introduced 
in Chapter 3 as the dual to the Ventilation, which we now name 
(K*fin) (Kl n K2) * A E {K1 * A, K2 * A, (Kl * A) n (K2 * A)). 
(K*fin) forces a constraint between the revision of a theory and the revision of 
theories in which it is included. We can indeed show that in a finite language, 
(K*l)-(K*8) and (K*fin) completely characterize analytic revision functions. 
Theorem 6.13 Given a Mite propositional language L, an operator * sa t is  
fies postulates (K*l)-(K*8) and (K*fin) if and only if there exists an analytic 
revision function i such that for any K E lK, A E L, K * A = KiA. 
PROOF. By Theorem 6.9 we know that i validates (K*l)-(K*8). We shall 
verify that 5 also validates (K*fin) . 
Let M be any model for i M = (W, d), A any formula of L and K any 
theory of L such that K = K1 n K2 for theories Kl,  K2. 
We have to show that in model M ,  [KiA] E {[KliA], [KziA], [(KliA)] U 
[(K26A)II. 
6.3. REPRESENTATION THEOREMS 
By Definition 6.3 [KiA] = {v E [A] : d([K],v) = d([K], [A])). Also by 
definition, d([K], v) = d([K1] U [K2], v) = min{d([K~], v), d([K2], v)) and 
d([Kl, [All = d([KlI U [Kzl, IAl) = min{d([KlI, [Al),d([KzI, [Al)). 
Then either d([K1], [A]) < d([K2], [A]) and KSA = KliA,  or 
d([Kz], [A]) < ~ ( [ K I ] ,  [A]) and KoA = K25A, or ~ ( [ K I ] ,  [A]) = d([K2], [A]) 
and then K i A  = K16A n K2SA. 
By Theorem 6.11, given a fixed theory K ,  * restricted to K is a analytic 
revision function, but a priori, with respect to different models MK, one 
for each theory. We want to prove that this family of functions can actually 
be obtained from a single update model. i.e. that when considered as a 
binary function, * can be obtained in the semantic framework of analytic 
revision. 
Take the following model, M = (W, d) where W is the set of complete, 
consistent theories of the language and d is defined as d(w,v) = dw(v), 
for dw a function characterizing the behaviour of * when taking w fixed 
as first parameter. Also d(0,v) = dO(v). We extend d to a function on 
sets as we did before, by means of the min function. We now proceed by 
induction on the size of K.  
Clearly, if K is empty or a singleton, K * A = KSA, by definition of d. 
Suppose K is not a singleton. 
[KSA G K * A]. We want to show that if w E [K * A] then w E [K] [A]. 
Clearly, KGA = K * A for [K] a singleton or [K] the empty set. 
Assume [K] = {xl,. . . , x,), v E [K * A] and v # [KSA]. Since * validates 
(K*fin) and K is finite, then there must be some x in [K] such that 
v E [x * A]. Let IN = {x E [K] : v E [x * A]). Also, by Definition 6.3 
there must exist some y E [K] such that d(y, [A]) = d([K], [A]). Then 
v # {y)e [A]. Hence v 6 [y*A]. Let OUT= {y E [K] : v # [y*A]). 
Consider the following sets of two elements, {yl, y2) C OUT, then trivially, 
by an application of (K*fin) v # {yl, y2) * A. Take now {x, y) such that 
x E IN and y E OUT, then either (1) d(x, [A]) < d(y, [A]) or (2) d(x, [A]) = 
d(y, [A]) or (3) d(x, [A]) > d(y, [A]). But (1) is impossible since x, y E [K] 
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and d(y, [A]) = d([K], [A]). If (2) holds then, (using that v E [X * A]), 
d(y, [A]) = d(x,v). Therefore, v E [K] [A], contrary to our assumption. 
Then (3) should be the case for any pair x, y. According to our definition of 
dl cty} (A) = c{"ly} (A) and C{"}(A) # C{"~Y) (A). Hence {x, y) * A = y * A, 
therefore, v 6 {x, y) * A. 
Now we are almost done. Notice that by pairing elements of IN with 
elements of OUT we can "delete" the elements of IN from [K]. 1.e. let 
x E IN, y E OUT and write [K] as {x, y) U ([K] \ {x)), then applying 
(K*fin) v E [Th([K] \ {x)) * A]. Because IN is finite, we will finally have 
v E [Th(OUT) * A]. A contradiction. 
[K * A c KGA]. Let u E [KSA] and let x E [K] such that d([K], [A]) = 
d(x,u). Then u E [x*A]. Also, because K is finite, by repeatedly applying 
(K*fin) we have [K*A] = U[Ti*A] for some complete theories Ti extending 
K .  If x = Ti for some i we are done. Suppose u # [Ti * A] for any T,. We 
now use again (K*fin) and comparison of pairs to arrive to a contradiction 
(write [K] = {x, Ti)U([K]\{Ti)) and consider K*A Th({x, T,))*A must 
hold for each Ti). Full details are given for the case of infinite languages 
in Theorem 6.15. QED 
Postulate (K*fin) appears in [Schlechta et al., 19961 as a property that revisions 
based on pseudo distances satisfy. 
The general case is slightly harder. Postulates (K*l)-(K*8) and (K*fin) do 
not fully characterize the operation in a language with an infinite number of 
propositional letters. 
Observation 6.14 Consider an infinite propositional language L. Postulates 
(K*l)-(K*8) and (K*fin) do not fully characterize the S operation. 
PROOF. Given a propositional language L with an infinite but countable num- 
ber of propositional letters we will exhibit a function * satisfying postulates 
(K*l)-(K*8) and (K*fin) for which there is no model M = (W, d), sat is  
fying that VK E K ,  VA E L, K * A = K.A. We define * semantically as 
6.3. REPRESENTATION THEOREMS 
follows. Let K E K ,  A E L and v E [A], then 
[Kl n [A1 , if [Kl n [A1 # 0. 
[K * A] = {v)  I , if [K] n [A] = 0 and [K] is finite. , if [K] n [A] = 0 and [K] is infinite. 
For each incomplete theory K E X such that [K] has a finite number of 
elements (i.e., there are only a finite number of maximal consistent sets 
extending K ) ,  then let *K be a f i e d  AGM maxichoice revision function for 
K always returning one and the same maximal consistent set of A. And 
for each incomplete theory K E K such that [K] has an infinite number 
of elements then let *K be the full meet revision function for K ,  namely 
K * A = Cn(A). 
Clearly * validates (K*fin). If [K] is finite it is easily verified. If [K] is 
infinite, for any theories K1, K2 such that K = Kl f l  K2, either [K1] or 
[Kz] are infinite. Then either Kl * A = Cn(A) or K2 * A = Cn(A), as 
required. 
Suppose for contradiction that there is a model M = (W, d) such that 
for every K E K ,  for every A E L, K * A = Th({y E [A] : d([K],  A) = 
d([Kl, Y))). 
According to our definition of *, for every theory K such that [K]  is 
finite, if [K] n [A] = 0 then [K * A] = {v) .  Therefore d must verify that 
Vx E W,d(x,x)  = 0; Vx,w E W,w # v, d(x,v) < d(x,w). 
For any [K] such that [K]n[A] = 0, Then 0 < d([K],  [A]) = d([K],v) ,  since 
for each x E [K] ,  d(x,v) = d(x, [A]).  Then [K*A] = {y E [A] : d([K] ,A)  =
d([K] ,  y))= {v). This contradicts the case when [K] is infinite, because 
according to our definition [K * A] = [A]. QED 
(K*fin) gives us the following insight: when performing the analytic revision of 
K by A, we should hear the opinions of the theories to which K can be extended. 
If we now turn to the way is defined given K and A, we see that we can always 
identify an element w of [K] which is responsible for defining d([K],  [A]).  Then 
[K] [A] is obtained as the subset of [A] standing at the same distance from [K] 
as w is. These complete theories are clearly the ones we should pay attention 
to. Following this intuition we propose: 
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(K*3) K * A = n(Ti * A), for some complete theories Ti extending K. 
(K*V) If K S K' C T, for T a complete theory then, for all A, K * A C T * A 
implies K * A C  K f * A C _ T * A .  
(K*3) claims there are some complete theories - "the intended interpretations" 
of our theory - that determine the result of the revision. (K*V) expresses the 
primacy of these complete theories and establishes a restricted form of monotony 
for the * operator. In particular, if our theory K is regarded as an intersection 
of two larger theories K1 and Kz, then (K*3) and (K*V) constrain the revision 
of K in terms of the other two. By (K*3) the revision of each K is guided by 
some complete theories. These complete theories either extend Kl or K2 or 
both. Then, by (K*V) the revision of K is included in the revision of KI or in 
the revision of K2, or both. Notice that, in the presence of (K*l)-(K*8), the 
postulates (K*3) and (K*V) imply (K*fin). 
We now prove that the eight AGM postulates plus (K*3) and (K*V) com- 
pletely characterize the analytic revision operation. 
Theorem 6.15 (Representation Theorem, general case) An operator * 
satisfies postulates (K*l)-(K*8), (K*3) and (K*V) if and only if there exists 
a model M = (W, d), where d is a distance function and for any K E K, A E L 
K * A =  KeA. 
PROOF. We have proved in Theorem 6.9 that 0 satisfies postulates (K*l)- 
(K*8). That i validates (K*3) follows immediately from Definition 6.2, 
since min requires the existence of elements in [K] such that their distance 
to [A] is minimal. i also validates (K*V) since for any Y if x E [K] and 
d([K], Y) = d(x, Y) then d(x, Y) = min,EIKl{d(z, Y)). Therefore, for all 
X c [K], if x E X then d(X, Y) = d(x, Y) and d(X, Y) = d([K], Y) as 
required. This proves the right to left implication. 
Let's see the left to right part. Let * be a change function satisfying (K*l)- 
(K*8), (K*3) and (K*V). We will construct a analytic revision model M = 
(W, d) which corresponds to 0 .  
We have to show that VK E K,VA E L, K * A = KiA.  
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We start by defining the model M .  The domain W will be the set of all 
complete theories in the language L. To define the distance function d, 
let { S K )  be the family of systems of spheres corresponding to *. If S K  
is a given system of sphere we note as ST a particular element of it, and 
for a given formula A, cK(A)  is the minimal sphere in S K  with nonempty 
intersection with [A].  
As before, we start by determining the value of d for elements in W and 
then extend the function to subsets of W as in Definition 6.2. Any function 
d : P ( W )  x P ( W )  + R+ satisfying the following restrictions is appropri- 
ate. 
ii. Vv, u ,m ,d (v ,u )  < d(v, m) iff 3Sy,Sz E Swu E S; ,m  E S,"&S," C S> 
iii. Vv, u ,  m, d(v, u )  = d(v, m) iff VS; E Swu E Sy @ m E S;. 
iv. d({x,  y), X )  = d(x ,  X )  iff c{"} (x) = c { " ~ Y } .  
v. d(x ,  X )  < d(y, X )  iff C { " ) ( X )  = c{">y}(X) and C { Y } ( X )  # c{">y} (x). 
vi. d ( x , X )  = d ( y , X )  iff C { " ) ( X )  U C { Y } ( X )  = c{"?y}(X).  
vii. Vv, u ,  m, d(0,u) < d(0,m) iff 3 s f ,  S! E S'U E s f ,  m E s!&s! C si. 
To verify that there are indeed distance functions satisfying i) to vii) above 
is easy. It is also clear that by case vii), when K is the inconsistent theory 
K * A and K*A agree. Furthermore if [A] = 0, by ( K  * 5), K * A = L ,  and 
also K s A  = L by definition. We will now prove, for K and A consistent, 
that u E [ K  * A ]  iff u E [KGA] by analyzing the different cases. 
Suppose [ K ]  = {v ) .  
[KGA C K * A].  Let u E [ K  * A],  to prove (1)  u E {w E [A] : d(w, [ A ] )  = 
d(v, w ) ) .  Let m E [A] be such that d(u, [A] )  = d(v ,m) ,  then (1)  is 
equivalent to (2) d(v, m) = d(v, u ) .  By iii) we have to prove that for 
all s!" E s { ~ } ,  u E sjU} t) m E sjW}. As d(u, [A] )  = d(v, m) then 
m E c { ~ } ( A ) .  Let 5':'' be any. If C { ~ ) ( A )  s?} then both m and u are 
in s!". If s?) C c{")(A), then u $ s!"}. Suppose m E s!"}, but then 
d(v,  [A] )  > d(v, m), a contradiction. 
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[K * A 2 KGA]. To prove the other inclusion, let u E [A] and suppose 
d(v, m) = d(v, u) for m E [A] such that d(u, [A]) = d(v, m). Suppose 
u # c{"}(A). Then by iii) rn c{")(A). Let s!"} be the &-smallest 
such that m E s!"}, c{"}(A) c s!"'. By the limit assumption C{"}(A) 
is defined and let m' E c{"}(A) n [A]. But then by i) d(v,mr) < d(v,m) 
contradicting the selection of m. 
The  general case, [K] > 1. 
[K * A  & KgA]. Let u E [KoA] and let x E [K] be such that d([K], [A]) = 
d(x, u) (notice that then, u E [xiA] and by the previous case u E [x * A]). 
By (K*3), [K r A] = U[Ti * A] for some complete theories extending K. If 
for some i, u E [Ti * A] we are done, so assume u @ [Ti * A] for all i. 
Consider for any i the proposition {x, T,) G [K] . Then by (K*V), [T, *A] C 
[Th({x, Ti)) * A] G [K * A]. Apply (K*3) to Th({x, Ti)) * A now. If 
[x * A] [Th({x, Ti)) * A] we are done. Rests to consider the case when 
[Th({x, T,)) * A] = [Ti * A], and furthermore [Th({x, T,)) * A] # [x * A]. 
But then by condition v), d(T,, [A]) < d(x, [A]), contradicting the choice 
of x. 
[KGA C K * A]. For this inclusion, we should further prove the case for 
[K] = {v, w) separately. Suppose u E [K* A], then by (K*3), u E U[Ti *A] 
for some Ti complete theories extending K ,  either 
a. K*A = v*A. Then by iii), d({v, w), [A])  = d(v, [A]). As u E c{"lw}(~), 
by definition of d, i) and ii) we have that d(v, u) = d(v, [A]) = d([K], [A]) .  
Hence u E [K] [A]. 
b. K * A = w * A. Similar to a. 
c. K * A = v * A n  w * A. By iv), d(v,[A]) = d(w,[A]). Also, either 
u E c{") (A) or u E C{W}(A). Hence, as above, either d(v, u) = d(v, [A]) or 
d(w, U) = d(v, [A]). In both cases, u E [K] a [A]. 
[K] > 2. Suppose u E [K * A], then by (K*3), u E U[Ti * A] for some 
Ti complete theories extending K. In particular, let Ti E W be such that 
u E [Ti * A]. 
Let x be any in [K], by (K*V), K * A  C Ti*A implies (Tinx)*A G Ti*A. 
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Hence, (Ti n x) * A c Ti * A. We are now in the previous cases, of 
revising theories whose proposition has cardinality one or two. Therefore 
we can claim that (Ti n x)iA c TiSA. I.e., by definition for all w E [A], 
d({Ti, x), [A]) = d({Ti, x), w) then d ( Z ,  [A]) = d({Ti, x), w), iff for all w E 
[A], min{d(Ti, [A]),d(x, [A])) = min{d(Ti,w),d(x,w)) then d(Ti, [A]) = 
d(Z ,  w). 
Therefore d(Ti, [A]) = d({Ti, x), [A]). As this is true for all x E [K], 
d(Ti, [A]) = d([K], [A]). Because u E [TiiA], d(Ti, u) = d(Ti, [A]) and 
u E KiA.  QED 
Hence, the analytic revision function is indeed a binary AGM function. 
Theorems 6.13 and 6.15 are interesting because they give general characteri- 
zation results for AGM revisions based on pseudo-distances, for both, the finite 
and the general cases. 
We now turn our attention to two natural constraints on the distance func- 
tions which give rise to proper subclasses of analytic AGM revisions. One is to 
consider a distance function d : W x W + R+ is such that no two points are at 
the same distance from a given point, if d(v, u) = d(v, w) then v = w. This is to 
take d,, the the projection of the distance function over its first argument, to  be 
injective. It  is quite strightforward to prove that such a distance function gives 
rise to an analytic AGM revision that takes consistent complete theories to con- 
sistent complete theories. For complete theories this analytic function behaves 
as a maxichoice AGM revision. For this reason we name it maxi-analytic AGM 
functions, and we show that they are characterized by the following postulate. 
(K*M) If K is consistent and complete then, for any A, K * A  is complete. 
Observation 6.16 (maxi-analytic AGM functions) An operator * satis- 
fies postulates (K*l)-(K*8), (K*3) (K*V) and (K*M) if and only if there exists 
a distance model M = (W,d), such that for each v E W, d, = d(v,w) is 
injective, and for any K E K ,  A E L K * A = KSA. 
PROOF. The characterization result follows directly for the fact that for every 
nameable Y W, {xld,(Y) = d,(x)) is a singleton. QED 
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Another interesting consideration is the case of well founded distances, that is 
distances that are definable over the ordinals, d : W x W -+ 0. Applying Obser- 
vation 2.14, a well founded system of spheres centered in [K] can be represented 
by ordinal function d~ : W -t 0. In this setting actual values of the function 
d(w, v) can be obtained by counting the number of ancestors of the argument 
along the well founded system of spheres centered in {w}. As a result we can 
precise an actual mapping of well founded update models (W, (5,: w E W)) 
to well founded distance models (W, d). In section 2.3.4 we reported that [Pep- 
pas, 19931 characterized the class of AGM revision functions, that are definable 
over well founded system of spheres. Peppas called them well behaved revision 
functions and showed that they are characterized by postulates (K*l)-(K*8) 
plus 
(K*WB) For every nonempty set X of consistent formulae of L there exists a 
formula A E X such that 7A $! K * (A V B), for every B E X. 
Of course, this characterization carries over analytic functions and update func- 
tions. Well behaved analytic AGM functions satisfy (K*l)-(K*8), (K*3), (K*V) 
and (K*WB), and are a proper subclass of general analytic functions that can 
be characterized semantically by a distance function d over the ordinals. 
It  is apparent from the proofs of Theorems 6.13 and 6.15 that the distance 
function that we use is just a convenient means to express the comparative 
relations relative to sets, that are induced from the comparative relations relative 
to single points. In fact the analytic operation can be regarded as a particular 
case of a more general framework. Consider a model with two ordering relations, 
(W, (3;: w E W},{i$: X E P(W))), being il, d2 possibly independent 
(total) preorders on W. Then the operation would be a double minimization 
over the two relations, defined as 
min U min(Y) 
5% Z ~ X  5; 
where min+(V) - = {v E V : Vz E V, v 3 2). Our definition of analytic revision 
in terms of distances obtains in this general framework, by considering 3' as 
an ordering encoding d : W x W -+ R+ and d2 as one encoding the extension 
d : P(W)  x P(W) -t B+. We believe it is interesting to study characterization 
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results for the double minimization operation on the general framework. This 
seems to be the proper setup to investigate which are the needed properties 
connecting the two orderings as well as the particular properties of each of 
them. 
6.4 Properties 
We turn now into properties of analytic revisions. Trivially, it is possible to 
define a binary AGM function as an accidental collection of unary AGM func- 
tions, one for each theory. But, if there are no properties linking the revisions 
of the different theories the result obtained can be erratic. For example, as 
we reported in Chapter 4 the postulate (K*9) counts as simple way of linking 
the revisions of all different theories. It is apparent that the link between the 
analytic revisions of different theories is more subtle than the link provided by 
(K*9). 
Observation 6.17 The following properties are not validated by the analytic 
revision operation. 
(Commutativity) ( K  * A) * B = (K * B) * A. 
(Weak Intersection) If 7A E Kl n K2 then (Kl n Kz) *A = (K1 *A) n (K2 *A). 
(Union) (K1 U K2) * A = (KI * A) U (K2 * A). 
(Weak Union) If 7A E Kl n K2 then (K1 U K2) * A = (K1 * A) U (K2 * A). 
(K*9) I ~ Y A E  K, K * A = L * A .  
PROOF. It is not difficult to find analytic revision functions violating each 
of these conditions. We prove Commutativity. Let L be a propositional 
language over {A, B). Let [A] = {w2, w4) and [B] = {w3, w4). As- 
sume EK] = Iwl) and d(wl,w2) < d(w1,~4),  d(w17~3) < d(w1, ~ 4 ) ,  
d(w2, w3) < d(w2, w4), and d(w3,w4) < d(w3, w2). 
[KGA] = { ~ 2 ) ,  [KGB] = {w3), [KGAGB] = {w3) but [KGBGA] = {w4). 
QED 
Being binary AGM functions, analytic revisions can freely perform iterated 
change, inheriting the form of iteration of the standard update operation. The 
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formal structure M = (W, d) determines the distance from every [K]. Since the 
analytic revision of K by A is a theory KSA, also a proposition in the same 
model M ,  distance from KSA is also defined in the structure. However, as we 
have already seen, there is a crucial difference between the iterating capabil- 
ities of the two forms of update: the standard update can not recover from 
inconsistency, while analytic revision can. Moreover, analytic revisions satisfy 
some natural conditions of iterated change. For any pair of theories Kl, K2 and 
sentences A, B,  C,  D ,  
(Or-Left) I f D  E ( K * ( A v B ) ) * C  then D E ( K * A ) * C o r  D E ( K * B ) * C .  
(Or-Right) If D E (K*A)*C and D E (K*B)*C then D E (K*(AvB))*C.  
Observation 6.18 Analytic revision functions satisfy Or-Left and Or-Right. 
PROOF. Let's name X = [K] [A], Y = [K] [B]. 
(Or-Left) . [K] [A V B]) [C] = {w 
m i n { x € [ ~ ] . [ ~ ~ ~ ] }  min{y€[~]}{d(x, Y))) = 
(by (K*7) and (K*8)) [K] [A V B] = [K] [A], or [K] [A V B] = [K] [B], 
or [Kl [A v Bl = ([Kl [Al) U ([Kl [BI). 
Then, either 
(1) {w E [Cl : min{x~x} min{y~[cl} {d(x, Y) 1 )  = [Kl [A]; or 
(2) {w E [Cl : m i n { x ~ ~ }  min{y~[cl} {d(x, Y)))= [Kl [Bl; or 
(3) {w E [C] : m i n { x ~ x u ~ }  m i n { y ~ [ c ] l { d ( ~ , ~ ) ) )  = {W E [C] : 
min{min{xEx} min{y€[q}{d(x, Y)), min{,€y} min{y€[c]}{d(x, Y)))) 
is either equal to [K] [A] or it is equal to [K] [B]. 
(Or-Right). Assume (1) D E (KSA)S;C and (2) D E (KSB)SC. 
By (1) {w E [C] : m i n { x ~ x } m i n { ~ ~ [ c ] } { d ( ~ , z ) ) )  [Dl. 
BY (2) {w E [C] : m i n { y ~ ~ >  min{~~[c]>{d(Y,z))) C [Dl. 
And [K] [A v B] [C] = 
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is either equal to [K] [A] or is equal to [K] [B]. 
Then [K] [A V B] [C] G [Dl. 
The analytic revision function validates five out of these seven postulates of 
[Lehmann, 19951. 
(11) K * A is a consistent theory. 
(12) A E K * A. 
(13) If B E K * A, then A > B E K .  
(14) I f A c K t h e n K * B 1 *  ...* B,= K * A * B 1 *  ...* B, f o r n 2 1 .  
(15) If A E Cn(B), then K * A * B * B1 * . . . * Bn = K * B * B1 * . . . * B,. 
(16) I f l B  61 K*A then K*A*B*B1*.. .*B, = K*A*(AAB)*B~*  ...* B,. 
(17) K * 7 B  * B C Cn(K U {B)). 
Condition (17) implies dependency between two revision steps and consequently 
enforces (at least to some extent) the property of "historical memory" which 
analytic revisions lack. As remarked by Lehmann, the standard update opera- 
tion fails postulates (I4), (15) and (I7), and satisfies the rest. It is then expected 
that the analytic revision operation violates (15) and (17) and validates the rest. 
Observation 6.19 
i) All analytic revision functions satisfy (Il),  (I2), (13)' (14) and (16). 
ii) There exist analytic revision functions violating (15) and (17). 
PROOF. The violation of (15) and (17) can be proved by constructing a coun- 
terexample. 
(I l) ,  (I2), (I3), (14) follow from the AGM postulates (K*l)-(K*4). 
For (16) we should prove that if 1 B  61 KSA then KSASB = KSAS(AAB). 
But this is obvious since KZAGB = Cn(KrAu{B)) = Cn(KZAu{AAB)). 
QED 
Analytic revisions do not validate any of Darwiche and Pearl's postulates [1997]. 
(Cl)  If A E Cn(B) then ( K  * A) * B = K * B. 
(C2) If 1 A  E Cn(B) then ( K  * A) * B = K * B. 
( C 3 ) 1 f A E K * B t h e n A € ( K * A ) * B .  
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Observation 6.20 
There exist analytic revision functions violating each of ((31)-(C6). 
PROOF. C1 is just postulate I5 above. 
C2. Assume a propositional language with three variables A, B and C.  Let 
w E- [ lA]n[ lB] ,  z E [A]n[yB], v E [lA]n[B]n[C] and u E [lA]n[B]n[iC]. 
Suppose d(z, v) < d(z, u) and d(w, u) < d(w, v). Let [K] = {w). Then 
[KmA] = {z), [KoAGB] = {v) but [KiB] = {u). 
C3 and C4. Let w E [-A] n [ lB] ,  z E [A] n [ lB] ,  v E [ lA]  n [B] n [C] 
and x E [A] fl [B] n [C]. Suppose d(w, z) < d(w, x) < d(w, v) and d(z, v) < 
d(z,x). Let [K] = {w). Then [KiB]  = {x} C [A], [KiA] = {z) and 
[KGASB] = {v) [A]. 
C5 and C6. Let w E [ iA]  n [iB], z E [A] n [ iB] ,  and x E [A] n [B] ana 
u E [l A] n [B] . Suppose d(w , z )  < d(w, u) < d(w, x)  and d(z, x) < d(z, u). 
Let [K] = {w). Then [KGB] = {u) C_ [ lA] ,  [KiA] = {z) [ l B ]  but 
[KoAGB] = {x) c [A]. 
As expected, analytic AGM revisions do not validate the postulates of iterative 
schemes. 
(T) K o A o B = K o B .  
(C) l f l B ~ K o A , t h e n K o A o B = K o B .  
(I) K o A o B = K o ( A A B ) .  
(MI 
, if 1 B  E Cn(A) 
, otherwise. 
Observation 6.21 There exist analytic revisions violating (T) , (M) , (I) and (C). 
Chapter 7 
Logical Calculi 
for Theory Change 
Alchourr6n's logic DFT [Alchourr6n, 19951 and Boutilier's CO [~outilier, 1992al 
are conditional logics that provide a logical calculus for the AGM theory. In a 
very natural way they can be used to calculate changes in different theories, by 
appealing to the consequence operation in each logic. Both logics share the spe- 
cial characteristics with respect to the conditional connective common to most 
logics for defeasible inference. Namely, they defeat the rules of Modus Ponens, 
Strengthening the antecedent, Transitivity, and Contraposition. But the two 
logics are clearly different. Although both are modal conditional logics with 
possible worlds semantics, CO has a relational semantics requiring a preorder 
over possible worlds, while DFT possesses a non-relational semantics based on 
a selection function Ch defined over the logical language. They also differ in 
their expressive power and have quite different axiomatic presentations. Spe- 
cially, the respective definitions of the conditional connectives stand on different 
grounds. 
In this chapter we compare the two logics and investigate their con- 
nection. After considering some general results of [ ~ o t t ,  19931 showing 
links between selection functions and binary relations, we will briefly present 
the two logics assuming basic knowledge of the standard modal systems. 
(For a thorough presentation of standard modal systems see [Chellas, 1980; 
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Hughes and Cresswell, 1968; Hughes and Cresswell, 19841). In particular we 
will consider the modal systems S5 and S4.3 (S5 is the extension of classical 
propositional logic with the Necessitation rule and the characteristic axioms K, 
4 and 5; while S4.3 possesses the characteristic axioms K, 4 and 3). We will 
then reveal the connection between DFT and CO by two main results. One is 
that there is a one to one correspondence between the finite models of the two 
logics. The other is that the respective definitions of the conditional connectives 
are semantically equivalent. These two results will allow us to prove that satisfi- 
able sentences in the respective finite propositional languages augmented solely 
by the respective conditional connectives are in a one to one correspondence. 
Since the conditional connectives have the same interpretation we will conclude 
that, in the restricted language, the two logics validate the same conditional 
sentences. 
As of notation, the symbol I- will be used to indicate derivability in different 
systems, using a subscript to specify the system. Semantic entailment will be 
denoted with the symbol k. To denote satisfiability in a point w of a model M 
we will use M k,. In addition we will refer to the set of models for a set of 
sentences X as: Mods(X)={M : M A, for each A E X). 
7.1 Select ion functions and Binary relations 
Let X be a set and X be a non-empty subset of P ( X )  \ 0. A selection function, 
or choice function over X is a function s : X -+ P(X) such that s(Y) is a non 
empty subset of Y E P(X). Intuitively, selection functions are supposed to 
give us the "best" elements of each Y E P(X).  The requirement that s(Y) be 
non-empty means that the selection function is effective. 
A set X of subsets of X is called n-covering (n = 1,2,3 ...) if it contains 
all subsets of X with exactly n elements, X is called nlnz-covering if it is nl- 
covering and nz-covering. X is called w-covering if it is n-covering for all natural 
numbers n = 1,2,3, . . .. A set X of subsets of X is called additive if it is closed 
under arbitrary unions, and it is called finitely additive if it is closed under finite 
unions. X is substractive if for every X and X' in X such that X X', X \ X' 
is also in X. (If X is 1-covering and finitely additive then X is w-covering.) 
7.1. SELECTION FUNCTIONS AND BINARY RELATIONS 
Finally, X is compact if for every X and Xi, i E I ,  if X C U{X, : i E I) then 
X C U{X, : i E lo) for some finite I. C I. 
For example, let L be an arbitrary infinite language, and W the set of max- 
imal consistent extensions of L. For any language sentence A, [A] = {w E W : 
A E w). Let X={[A] c W : A E L} 2 'P(W); be the set of nameable subsets of 
W. By cardinality considerations, X is a proper subset of P(W). Moreover, X 
is not additive nor finitely additive nor 1-covering nor compact nor substractive. 
However, if we take L a propositional language over a finite set of propositional 
variables P, and we take W as the set of all maximal consistent extensions of 
L, then X is finitely additive, n-covering, substractive and compact. 
A selection function with domain X is said to be n-covering, (finitely) addi- 
tive, substractive, etc., if X is n-covering, (finitely) additive, substractive, etc. 
Rott shows that under certain conditions it is possible to recover the relations 
underlying choice functions. And conversely, under appropriate conditions a 
relation induces a selection function. Generically, choice sets are taken to be 
sets of "best" elements in some relation 5. A selection function is relational 
with respect to 5 over X ,  and we write s = S(<),  when for every Y E P ( X )  
s(Y) = {y E Y :  y 5 y' for ally' E Y). 
Samuelson preferences are a classical way to recover a relation underlying a 
selection function: 
Ss= {(x, xi) E X x X : 3Y E P(X) such that (x,xf) 5 Y and x' E s(Y)) 
5, is not guaranteed to be reflexive unless s is 1-covering. 
In order to show the correspondence of properties of selection functions and 
binary relations Rott [1993] formulates the following postulates. 
I . For all Y,Y1 E X such that Y UY' E X s(Y U Y') C s(Y) U s(Y1). 
I1 . For all Y, Y' E X such that Y U Y' E X s(Y) n s(Y1) C s(Y U Y'). 
111 . For all Y E X and Y' such that Y U Y' E X if s(Y U Y') n Y' # 8 then 
s(Y) C s(Y U Y'). 
IV . For all Y E X and Y' such that Y U Y' E X, if s(Y U Y') n Y  # 0 then 
s(Y) C s(Y U Y'). 
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The following lemmas show the connection between selection functions and pref- 
erence relations. 
Lemma 7.1 ([Rott, 19931,Lemma 1) 
If s satisfies I and I1 and is 12-covering or additive then s = S(5,) .  
Lemma 7.2 ([Rott, 19931,Lemma 2) (Notation adapted). 
(a) If s is 12n-covering and satisfies I then the complement of 5, is n-acyclic. If 
s is w-covering and satisfies I then the complement of <, is acyclic. 
(b) If s is 123-covering and satisfies I and I11 then 5, is transitive. 
(c) If s is finitely additive and satisfies IV, then the complement of <, is transi- 
tive. 
Lemma 7.3 ([Rott, 19931,~emma 3) (Notation adapted). 
(a) If the strict part of 5 is well-founded with respect to X then S ( 5 )  is a 
selection function over X which satisfies (I) and (11). 
(b) If 5 is transitive then S(<) is a selection function over X which satisfies 
(111). 
(c) If the complement of < is transitive then S ( 5 )  is a selection function over X 
which satisfies (IV) . 
7.2 The Logic DFT 
Alchourr6n1s modal conditional logic is based on a propositional language L 
augmented with an S5-necessity operator and a revision operator f ,  which 
is in fact another modality. We will refer to this modal language with Lm. 
Alchourr6n bases his construction on the very idea that in a defeasible condi- 
tional the antecedent is a contributory condition of its consequent, as opposed 
to be a sufficient condition for the consequent. Hence, he defines a defeasible 
conditional A >b, B meaning that the antecedent A jointly with the set of 
assumptions that comes with it is a sufficient condition for the consequent B. 
In order to represent in the object language the joint assertion of the proposi- 
tion expressed by a sentence A and the set of assumptions (or presuppositions) 
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that comes with it he uses a revision operator f .  For example, if A1,. . .A, 
are the assumptions associated with A then f A  stands for the joint assertion 
(conjunction) of A with all the Ai (for all 1 5 i < n), where A is always one 
of the conjuncts of fA. Although Alchourr6n does not explicitly refer to the 
cardinality of the set of assumptions for a given proposition, this set may well 
be infinite and f A stands for a nominal of the infinite conjunction. 
Since L .  is the standard modal language of S5 augmented with f ,  the S5- 
possibility operator 0 and the strict conditional +- are defined in terms of q as 
usual: 
OA =df 10-A and A + B =df O(A > B). 
Definition 7.4 (logic DFT, [Alchourrcin, 19951) The conditional logic 
DFT is the smallest set S C such that S contains classical propositional 
logic and the following axiom schemata, and is closed under the following rules 
of inference: 
K O(A 3 B) 3 (UA 3 UB). 
T o A > A .  
4 o A > n o A .  
5 A >  UOA. 
f. 1 ( f A > A). (Expansion) 
f.2 (A - B) > (f A - f B). (Extensionality) 
f.3 OA > 0 f A. (Limit Expansion) 
f.4 ( f ( A V B ) * f A ) V ( f ( A V B ) - f B ) V ( f ( A V B ) - ( f A V f B ) )  
(Hierarchical Ordering) 
Nes From A infer OA. 
MP From A > B and A infer B. 
Axioms K, T, 4 and 5 giver rise to S5, and f.1-f.4 are constraints imposed on 
the revision operator f .  Condition f.1 is in fact the characteristic axiom T of 
standard modal systems. As an axiom constraining f it is quite natural since 
it states that f A stands for the conjunction of A and its presuppositions. f.2 
asserts that equivalent sentences have equivalent presuppositions. f.3 links the 
two modalities. It  ensures the existence of consistent presuppositions for any 
sentence that is not a contradiction. We will see below that condition f.3 carries 
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some consequences that we will analyze in semantic terms. f.4 asserts that the 
presuppositions of a disjunction are either the presuppositions of one of the 
disjuncts, or else the disjunction of the presuppositions of each of the disjuncts. 
In a forward reading it implies that f is a normal modality, in the sense that it 
satisfies the characteristic axiom K (notice that k,, f (7A) > l( f A)). 
Alchourr6n gives a formal semantic interpretation of the language Lm based 
on standard non-relational S5-models. 
Definition 7.5 (DFT model) A model for is Nrn = (W, Ch, [ I )  where 
W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, the valuation function [ ] maps P into 
P(W), and Ch : L + P(W) is a selection function such that for each sentence 
A,B of 4x3- 
Ch.1 Ch,(A) G [A]. 
Ch.2 If [A] = [B] then Ch(A) = Ch(B). 
Ch.3 If [A] f 0 then Ch(A) f 0. 
Ch.4 Ch(A v B) E {Ch(A), Ch(B), Ch(A) u Ch(B)). 
We shall mention that [Alchourr6n, 19951 defines the selection function as 
Ch" meaning that the selection is indexed by the particular preferences of an 
individual a (as opposed to be a universal selection function for every indi- 
vidual). For the purposes of this note this is an irrelevant restriction. The 
selection function Ch is proposed as the semantic counterpart of the syntactic 
revision operator. Ch(A) is the proposition of the joint assertion of A and its 
assumptions, i.e., the worlds in which f A  are true. 
The four constraints on Ch are in exact correspondence with the four on f .  In 
particular, Ch.3 reflects that every consistent proposition must contain some 
chosen elements. 
A DFT frame (W,Ch) is the set of all DFT models having W and Ch. 
Satisfaction of a modal formula at world w in a model Grn = (W, Ch, [ I) is 
given by: 
Nrn kw A iff w E [A] for atomic sentence A. 
i'b&= k w l A  iff not &m k, A. 
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kgm +,AAB iff kgm bw Aandkgm ~ w B .  
kw UA iff [A] = W. 
Nm bw f A  iff w E Ch(A). 
The derived satisfaction conditions for the connectives 0 and + are: 
Nm )=w A * B iff [A] C [B]. 
b, OA iff there is some v E W such that v E [A]. 
Truth in a model = (W, Ch, [ I )  is truth a t  every point: 
Nm F A  iff Nm k, A for every w E W. 
Truth in a frame (W, Ch) is truth at every model (W, Ch, [ I). 
(W, Ch) + A iff (W, Ch, [ I )  k A for all valuation functions [ 1. 
Alchourr6n proves that his semantic and axiomatic presentations coincide. 
Observation 7.6 ([Alchourrbn, 19951, Theorem cm-DFT) 
For any A E L, k D F T  A iff kDFT A. 
We are ready for the definition of the conditional A bm B. Alchourr6n wants 
to capture the idea that the antecedent A jointly with the set of assumptions 
that comes with it is a sufficient condition for the consequent B. To reflect 
this intuition, Alchourr6n adopts the following definition due to Lennart &pist 
[1973]: 
Definition 7.7 (DFT conditional connective) A bm B ~ d f  O(fA > B). 
Satisfaction of a conditional sentence a t  world w in a model kgm = (W, Ch, [I) 
is given by: NFT bw A bm B iff Ch(A) C [B] iff kgm k A bm B. As a 
result, N ,  A >bFT B iff [A >Dm B] = W. Conversely, Nm (A >b, B) 
iff [A >bm B] = 0 iff )= l ( A  >~PT B). This means that Alchourr6n 
conditionals are true at every point in a model, or at none. 
Observation 7.8 ([Alchourrbn, 19951) 
kDm (A b m  B) 3 o(A b m  B) and tbm -(A =a, B) 3 >2, B). 
In DFT >bm is in general different from +-. 
Observation 7.9 hm A +- B > A =arn B but Y,, A =a, B 3 A + B. 
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PROOF. To prove that t,,. A +- B > A hm B, assume I,, A + B. Then 
for every DFT-model [A] G [B]. Since Ch(A) G [A], then Ch(A) g [B], 
hence, tDm A hrn B. 
To prove & A hm B > A + B, suppose kD, A bm B. Hence, for 
every DFT model Ch(A) G [B]. In particular for = (, W, Ch, [I) such 
that W is the set of valuations of the language based on two propositional 
variables, A, B. Suppose {wl, wz} = [A] and {wl, w3) = [B] and Ch(A) = 
{wl} provides a model where &, A hrn B and Mm A + B. QED 
This proof also shows that hm in DFT does not validate Modus Ponens nor 
Contraposition. And similarly, with three propositional letters can be shown 
that hm does not validate Strengthening the antecedent nor Transitivity. 
Modus Ponens From A > B and A infer B.  
Strengthening From A > B infer A A C > B. 
Transitivity From A > B and B > C infer A > C. 
Contraposition From A > B infer 1 B  > i A .  
As a corollary of the observation above we obtain that in a limiting case &, 
and + are equivalent. In the particular case where the Choice function sanc- 
tions Ch(A) = [A] for every A E &,,, >b, collapses with j. In this case 
the Choice function induces an ignorant revision function f, where every sen- 
tence becomes its own presupposition. Then, the conditional &, looses all its 
defeating properties. 
Alchourr6n also gives a gives an axiomatic presentation of his logic DFT, 
in a purely conditional language, having the conditional connective > added to 
those of classical propositional logic. Let's denote this language by L'. The 
following abbreviations are used in Alchourr6n's axiomatisation. A notion of 
necessity N ,  a notion of possibility M and a notion of comparativeness k. 
Definition 7.10 ([~lchourrbn, 19951) The conditional logic DFT, is the 
smallest set S L> such that S contains classical propositional logic and the 
following axiom schemata, and is closed under the following rules of inference: 
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DFTl I-, ( A > A ) .  
DFT2 t-> (A > (B  A C)] - [A > B)  A (A > C)). 
DFT3.1 tj ( ( A > C ) A ( B > C ) )  3 ( (AvB)  > C ) .  
DFT3.2 k , ( A k B ) > ( ( A v B ) > C ) > ( A > C ) .  
DFT4 t-, (A > B)  3 N(A > B).  
DFT5 t-> -(A > B) 3 NT(A > B). 
DFT6 t-> N A  3 A. 
Ext If F> A =  B then t, ( A >  C) = (B  > C) and t-> ( C  > A) = ( C  > B). 
In this purely conditional axiomatization it is also apparent that a conditional 
sentence is always impossible or necessary (this is directly entailed by DFT.4 
and DFT.5). Alchourr6n shows the following correspondence between DFT and 
DFT,. Let 9 be a translation function from L> to Lm. 
9(A)  = A, if A is a propositional variable. 
9 ( T )  = T and * ( I )  = 1. 
Q(1A)) = 19(A) .  
9 ( A  A B )  = *(A) A 9(B) .  
@ ( A >  B)  = O(f9(A) 3 9(B)) .  
Alchourr6n proves that the logic DFT, is properly embedded in DFT. 
Observation 7.11 ([~lchourr6n, 19951, Corr.3) For every A E L', 
t-> A iff bm 9 (A). 
Since the translation 9 is not surjective on l&, that is, there are formulae 
of LFT which are not equivalent to the image of any formula of L', then the 
expressive power of DFT exceeds that of DFT,. 
We end up this section with a final remark. Some (infinite) sets of conditional 
sentences in L> define single DFT models. Let I' C L' such that for every purely 
propositional A, B E L, either A > B E I' or -(A > B)  E I' but not both. Such 
a r characterises a single DFT-model. We will return to this idea when we 
study how DFT provides a logical calculus for theory change. We shall now 
turn our attention into Boutilier's logic CO. 
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7.3 The Logic CO 
The logic CO is one in Boutilier's family of conditional logics for theory change 
and default reasoning [Boutilier, 1992al. He bases his logics on Humberstone's 
bimodal logic  umberst stone, 19831, which provides a modality that denotes 
truth along an accessibility relation and another modality that denotes truth 
along the complement of the accessibility relation. The expressive power of this 
bimodal logic exceeds that of standard mono modal systems. For instance, it 
can express a number of relational properties that are inexpressible in standard 
modal logics, like tot a1 connectedness, asymmetry and irreflexivity. Humber- 
stone's logic is closely related to temporal logics, which are also based on two 
modalities. In temporal logics the modality for the "future" coincides with 
Humberstone's modality for denoting truth along the accessibility relation R. 
However, the temporal operator for the "past" denotes truth along the inverse 
of relation 8, while in Humberstone's logic the second modality denotes truth 
along the complement of R. 
Humberstone presented his logic as an enumerable set of axioms, and left 
open the question of whether a finite axiomatization existed  umberst stone, 
19831. Boutilier [Boutilier, 1992a] provided the sought finite axiomatization. 
The language Lo is defined as a propositional language L augmented with 
-+ 
two modal operators. q is the modality for accessibility along a relation R and 
+ 
q is the modality for inaccessibility, denoting truth along the complement of 
relation R. Since Boutilier's conditional connective is only an abbreviation of 
an involved formula in the bimodal language, the expressive power of CO is 
precisely that of Humberstone's. Boutilier defines several connectives in terms 
of the primitive fi and 6 as follows: 
+ -4 OA Gdf 1O1A; 
+ + OA E d f  1 L A ;  
* UA ~~f SA A EA; and 
CI 4-9 OA --df 7O-lA. 
Definition 7.12 (logic CO [Boutilier, 1992al) The conditional logic CO is 
the smallest set S Lo such that S contains classical propositional logic and 
the following axiom schemata, and is closed under the following rules of infer- 
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ence: 
K Z ( A >  B)  3 ( Z A > ~ B ) .  
K9 E ( A > B ) ~ ( ~ A ~ ~ B ) .  
4 EA> ~ E A .  
S ~ 3 6 6 ~ .  
H ~ ( Z A   EB) ~ ( A V  B). 
Nes From A infer EA. 
MP From A > B and A infer B. 
Axioms K and K' indicate that the two modalities are normal. Axiom 4 ensures 
transitivity of the accessibility relation and axiom S, which is only expressible 
in a bimodal language, ensures total connectedness. Axiom H gives the rela- 
tionship between the two modalities. 
CO is sound and complete with respect to S4.3 structures, the structures 
whose relations are total preorders. 
Definition 7.13 (CO-model, [Boutilier, 1992aI) A CO -model is a triple 
&, = (W, R, [ I )  where W is a set of worlds, with valuation function [ ] : P + 
P(W),  and R is a total preorder on W. 
Satisfaction at world w in a model I$, = (W, R, [ I )  is given by: 
I$, kw A iff w E [A] for atomic sentence A. 
&o kw iff &o F w  A. 
&, kw SA iff for each v such that wRv, I$, kv A. 
&, kw ZA iff for each v such that not wRv, &, k, A. 
4 + 
The derived connectives have the following truth conditions: 0 (OA) is true at 
a world if A holds at some accessible (inaccessible) world; EA ( 8 ~ )  holds iff 
A holds at all (some) worlds. Therefore, the and 8 modalities behave as S5 
modalities. 
Truth in a model I$, = (W, R, [ I) and in a frame (W, R) are defined as usual. 
&, k A iff &, kw A for every w E W. 
(W, R) t= A iff (W, R, [ I) + A, for every [ 1. 
The system CO is characterized by the class of CO-models. 
Theorem 7.14 ([Boutilier, 1992aI) kco A iff kco A. 
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The conditional connective is defined in the bimodal language as follows. 
Definition 7.15 (conditional connective in CO , [Boutilier, 1992al) 
(A >,, B) --df a ( ~  3 a ( ~  A a ( ~  > B))) 
The conditional A >,, B holds in a model when either there are no A worlds at  
all, or, when every A-world has access to some point where every R-accessible 
world satisfying A also satisfies B. The conditional A >,, B states that the 
(possibly infinite) chain of R-minimal A-worlds must satisfy B. Boutilier does 
not assume the existence of the minimal A-worlds. In the case where such worlds 
do exist, obviously A >,, B holds just when B holds at  all such worlds. In 
contrast, suppose there is some unending chain of R-minimal A-worlds. If some 
B-world lies in this chain having the property that B-holds whenever A does, 
at all farther accessible worlds in the infinite descending chain, then A &, B 
ought to be considered true. B would hold at the hypothetical limit of A-worlds 
in this chain. This is the same truth conditions that Lewis' [Lewis, 19731 has 
imposed to his counterfactuals conditionals in models that do not comply the 
limit assumption. 
Boutilier argues against the limit assumption. He explains that without the 
limit assumption a selection function fails and, vacuously, makes all conditionals 
true. But certainly some conditionals should remain true and some others false. 
Since CO makes no commitment to the limit assumption this is a point in 
which the Boutilier's and Alchourr6n's formalisms differ. A proper subclass 
of CO-models is that of models whose accessibility relation satisfies the limit 
assumption. Since the limit assumption is not expressible in CO, this class 
cannot be syntactically characterized in the bimodal language. In models that 
satisfy the limit assumption it is possible to define the set of R-minimal A- 
worlds. 
Definition 7.16 (min) Let &, a CO-model satisfying the limit assumption. 
We define min : Lo + P(W) as: 
min(A) = {w E W : I&, +,A and A4, +,,GA implies wRv for all v E W). 
When dealing with CO-models that comply the limit assumption, A >,, B is 
true in a model &, just when B is true at  each of the R-minimal A-worlds. 
The definition of a conditional can be expressed semantically as follows: 
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A!&, + A >, B iff min(A) 2 [B]. 
We are ready to compare logic DFT and CO and reveal their connection. 
7.4 The Connection between DFT and CO 
Let's first prove the correspondence between DFT models and CO models us- 
ing the results in section 7.1. Let's start specifying how a CO-model A!&o = 
(W, R, [ I )  satisfying the limit assumption induces a Choice function ChR. 
Definition 7.17 (ChR) Let a CO-model A!&, = (W, R, [ I) that satisfies the 
limit assumption, and let A E L. The Choice function ChR induced by the 
accessibility relation R is defined as: 
ChR(A) = {W E [A] : wRw', VW' E [A]). 
To discover the properties of C ~ R  we want to apply lemma 7.3. As R is a total 
preorder satisfying the limit assumption, then strict part of R is well founded, 
R is transitive and the complement of R is also transitive. (To see this last 
property suppose not xRy and not yRz but xRz. Since R is connected, then 
it must be zRy. Thus, by the transitivity of R we obtain sRy contrary to our 
assumption.) Hence, by lemma 7.3 ChR satisfies (I), (11), (111), and (IV). We 
have to check now that ChR validates Ch.1-Ch.4, the characteristic properties 
of Alchourr6n1s choice functions. 
Proposition 7.18 ChR satisfies the following properties: 
(Ch.1) C ~ R ( A )  5 [A]. 
(Ch.2) If [A] = [B] then ChR(A) = ChR(B). 
(Ch.3) If [A] # 0 then ChR(A) # 0. 
(Ch.4) ChR(A V B) E {ChR(A), C ~ R ( B ) ,  C ~ R ( A )  U ChR(B)). 
PROOF. That ChR satisfies Ch.1 and Ch.2 is obvious by definition 7.17 
To see Ch.3 suppose ChR(A) = 0. Then, there is no w E [A] such that 
wRw' for all w' E [A]. Since R satisfies the limit assumption, [A] = 0. 
Let's see Ch.4. Let X = [A] and Y = [B]. There are four cases. 
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(1) If Chx(X U Y) n X = 0 and ChR(X U Y) n Y = 0 then, by case Ch.1 
above, X U Y = 0, and Ch.4 trivially holds. 
(2) Assume C ~ R ( X  U Y) n X # 0 and C ~ R ( X  U Y) n Y # 0. By postulate 
(I) ChR(X U Y) C C h ~ ( x )  U C ~ R ( Y ) .  By postulate (IV) C h ~ ( x )  C
ChR(XUY) and C h ~ ( x )  CC ~ R ( X U Y ) .  By de Morgan laws, C ~ R ( X ) U  
ChR(Y) C C ~ R ( X  U Y). Thus ChR(X) U C ~ R ( Y )  = C ~ R ( X  U Y), and 
Ch.4 holds. 
(3) Assume ChR(XuY) nX # 0 and ChR(XUY) n Y  = 0. By postulates 
(111) and (IV) ChR(X) C C ~ R ( X  U Y). By postulate (11) C h ~ ( x )  fl 
ChR(X U Y) 2 ChR(X U X U Y) = ChR(X U Y). And by ~ostulate (I) 
ChR(X U Y) C ChR(X) U ChR(Y). Since by Ch.1 Ch(Y) 2 Y, and by 
assumption of Ch.3 C ~ R ( X  U Y) n Y = 0, then C ~ R ( X  U Y) 2 C h ~ ( x ) .  
Hence C h ~ ( x )  C C ~ R ( X  U Y) C C h ~ ( x ) ;  namely, C h ~ ( x )  = C ~ R ( X  U 
Y), and Ch.4 is verified. 
(4) The case ChR(X U Y) n X = 0 and ChR (X U Y) n Y # 0 is analogue 
to case (3) above. QED 
Now let's see how a DFT-model I&m = (W, Ch, [ I) induces a total preorder 
RCh on W and gives rise to a CO-model No = (W, Rch, [ I). 
Definition 7.19 (RCh) Let = (W, Ch, [ I) with Ch : L -* P(W). The 
relation RCh induced by Ch is defined as follows. 
RCh = {(w,v) E W x W : 3Y E P(W) such that w,v E Y and w E Ch(Y)) 
We have to check RCh is a total preorder on W. Lemma 7.1 states that if 
Ch is additive or 12-covering and satisfies (I) and (11) then there exists some 
some relation 5 on W such that the selection function induced by 5 coincides 
with Ch. But Ch over an infinite set of propositional variables is not additive 
nor lZcovering, so the we can't apply the lemma. As suggested in section 7.1 
this is the problem we face when dealing with infinite languages. Let's consider 
L an infinite propositional language, W the set of all its maximal consistent 
extensions and X C P(W) the set of all the L-nameable subsets of W. 
A preorder R & W x W automatically determines a preorder relation over 
every subset of W, that is, VX C W, R n X x X is a relation on X.  In contrast, 
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Alchourr6n's choice function is intrinsically linguistic, that is, it is defined from 
L to subsets of W. Hence, Ch provides a selection just for nameable subsets of 
W. The cardinality of L is less than the cardinality of P(W) so it is impossible 
to provide a one to one correspondence between binary relations on W and 
linguistic selection functions. In order to establish a one to one correspondence 
we have to be able to name all subsets of W. With this objective we will restrict 
to propositional languages based on finite sets of propositional variables. Thus, 
C h  becomes additive and lZcovering, and we can apply lemma 7.2. 
Proposition 7.20 RCh is a total preorder on W 
PROOF. We apply lemma 7.2. Since Ch is 12-covering and satisfies (I) the 
complement of Rch is acyclic. Since Ch is 123-covering and satisfies (I) 
and (11) Rch is transitive. Since Ch is finitely additive and satisfies (IV) 
the complement of RCh is transitive. 
That RCh is totally connected follows from acyclicity of the complement 
of RCh, ( if not xRchy and not yRChx then the complement Rch would 
not be acyclic ). QED 
Let's check that in the finite case ChRch = Ch and RChR = R. 
Observation 7.21 Given a finite propositional language L, ChR,, = Ch and 
RchR = R. 
PROOF. Assume R G W x W, a total preorder. Let's define ChR(A) = 
{w E [A] : wRwl, Vw' E [A]). This is additive n-covering choice function 
satisfying (I)- (IV) . 
RchR = {(w,v) E W x W : 3Y E P(W) such that w,v E Y and w E 
c h ~ ( Y ) ) .  By lemma 7.1, directly C~R,, = Ch. 
Let's see that R = RchR. Suppose wRv and not vRw. Then, there is 
s o m e A ~ w n v a n d s o m e B ~ w B ~ v s u c h t h a t w ~ C h ~ ( A V B ) a n d  
v 6 C ~ R ( A  V B). Hence wRchRv and not vRw. 
Suppose wRv and vRw. Then, for every A E L such that A E w n v, 
w, v E C ~ R ( A ) .  Hence, wRchRv and vRchRw. 
Therefore, Vw, v, wRv iff wRChRv. 
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Consequently finite DFT models and finite CO models (with the same universe 
set W and the same valuation function [I)  are in a one to one correspondence. 
Our next result is that the semantic definitions of the conditional connectives 
in CO and DFT coincide. 
Observation 7.22 Let A, B propositional formulae of L, then, 
(W, R, [ I )  k A >co B iff (W, C ~ R ,  [ 1) k A =bm B. 
PROOF. Let CTM = (W, R, [ I ) .  
By the definition of the conditional connective in CO, 
(W, R, [ I )  k A >,o B iff min~(A)  G [B] iff, 
by observation 7.21 ChR(A) C [B] iff, 
by definition of the conditional connective in DFT, 
(w,ChR, [ 1) ?D= 
We are now able to state our main result, which reveals the connection be- 
tween the two logics: the two logics validate the same conditional sentences in 
a restricted language. Let's define &'= and &< as the propositional languages 
formed from a finite set P of propositional variables together with the connec- 
tives 1, A augmented solely with the respective conditional connective >b, and 
h0 (the connectives >, V = are defined in terms of 7, A as usual). 
We will define a bijective translation function taking a sentence in &>= and 
returning a sentence in I.&,>,. We will then prove that this bijective translation 
preserves satisfiability in the two logics. As a result will be able to assert 
that there is a one to one correspondence of valid sentences in the respective 
restricted languages in the two logics, with exactly the same interpretation. 
Since the translation just interchanges the respective conditional connectives 
the two logics validate the same conditional sentences. Let Q be a translation 
function from &'m to L+<. 
Q(A) = A, if A is a propositional variable. 
Q(T) = T and @(I) = 1.
Q (-A)) = -7Q (A) .  
*(A A B) = Q(A) A Q(B). 
9 ( A  >~FT B) =Q(A) >CO Q(B)- 
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Let's remark that @ is a bijective translation function. 
Theorem 7.23 FDm A iff kco *(A). 
PROOF. Suppose A E Lb>, such that not k,,,, A. 
Given that CO and DFT are sound and complete with respect to their 
respective classes, there is a DFT model (W, Ch, [ 1) where A is not true. 
By observation 7.22 there is a CO model (W, R c ~ ,  [I) where @(A) is not 
true. QED 
We obtain the following corollary. For any set of sentences X 2 I&, let's 
define the translation of X as Q(X) = {B  E J!&~ : B = *(A)  : A f X). Then, 
Mods(X) + A iff X kDm A iff @(X) Fco Q(A) iff Mods(Q(X)) I= @(A). 
We have proved that in the respective restricted languages the theorems of 
CO and DFT are in a one to one correspondence, and have the same inter- 
pretation. But this correspondence only holds in the restricted languages, that 
is, the two logics are not equivalent as a whole. For instance, in DFT there 
is no counterpart of the CO modalities for accessibility and inaccessibility. A 
question still to be answered in this direction is whether the revision operator 
f of DFT is expressible in CO. It is clear that the expressive power of DFT 
extends that of S5 without being exactly clear what is the expressivity added 
by the "revision function" f .  The study of the formal properties that become 
expressible in DFT that are inexpressible in standard systems is an interesting 
issue that remains to be investigated. 
7.5 A Logical Calculus for Theory Change 
Conditional logics were initially developed for modeling "if . . . then" statements 
in natural language. Robert Stalnaker [1968] gives a possible worlds semantics 
for his logic for "subjunctive conditionals". A conditional A > B, read as "if A 
were true B would be true". Stalnaker argues that the conditional connective > 
should not validate transitivity, nor the strengthening rule, nor contraposition. 
For instance, we accept the conditional "If this match were struck, it would 
light", while we deny that "If this match were wet and struck, it would light". 
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Stalnaker gives the following "recipe" based on the Ramsey test to evaluate a 
conditional in a given theory or state of belief: 
"First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of be- 
liefs; second, make whatever adjustments are required to maintain 
consistency (without modifying the hypothetical belief in the an- 
tecedent); finally, consider whether or not the consequent is then 
true." (Stalnaker 1968, page 44) 
Stalnaker's formulation of the Ramsey test has been used to provide a formal 
connection between theory change and conditional logic. 
A conditional A > B is true iff B belongs to the revision of K by A. 
Based on this formulation Boutilier provides a logical calculus for AGM revision 
[1992a]. 
Go + A >,, B is equated with B E K * A. 
Given the Ramsey test, >,, is nothing more than a subjunctive conditional, 
interpreted as "If K were revised by A, then B would be accepted". For any 
propositional A, the theory resulting from revision of K by A is: 
Since total preorders on W satisfying the limit assumption are isomorphic to 
Grove's systems of spheres with no empty center CO-models are appropriate for 
AGM revision, when the theory K being revised is assumed to be a propositional 
theory. By appealing to Grove's result [Grove, 19881 for representing revision 
functions, each CO-model satisfying the limit assumption represents a revision 
function. Those worlds consistent with K should be exactly those minimal in 
R. The interpretation of R is as follows: wRv iff v is as close to theory K as w. 
CO models that satisfy this constraint are called revision models for K.  
Definition 7.24 ([~outilier, 1992al) A revision model for theory K is any 
structure &, =< W, R, [ ] > such that R satisfies the limit assumption, R is 
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transitive and totally connected on W and v E {w : W k, A for all A E K )  iff 
v is R-minimal in A&,. 
Full models are those where all propositional valuations are represented. They 
have to to be considered in order to allow every consistent sentence be capable 
of generating a consistent revision. Boutilier proves that the revision function 
determined by a full revision model for K satisfies the eight AGM postulates 
for revision (K*l)-(K*8). 
Observation 7.25 ([Boutilier, 1992a], Theorem 6.7) Let A&, be a full re- 
vision model for K and * M  the revision function determined by M. *M is defined 
for each A E LcpL by K * M  A = { B  E L : M A >co B). Then, *" satisfies 
postulates (K*l)-(K*8). 
Boutilier defines a modality Beb, to refer to the sentences in K.  Beb,A is read 
as A is accepted in K. He calls it a modality for belief. The modality Beb, is 
defined as follows. 
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Definition 7.26 ([Boutilier, 1992al) Beb,A ~ d f  0 0 0 A .  
The sentence Beb,(A) holds in a revision model when A is true at each minimal 
worlds: A&, Bebo(A) iff min(T) C [A] iff &, T >cO A. 
By appealing to the derivability in the logic CO it is possible to calculate 
the results of revising a theory K. Each set of conditional sentences I' G L&, 
such that Mod@) is a singleton represents a theory K and the AGM revision 
function * for K. For instance, K = {A E L : T >cO A E I?). Then, if I' is 
conditionally complete then Mods(I') = {A&,). So, we obtain the following 
chain of equivalences: 
I' kco A = ~ F T  B iff A&, A >to B iff min(A) G [B] in &, iff B E K * A. 
In this way the logic CO provides a logical calculus for change in different 
theories, by appealing to derivability from different sets rl and r2. Given the 
correspondence we have proved between CO and DFT, all the considerations 
about CO as a logical calculus for theory change directly apply to DFT. 
One could wonder about calculating iterated change in logic CO. It is possible 
to use the Ramsey test to relate iterated changes and acceptance of nested 
conditionals [Levi, 1988; Boutilier, 1992b; Lindstrijm and Rabinowicz, 19921. 
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Different intuitions correspond to whether the nesting of the conditional 
connective appears in the antecedent or in the consequent of a conditional con- 
struction. One could inspect whether (A > (B > C) can be taken to mean that 
C E K * A * B. This would require two applications of the Ramsey test. 
But the nested occurrences of the conditional connective collapse into the flat 
portions of CO and DFT, as follows. Given a revision model &, we have that 
No k A > (B > C) is identical to either No k A > T or No k A > I, 
depending whether I&, k B > C or not. On the one hand &, + A > T 
is always true, because for all A, min(A) W and if A is not satisfiable then 
min(A) = 8. On the other hand No k A > I is always false unless No I= 
TA. In full revision models this means that A is not satisfiable. Consequently, 
A > B > C is true iff (B > C) is true or A is itself inconsistent. This is equated 
via the Ftamsey test as C E K * A* B iff A is inconsistent or C E K * B. Hence, 
for consistent formulae A A > ( B  > C) says that the set K * A * B, is just 
K * B. The notion of iteration it yields validates the following postulate that 
we advanced in Chapter 3 for a trivial revision function. 
K o B , if AI, . . . A,-1 are satisfiable. 
K o A o B =  
, otherwise. 
We conclude that nested conditionals in CO or DFT do not provide an inter- 
esting logical calculus for iterated change. This conclusion can also be reached 
from our interpretation of CO models as models for revision. If a, is a revi- 
sion model for K, then all the worlds consistent with K are R-minimal in N o .  
Therefore, I&, is just a revision model for K and in general it is not a revision 
model for K * A. 
Let's analyze no the case when the nested conditional connective appears in 
the antecedent of a conditional construction. Again following the Ramsey test, 
the conditional (A > B) > C is equated with C being accepted in the theory 
resulting by the revision of K by the conditional sentence ( A  > B). But such 
a revision would collapse with our initial assumptions about how CO provides 
a calculus for revision. A CO model induces an AGM revision function * M  
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for a propositional theory K ,  such that ** satisfies (K*l)-(K*8). Since (K*2) 
requires ( A  > B) E K then K should contain conditional sentences, contrary to 
our assumption that K is propositional. The so called "Gardenfor's triviality 
theorem" or "impossibility theorem" [Gardenfors, 1986; Rott, 19891 shows that 
the AGM revision operation becomes trivial when it is applied to conditional 
theories whose conditional sentences are interpreted with the Ramsey test. No 
sound conclusions about iterated change can be derived from CO nor DFT from 
this interpretation. 
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Conclusions 
In this thesis we have argued that although AGM functions provide coherent 
change operations for single theories separately, these change operations are not 
necessarily jointly coherent. We have regarded this as a serious limitation of the 
AGM formalism and the work in this thesis has been devoted to overcome this 
limitation. 
According to the AGM theory, the change of one theory may be unrelated 
to the change of another. For this reason, we have posed that standard AGM 
functions are better regarded as unary functions relative to an underlying theory, 
which take a formula and return an updated theory. 
In this thesis we have defined authentic binary functions for theory change 
and we have argued that they solve the problem of change in different theories. 
Being definitionally simple they also solve, to some extent, the problem of it- 
erated change. Since binary functions are defined for every theory, the result 
of one application of a change function is a theory that can yet be put as an 
argument of the same change function. Consequently, the scheme for iterated 
change induced by binary functions is deterministic with respect to their argu- 
ments. This behaviour has been interpreted as a lack of historic memory, which 
is not always desirable in a model of iterated change. 
We have started our study of binary functions with two exceptions in the 
AGM theory, which satisfy a number of elegant properties, AGM expansions 
and full meet functions. We have continued with a distinctive binary operation 
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 
for theory change outside the AGM framework: Katsuno and Mendelzon's u p  
date. In contrast to the AGM tradition, Katsuno and Mendelzon formalized 
their update operation as a binary connective in a finite language. We have 
shown that nothing crucial relies on this formal difference, as it is possible to 
reformulate the update operator as a binary function that takes a theory and 
a formula and returns a theory. However, we have exhibited an unexpected 
result. Katsuno and Mendezon's postulates are incomplete to characterize the 
update function for infinite propositional languages. We have provided an a p  
propriate set of postulates, strengthening theirs, and proved the corresponding 
representation theorem for possibly infinite propositional languages. In this way 
we have extended Katsuno and Mendelzon's original work just defined for the 
finite case. Our results complete and clarify those of [peppas and Williams, 
19951, who realized that Katsuno and Mendlezon's framework was incomplete 
for first order languages. In addition, we have put the AGM revision and u p  
date in an even definitional basis that may allow for a better comparison or 
understanding, when the nature of their difference is still an open question in 
the philosophical logic literature. 
We have given two different formulations extending the AGM framework, 
iterable AGM functions and analytic AGM functions. We have proposed them 
as plausible candidates for changing multiple theories, and we have also shown 
that they satisfy significant properties of iterated change. We have defined both 
functions for possibly infinite languages and in both cases we have provided 
postulates extending AGM's and given representation theorems for different 
formal structures. 
We have defined iterable AGM functions with the peculiar property of being 
almost constant on their first argument, the second argument held fixed. In 
spite of their quite simple definition they provide a strong notion of coherence 
with respect to the change in different theories. According to iterable functions, 
the change in one theory depends on the change of the largest theory, the whole 
language. We have shown that they satisfy a number of significant properties 
that have been presented in the literature. 
Analytic AGM functions have been defined as almost monotone functions on 
their first argument (the other held fixed) without being almost constant. As 
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AGM functions for changing multiple theories we have shown that they possess a 
significant property. The analytic change operation can be calculated by means 
of a case analysis, such that if one theory is an extension of another the cases 
considered for the first can be lift to the cases for the second. In addition, we 
have defined and characterized maxi-analytic AGM functions that when applied 
to a consistent complete theory they also return a consistent complete theory. 
But analytic AGM revisions have also another interest. We have shown 
that they provide a formal connection with the update function of Katsuno and 
Mendelzon. Analytic functions provide a new presentation of AGM revision 
based on the update semantic apparatus establishing in such a way a bridge 
between the two seemingly incomparable frameworks. 
Finally, we have studied and compared two conditional logics that provide a 
logical calculus for theory change, Alchourr6n's logic DFT and Boutilier's logic 
CO. By appealing to the notion of consequence, the two logics can be used to 
calculate changes in different different theories. We have revealed the connection 
between the two logics showing that in a restricted language, the two logics 
validate the same conditional sentences. Hence, under appropriate restricting 
conditions the two logics are equivalent. In addition we have identified the 
scheme of iterated change induced by the nested occurrences of the conditional 
connective in the two logics and we have shown that it yields a trivial notion of 
iterated change. 
8.1 Further Work 
Iterable functions and analytic functions are just two instances of binary AGM 
functions, and there is possibly a whole landscape of binary functions that 
remains to be considered. Iterable and analytic functions can be regarded as two 
extreme poles. The result of an iterable revision is either an expansion or just 
the result of revising to the largest theory, the whole language. In contrast, the 
result of an analytic revision of some theory is always dependent on the revision 
of each of its maximal consistent extensions. It may be possible to define binary 
functions that stay in between the two. 
In a different perspective, we believe that our analytic AGM functions can be 
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a definitional basis for merge operators [~uhrmann and Hansson, 19941. In their 
most general form they are n-ary functions taking n theories and returning a 
theory, o : Kn -+ K ,  and this path of investigation has hardly been addressed. 
Given the link existing between conditionals and theory change, as pursued 
for example by [Grahne, 1991] and [~outilier, 19961, it seems interesting to 
investigate conditional logics for our frameworks. In such logics our binary 
functions would become connectives in the object language and only finitely 
axiomatizable theories would be considered. The iteration of our functions 
would be reflected as logical formulae with nested occurrences of the change 
operators. Presumably this logic would provide further light on new properties 
of binary functions and establish a closer link between theory change and the 
field of conditional logics. 
In this thesis we have not addressed the problem of change functions of con- 
ditional theories. A conclusive result, known as Gardenfors impossibility the* 
rem [1986] has showed that AGM revisions operating on a conditional language 
are incompatible with the Ramsey test for interpreting conditionals. There is 
considerable work in the literature on how to deal with the impossibility the- 
orem, proposing either to weaken the Rarnsey test or alter the properties of 
revisions [Gardenfors, 1987; Gkdenfors et al., 1991; Rott, 1989; Levi, 1988; 
Boutilier and Goldszmidt, 1993; Hansson, 19921 . But, whatever be the solution 
to this dilemma, the notion of change in a conditional theory seems to be best 
modeled via binary functions. In their most general form they would take a con- 
ditional theory and a conditional formula and they would return a conditional 
theory. In the context of conditional theories the property of historic memory 
seems to play no role, for what binary functions would provide the appropriate 
notion of change in multiple theories and iterated change. 
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